FIRST TC 2002 John Kristoff - DePaul University 1 Local Network Attacks John Kristoff +1 312 362-5878 DePaul University Chicago, IL 60604.

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Presentation transcript:

FIRST TC 2002 John Kristoff - DePaul University 1 Local Network Attacks John Kristoff DePaul University Chicago, IL 60604

FIRST TC 2002 John Kristoff - DePaul University 1 Agenda Overview Theoretical and example attacks How to resist (if possible) local network attacks References Tools

FIRST TC 2002 John Kristoff - DePaul University 1 Overview Local network attacks target an internal network Some attacks can be launched remotely Most do not monitor or guard against local attacks Ultimately everything is a physical security problem

FIRST TC 2002 John Kristoff - DePaul University 1 Theoretical and Example Attacks ARP LAN Bridge/Switch Routing DHCP Multicast Other

FIRST TC 2002 John Kristoff - DePaul University 1 ARP-based Attacks ARP request spoofing Responders to a request cache the sender's info As do others who already have the sender's info ARP update spoofing (gratutious ARP) Thinking out loud: Is UNARP widely used? Can we attack with it? Can we poison ARP entries to = group address?

FIRST TC 2002 John Kristoff - DePaul University 1 Preventing ARP-based Attacks Use LAN switches with one port per end host Enable port security to limit source MAC addresses Use 802.1x port authentication Enable (get) knobs on end hosts to validate ARPs How to best do this? Monitor LAN bridge/switch address tables Monitor router ARP tables Keep history of address/ARP tables FYI... vendors must support knobs (at line rate)

FIRST TC 2002 John Kristoff - DePaul University 1 LAN Bridge/Switch Attacks Overflow MAC address tables to cause flooding Typical gear can hold a few thousand addresses MAC addresses = 48 bits or >> a few thousand Spoof spanning tree BPDU messages Take over as root/designated bridge Cause continuous topology recomputations Forge VLAN, priority or aggregation tags Spoof PAUSE (flow control) frames (gig only)

FIRST TC 2002 John Kristoff - DePaul University 1 Preventing LAN Bridge Attacks Monitor MAC address tables Manually set root bridge and monitor Use knobs like Cisco's BPDU and Root Guard Manually set and prune trunked switch ports Use 802.1x port authentication

FIRST TC 2002 John Kristoff - DePaul University 1 Routing Attacks Route injection Route monitoring Route redirection Route process DDoS attack Note, other types of local attacks may target routers

FIRST TC 2002 John Kristoff - DePaul University 1 Preventing Routing Attacks Strongly authenticate all routing updates/packets Listen/send routing packets where there are routers Protect processes and access (ports, IPs, physical) Monitor routing Table size (especially changes over time) Checksum values and LSA counts in OSPF Flaps, deaggreation, traffic patterns Build baseline network map (ala Ches's netmapper)

FIRST TC 2002 John Kristoff - DePaul University 1 DHCP Attacks Spoof DHCP requests Spoof DHCP replies (or be a rogue DHCP server) Thinking out loud: Can we spoof DHCP releases?

FIRST TC 2002 John Kristoff - DePaul University 1 Preventing DHCP Attacks Monitor DHCP discover/lease activity Monitor DHCP discovers, requests and offers Clients broadcast request, contains server IP Can monitor DHCP packets and contents at: DHCP servers Router edges Use intra-VLAN knobs (e.g. Cisco's intra-VACL)

FIRST TC 2002 John Kristoff - DePaul University 1 Multicast Attacks Spoof IGMP queries and take over as Querier Spoof IGMP reports (joins) There are /4 IP multicast groups Spoof or simply generate group traffic Thinking out load: Can a default querier(s) be configured on hosts? Ala DHCP option or just set to default gw How to better authenticate group participation? Will we see intentional multicast based attacks?

FIRST TC 2002 John Kristoff - DePaul University 1 Preventing Multicast Attacks Monitor IGMP querier on router edges Monitor IP multicast group usage on edges Monitor IP multicate routing state changes Heavily filter IP multicast group state, allow just: / / /14 (internal only if used) 233.xx.yy.0/8 (GLOP space) Then filter out bogus groups in above ranges

FIRST TC 2002 John Kristoff - DePaul University 1 Other Attacks HSRP/VRRP - use MD5 auth and/or IPSEC Wireless - better authentication needed! See my first-teams post about finding APs ICMP redirect, SQ, router adv. - easily fixed Time sync - who is getting time from who? IPv6 - potential problems with discovery/autoconf?

FIRST TC 2002 John Kristoff - DePaul University 1 References Layer 2 Attacks and Their Mitigation, Cisco Networkers 2002 presentation or Hacking Layer 2: Fun with Ethernet Switches, Blackhat 2002 Directed IGMP Report vulnerability: Making Multicast Hard (How to ward off DOS & other threats), Marshall Eubanks, IETF 51 Gigabit Ethernet and The Switch Book, both by Rich Seifert

FIRST TC 2002 John Kristoff - DePaul University 1 Tools Cammer from Tobias Oetiker (MRTG/RRDTool) At ARPTrack cislog RouteCheck I hope to do more (particularly multicast related) We also have an unreleased AP MAC/IP tracker