1 802.11 User Fingerprinting Jeffrey Pang 1 Ben Greenstein 2 Ramakrishna Gummadi 3 Srinivasan Seshan 1 David Wetherall 2,4 Presenter: Nan Jiang Most Slides:

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Presentation transcript:

User Fingerprinting Jeffrey Pang 1 Ben Greenstein 2 Ramakrishna Gummadi 3 Srinivasan Seshan 1 David Wetherall 2,4 Presenter: Nan Jiang Most Slides:

2 Motivation: The Mobile Wireless Landscape A well known technical problem –Devices have unique and consistent addresses –e.g., devices have MAC addresses  fingerprinting them is trivial! MAC address now: 00:0E:35:CE:1F:59 MAC address later: 00:0E:35:CE:1F:59 Adversary tcpdump time

3 Motivation: The Mobile Wireless Landscape The widely proposed techical solution –Pseudonyms: Change addresses over time : Gruteser ’05, Hu ’06, Jiang ’07 Bluetooth: Stajano ’05 RFID: Juels ‘04 GSM: already employed MAC address now: 00:0E:35:CE:1F:59 MAC address later: 00:AA:BB:CC:DD:EE tcpdump ? time

4 Motivation: The Mobile Wireless Landscape Our work shows: Pseudonyms are not enough –Implicit identifiers: identifying characteristics of traffic –E.G., most users identified with 90% accuracy in hotspots 00:0E:35:CE:1F:5900:AA:BB:CC:DD:EE tcpdump Search: “Bob’s Home Net” Packets  Intel Server … Search: “Bob’s Home Net” Packets  Intel Server … time

5 Contributions Four Novel Implicit Identifiers Automated Identification Procedure Evaluating Implicit Identifier Accuracy

6 Contributions Four Novel Implicit Identifiers Automated Identification Procedure Evaluating Implicit Identifier Accuracy

7 Implicit Identifiers by Example Implicit identifier: network destinations –IP pairs in network traffic –Some nearly-unique destinations repeatedly visited (e.g., server) SSH/IMAP server: tcpdump ? time SSH/IMAP server: ?

8 Implicit Identifiers by Example Implicit identifier: SSIDs in probes –Set of SSIDs in probe requests –Many drivers search for preferred networks –Usually networks you have associated with before SSID Probe: “roofnet” User of “roofnet” tcpdump ?

9 Implicit Identifiers by Example Implicit identifier: broadcast packet sizes –Set of broadcast packet sizes in network traffic –E.g., Windows machines NetBIOS naming advertisements; FileMaker and Microsoft Office advertise themselves Broadcast pkt sizes: 239, 245, 257 tcpdump ? time Broadcast pkt sizes: 239, 245, 257

10 Implicit Identifiers by Example Implicit identifier: MAC protocol fields –Header bits (e.g., power management., order) –Supported rates –Offered authentication algorithms tcpdump ? time Protocol Fields: 11,4,2,1Mbps, WEP Protocol Fields: 11,4,2,1Mbps, WEP

11 Implicit Identifier Summary Networks: PublicHomeEnterprise Network destinations SSIDs in probes Broadcast pkt sizes MAC protocol fields Visible even with WEP/WPA TKIP encryption More implicit identifiers exist Identifying even if devices have identical drivers

12 Contributions Four Novel Implicit Identifiers Automated Identification Procedure Evaluating Implicit Identifier Accuracy

13 Tracking Users Tracking scenario: –Every users changes pseudonyms every hour –Adversary monitors some locations  One hourly traffic sample from each user in each location ? ? ? tcpdump Build a profile from training samples: First collect some traffic known to be from user X and from random others tcpdump..... ? ? ? Then classify observation samples Traffic at 2-3PM Traffic at 3-4PM Traffic at 4-5PM Traffic at 2-3PM Traffic at 3-4PM Traffic at 4-5PM Traffic at 2-3PM Traffic at 3-4PM Traffic at 4-5PM

14 Sample Classification Algorithm Core question: –Did traffic sample s come from user X? A simple approach: naïve Bayes classifier –Derive probabilistic model from training samples –Given s with features F, answer “yes” if: Pr[ s from user X | s has features F ] > T for a selected threshold T. –F = feature set derived from implicit identifiers

15 Deriving features F from implicit identifiers Set similarity (Jaccard Index), weighted by frequency: IR_Guest SAMPLE FROM OBSERVATION Sample Classification Algorithm linksys djw SIGCOMM_1 PROFILE FROM TRAINING Rare Common w(e) = low w(e) = high

16 Contributions Four Novel Implicit Identifiers Automated Identification Procedure Evaluating Implicit Identifier Accuracy

17 Evaluating Classification Effectiveness Simulate tracking scenario with wireless traces: –Split each trace into training and observation phases –Simulate pseudonym changes for each user X DurationProfiled UsersTotal Users SIGCOMM conf. (2004) 4 days UCSD office building (2006) 1 day Apartment building (2006) 19 days39196

18 Question: Is observation sample s from user X? Evaluation metrics: –True positive rate (TPR) Fraction of user X’s samples classified correctly –False positive rate (FPR) Fraction of other samples classified incorrectly Evaluating Classification Effectiveness Pr[ s from user X | s has features F ] > T

19 Evaluating Classification Effectiveness

20 Results: Individual Feature Accuracy TPR  60% TPR  30% Individual implicit identifiers give evidence of identity 1.0

21 Results: Individual Feature Accuracy Individual implicit identifiers give evidence of identity TPR  50% Other implicit identifiers distinguish groups of users

22 Results: Individual Feature Accuracy Some users more distinguishable than others netdests: ~60% users identified >50% of the time ~20% users identified >90% of the time

23 Results: Multiple Feature Accuracy Users with TPR >50%: Public: 63% Home: 31% Enterprise: 27% We can identify many users in all environments PublicHomeEnterprise netdests ssids bcast fields

24 Results: Multiple Feature Accuracy Some users much more distinguishable than others Public networks: ~20% users identified >90% of the time PublicHomeEnterprise netdests ssids bcast fields

25 Results: Tracking with 90% Accuracy Majority of users can be identified if active long enough Of 268 users (71%): 75% identified with ≤4 samples 50% identified with ≤3 samples 25% identified with ≤2 samples

26 Results: Tracking with 90% Accuracy Many users can be identified in all environments

27 Conclusions Implicit identifiers can accurately identify users –Individual implicit identifiers give evidence of identity –We can identify many users in all environments –Some users much more distinguishable than others Understanding implicit identifiers is important –Pseudonyms are not enough Eliminating them poses research challenges