Robustness of complex networks with the local protection strategy against cascading failures Jianwei Wang Adviser: Frank,Yeong-Sung Lin Present by Wayne.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Marzieh Parandehgheibi
Advertisements

RESILIENCE NOTIONS FOR SCALE-FREE NETWORKS GUNES ERCAL JOHN MATTA 1.
School of Information University of Michigan Network resilience Lecture 20.
Information Networks Generative processes for Power Laws and Scale-Free networks Lecture 4.
1 Finite-Length Scaling and Error Floors Abdelaziz Amraoui Andrea Montanari Ruediger Urbanke Tom Richardson.
Farnoush Banaei-Kashani and Cyrus Shahabi Criticality-based Analysis and Design of Unstructured P2P Networks as “ Complex Systems ” Mohammad Al-Rifai.
Cascading failures in interdependent networks and financial systems -- Departmental Seminar Xuqing Huang Advisor: Prof. H. Eugene Stanley Collaborators:
Directional triadic closure and edge deletion mechanism induce asymmetry in directed edge properties.
University of Buffalo The State University of New York Spatiotemporal Data Mining on Networks Taehyong Kim Computer Science and Engineering State University.
1 Epidemic Spreading in Real Networks: an Eigenvalue Viewpoint Yang Wang Deepayan Chakrabarti Chenxi Wang Christos Faloutsos.
A New Force-Directed Graph Drawing Method Based on Edge- Edge Repulsion Chun-Cheng Lin and Hsu-Chen Yen Department of Electrical Engineering, National.
Fault-tolerant Adaptive Divisible Load Scheduling Xuan Lin, Sumanth J. V. Acknowledge: a few slides of DLT are from Thomas Robertazzi ’ s presentation.
Continuum Crowds Adrien Treuille, Siggraph 王上文.
Correctness of Gossip-Based Membership under Message Loss Maxim Gurevich, Idit Keidar Technion.
Models of Influence in Online Social Networks
Game theoretic models for detecting network intrusions OPLab 1.
Analyzing the Vulnerability of Superpeer Networks Against Churn and Attack Niloy Ganguly Department of Computer Science & Engineering Indian Institute.
Epidemic spreading in complex networks: from populations to the Internet Maziar Nekovee, BT Research Y. Moreno, A. Paceco (U. Zaragoza) A. Vespignani (LPT-
(Social) Networks Analysis III Prof. Dr. Daning Hu Department of Informatics University of Zurich Oct 16th, 2012.
An Evaluation model of botnet based on peer to peer Gao Jian KangFeng ZHENG,YiXian Yang,XinXin Niu 2012 Fourth International Conference on Computational.
Developing Analytical Framework to Measure Robustness of Peer-to-Peer Networks Niloy Ganguly.
Fundamentals of Data Analysis Lecture 4 Testing of statistical hypotheses.
Wei Gao1 and Qinghua Li2 1The University of Tennessee, Knoxville
ANALYZING PROTEIN NETWORK ROBUSTNESS USING GRAPH SPECTRUM Jingchun Chen The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio Institute.
NTU GICE Intentional Attacks on Complex Network Speaker: Shin-Ming Cheng Advisor: Kwang-Cheng Chen.
GRID’2012 Dubna July 19, 2012 Dependable Job-flow Dispatching and Scheduling in Virtual Organizations of Distributed Computing Environments Victor Toporkov.
Clustering of protein networks: Graph theory and terminology Scale-free architecture Modularity Robustness Reading: Barabasi and Oltvai 2004, Milo et al.
A Clustering Algorithm based on Graph Connectivity Balakrishna Thiagarajan Computer Science and Engineering State University of New York at Buffalo.
Network Survivability Against Region Failure Signal Processing, Communications and Computing (ICSPCC), 2011 IEEE International Conference on Ran Li, Xiaoliang.
Gennaro Cordasco - How Much Independent Should Individual Contacts be to Form a Small-World? - 19/12/2006 How Much Independent Should Individual Contacts.
Analyzing the Vulnerability of Superpeer Networks Against Attack B. Mitra (Dept. of CSE, IIT Kharagpur, India), F. Peruani(ZIH, Technical University of.
1 Efficient Obstacle-Avoiding Rectilinear Steiner Tree Construction Chung-Wei Lin, Szu-Yu Chen, Chi-Feng Li, Yao-Wen Chang, Chia-Lin Yang National Taiwan.
Complex network of the brain II Hubs and Rich clubs in the brain
Sections 7-1 and 7-2 Review and Preview and Estimating a Population Proportion.
Secure and Energy-Efficient Disjoint Multi-Path Routing for WSNs Presented by Zhongming Zheng.
Percolation Processes Rajmohan Rajaraman Northeastern University, Boston May 2012 Chennai Network Optimization WorkshopPercolation Processes1.
Analyzing the Vulnerability of Superpeer Networks Against Attack Niloy Ganguly Department of Computer Science & Engineering Indian Institute of Technology,
O PTIMAL SERVICE TASK PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTION IN GRID SYSTEM WITH STAR TOPOLOGY G REGORY L EVITIN, Y UAN -S HUN D AI Adviser: Frank, Yeong-Sung Lin.
Optimal Resource Allocation for Protecting System Availability against Random Cyber Attack International Conference Computer Research and Development(ICCRD),
Mitigation strategies on scale-free networks against cascading failures Jianwei Wang Adviser: Frank,Yeong-Sung Lin Present by Chris Chang.
Lecture 10: Network models CS 765: Complex Networks Slides are modified from Networks: Theory and Application by Lada Adamic.
Author: Tadeusz Sawik Decision Support Systems Volume 55, Issue 1, April 2013, Pages 156–164 Adviser: Frank, Yeong-Sung Lin Presenter: Yi-Cin Lin.
1 Presented by Sarbagya Buddhacharya. 2 Increasing bandwidth demand in telecommunication networks is satisfied by WDM networks. Dimensioning of WDM networks.
Measuring Behavioral Trust in Social Networks
JEHN-RUEY JIANG, GUAN-YI SUNG, JIH-WEI WU NATIONAL CENTRAL UNIVERSITY, TAIWAN PRESENTED BY PROF. JEHN-RUEY JIANG LOM: A LEADER ORIENTED MATCHMAKING ALGORITHM.
Network resilience.
Brief Announcement : Measuring Robustness of Superpeer Topologies Niloy Ganguly Department of Computer Science & Engineering Indian Institute of Technology,
An Effective Method to Improve the Resistance to Frangibility in Scale-free Networks Kaihua Xu HuaZhong Normal University.
Mix networks with restricted routes PET 2003 Mix Networks with Restricted Routes George Danezis University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory Privacy Enhancing.
1 11 Distributed Channel Assignment in Multi-Radio Mesh Networks Bong-Jun Ko, Vishal Misra, Jitendra Padhye and Dan Rubenstein Columbia University.
A Bandwidth Scheduling Algorithm Based on Minimum Interference Traffic in Mesh Mode Xu-Yajing, Li-ZhiTao, Zhong-XiuFang and Xu-HuiMin International Conference.
Urban Traffic Simulated From A Dual Perspective Hu Mao-Bin University of Science and Technology of China Hefei, P.R. China
Resource Distribution in Multiple Attacks Against a Single Target Author: Gregory Levitin,Kjell Hausken Risk Analysis, Vol. 30, No. 8, 2010.
Network Partition –Finding modules of the network. Graph Clustering –Partition graphs according to the connectivity. –Nodes within a cluster is highly.
An Improved Acquaintance Immunization Strategy for Complex Network.
Presented by Yu-Shun Wang Advisor: Frank, Yeong-Sung Lin Near Optimal Defense Strategies to Minimize Attackers’ Success Probabilities for networks of Honeypots.
Network Dynamics and Simulation Science Laboratory Structural Analysis of Electrical Networks Jiangzhuo Chen Joint work with Karla Atkins, V. S. Anil Kumar,
Biao Wang 1, Ge Chen 1, Luoyi Fu 1, Li Song 1, Xinbing Wang 1, Xue Liu 2 1 Shanghai Jiao Tong University 2 McGill University
Fundamentals of Data Analysis Lecture 4 Testing of statistical hypotheses pt.1.
Cascading failures of loads in interconnected networks under intentional attack Yongxiang Xia Department of Information Science and Electronic Engineering.
Complex network of the brain II Attack tolerance vs. Lethality Jaeseung Jeong, Ph.D. Department of Bio and Brain Engineering, KAIST.
1 Link Privacy in Social Networks Aleksandra Korolova, Rajeev Motwani, Shubha U. Nabar CIKM’08 Advisor: Dr. Koh, JiaLing Speaker: Li, HueiJyun Date: 2009/3/30.
Algorithms and Computational Biology Lab, Department of Computer Science and & Information Engineering, National Taiwan University, Taiwan Network Biology.
Complex network of the brain II Hubs and Rich clubs in the brain Jaeseung Jeong, Ph.D. Department of Bio and Brain Engineering, KAIST.
Cmpe 588- Modeling of Internet Emergence of Scale-Free Network with Chaotic Units Pulin Gong, Cees van Leeuwen by Oya Ünlü Instructor: Haluk Bingöl.
Epidemic Profiles and Defense of Scale-Free Networks L. Briesemeister, P. Lincoln, P. Porras Presented by Meltem Yıldırım CmpE
Random Walk for Similarity Testing in Complex Networks
IMSWT2012 Conference Ship Fire-fighting System Cascading Failure Analysis Based on Complex Network Theory Speaker: Hongzhang Jin Affiliation: Harbin.
Maximizing MAC Throughputs by Dynamic RTS-CTS Threshold
复杂网络可控性 研究进展 汪秉宏 2014 北京 网络科学论坛.
Presentation transcript:

Robustness of complex networks with the local protection strategy against cascading failures Jianwei Wang Adviser: Frank,Yeong-Sung Lin Present by Wayne Hsiao

Agenda  Introduction  The mitigation strategy  Simulation analysis of the mitigation strategy  Theoretical analysis of cascading model  Conclusion

Agenda  Introduction  The mitigation strategy  Simulation analysis of the mitigation strategy  Theoretical analysis of cascading model  Conclusion

Introduction  There has been a lot of research related with the robustness and stability of networks  Great efforts have been dedicated to the research on cascading failures  Cascading failures induced by targeted attacks and random failures can occur in many natural and man- made systems

Introduction  Cascading failures are generally induced by random failures or intentional attacks on a few nodes and take frequently place on the single and non-interacting networks.  Earlier studies on cascading failures mainly focus on the cascading modeling  the cascade control and defense strategies  the attack strategies  the cascading phenomena in the diverse networks

Introduction  Most works on cascading failures from the single network to coupled networks have focused only on the modeling of cascading failure, the cascade control and defense strategies, or a fundamental property of coupled networks without considering the load.  There are few works about investigating how by the extra protection strategies of the neighboring nodes of an overload node to enhance the robustness of complex networks against cascading failures.

Introduction  In many infrastructure networks, when a node overloads, its neighboring nodes can provide some protection resources to avoid its failure

Introduction  We propose a new mitigation method  Protection strategy provided by the neighboring nodes of an overload node  Without changing the total protection capacities of the whole network  Numerically investigate its effectiveness on improving the robustness of BA scale-free networks (Barabasi and Albert, 1999) against cascading failures and find that the simple local protection method can dramatically optimize the resilience of BA networks.  We examine the effectiveness of the mitigation strategy on improving the robustness of the power grid against cascading failures and give the optimal protection strategy to avoid potential cascading failures

Agenda  Introduction  The mitigation strategy  Simulation analysis of the mitigation strategy  Theoretical analysis of cascading model  Conclusion

The mitigation strategy  In general, a simple network can be represented by an undirected and unweighted graph G = (V, E)  In previous studies, the rule that the overload nodes are immediately removed from the network is widely adopted  When the load on a node exceeds its capacity, whether there exist some strategies to maintain its normal and efficient functioning to avoid the cascading propagation or not?

The mitigation strategy  In realistic networks, for example in traffic networks, when a traffic intersection saturates, traffic police can ease the traffic flows  Considering that the neighboring nodes of an overload node may provide some protection resources to this overload node to maintain its normal and efficient functioning, we propose a local protection method

The mitigation strategy  when the load on node i exceeds its capacity, we define the extra capacity received by node i from its neighboring nodes to

The mitigation strategy  The expression Cm - Lm ensures that node m can handle the initial load on it after providing some protection resources to node i.  In this mitigation strategy, we can see that the total price of the whole network is not changed.

The mitigation strategy  Cascading model  The initial load Li on node i in a network is defined as  The capacity Ci of node i is defined as  After node i fails, the additional load received by node j, one of its neighboring nodes, is proportional to its initial load

The mitigation strategy  According to the protection strategy, at t time, when the load on node i exceeds its capacity, the capacity Ci,t of node i can dynamically be adjusted to  The capacities of the neighboring nodes of node i can simultaneously be adjusted to

The mitigation strategy  Our aim is to investigate the effect of the capacity adjustment on the network robustness  Here we only focus on the cascading propagation induced by removing a single node  A failed node can lead to the load redistribution, and then cascading failures may occur  This process will be repeated until the load of all nodes is less than their capacities, and at this moment, cascading failures can be considered to be completed

The mitigation strategy  We quantify the effectiveness of the mitigation strategy on improving the network robustness against cascading failures by two measures  The avalanche size S  The proportion P(S)  Represents the proportion between the number of the protected nodes after adopting the mitigation method and the number of the broken nodes induced before adopting the mitigation strategy

Agenda  Introduction  The mitigation strategy  Simulation analysis of the mitigation strategy  Theoretical analysis of cascading model  Conclusion

Simulation analysis of the mitigation strategy  We firstly investigate the effectiveness of the mitigation strategy on improving the robustness of the scale-free networks against cascading failures  The degree distribution of the scale-free networks satisfies a power law form:  the scale-free network is generated by using the standard Barabasi–Albert model

Simulation analysis of the mitigation strategy  In computer simulations  The network size N is equal to 5000  Average degree is 4

Simulation analysis of the mitigation strategy  Numerical results are obtained by averaging over 50 experiments on 10 independent networks  The mitigation areas marked show that the robustness of BA networks against cascading failures can be improved dramatically

Simulation analysis of the mitigation strategy  By computer simulations, we observe that the parameter p plays an important role in the effective control of cascading failure  We also find that the average avalanche size S after and before adopting the protection strategy shows the threshold- like behaviors marked by the critical threshold β c  The critical threshold is widely applied to many cascading models and can quantify the network robustness against cascading failures  The smaller the value of β c, the stronger the network robustness, and the lower the price of the whole network

Simulation analysis of the mitigation strategy  In two cases of p = 0.5 and p = 0.9, we can observe that BA networks can obtain the strongest robust level against cascading failures when α 0.8

Simulation analysis of the mitigation strategy  As the value α increases, according to the proportion P(S), the improvement of the robustness of BA networks is bigger and bigger.

Simulation analysis of the mitigation strategy  We simply apply two attacks :  attacking the nodes with the highest load (HL)  attacking the ones with the lowest load (LL)  By the normalized average avalanche size S attack, we quantify the network robustness after and before adopting the mitigation strategy, of which  In computer simulations, for both the HL and the LL, we choose 50 nodes as the attacked objects and numerical results are obtained by averaging over 50 experiments on 10 independent networks

Simulation analysis of the mitigation strategy  For the HL and the LL, we observe that  The mitigation strategy can dramatically enhance the network robustness against cascading failures  The bigger the value p, the stronger the network robustness

Simulation analysis of the mitigation strategy  We find that the effectiveness orders of the mitigation method in two attacks are different  As the value α increases, in the LL the protection method is more and more effective, while in the HL, the case is the opposite

Simulation analysis of the mitigation strategy  We apply the protection method to the power grid  with 4941 nodes and 6594 edges  We also observe that the robustness level of the power grid against cascading failures can obtain the significant improvement and that and the effect of the value p on the cascading propagation

Simulation analysis of the mitigation strategy  As the value α increases, the protection method is more and more effective

Simulation analysis of the mitigation strategy

Agenda  Introduction  The mitigation strategy  Simulation analysis of the mitigation strategy  Theoretical analysis of cascading model  Conclusion

Theoretical analysis of cascading model  After adopting the mitigation strategy, we analyze the correlation between the parameter α and the critical threshold β c in BA network  Our aim is to seek for the minimal value β c

Theoretical analysis of cascading model  Therefore, after node i, we assume the load on its neighboring node j fails to exceed its capacity  The extra capacity received by node j can further protect node j  According to the capacity and the extra capacity of node j, to avoid the cascading propagation induced by the load redistribution on node i, the neighboring node j of node i should satisfy

Theoretical analysis of cascading model  So, the above inequality is represented as

Theoretical analysis of cascading model  Next, we focus on the following two mathematical expectations of the expressions

Theoretical analysis of cascading model  So, the above inequality (6) is simplified to  Analyzing the above inequality (9), we can obtain the critical threshold β c in three ranges of a 1.

Theoretical analysis of cascading model  When the value p is equal to 0, the equation has been verified by Wang et al. (2008)  for p ≠ 0,we first compare the value β c in two cases of α > 1 and α = 1. When α > 1, we have

Theoretical analysis of cascading model  Therefore, according the Eq. (10) and the inequality (12) and the correctness of the Eq. (12), we can get β c ( α > 1) > β c( α = 1).  In the case of a β c ( α =1)

Theoretical analysis of cascading model  We further analyze the effect of the mitigation strategy on the critical threshold β c  We compare the value β c in two cases of p = 0 and p ≠ 0, correspond to not adopting and adopting the mitigation

Theoretical analysis of cascading model  For simplicity, we only calculate the value in the case of α = 1  For a BA network with the finite size, its degree distribution is  Where m is equal to kmin (here kmin = ½ ).  in a BA network can be calculated by

Theoretical analysis of cascading model  In BA networks, k max can be calculated by  Then we can have

Theoretical analysis of cascading model  Therefore, when α = 1, we can get  In computer simulations  the parameter p 0.5  the average degree = 4  the network size N = 5000  We can obtain

Agenda  Introduction  The mitigation strategy  Simulation analysis of the mitigation strategy  Theoretical analysis of cascading model  Conclusion

Conclusion  We propose a method to effectively protect the overload node to avoid its breakdown  Without changing the total price of the whole network  Applying a simple cascading model, we numerically investigate the effectiveness of the mitigation strategy on improving the robustness against cascading failures in BA scale-free networks and the power grid  After applying the mitigation strategy, we obtain the optimal value α, at which both BA networks and the power grid can reach the strongest robust level against cascading failures

Thanks for your listening!