Quantum Cryptography Zelam Ngo, David McGrogan. Motivation Age of Information Information is valuable Protecting that Information.

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Presentation transcript:

Quantum Cryptography Zelam Ngo, David McGrogan

Motivation Age of Information Information is valuable Protecting that Information

Quantum Security Benefits Provably Secure Evidence of Tampering

History Stephen Wiesner wrote “Conjugate Coding” in the late sixties Charles H. Bennett and Gilles Brassard revived the field in 1982 by combining quantum process with public key cryptography.

Fundamentals Measurement causes perturbation No Cloning Theorem Thus, measuring the qubit in the wrong basis destroys the information.

BB84 Set-up Alice Has the ability to create qubits in two orthogonal bases Bob Has the ability to measure qubits in those two bases.

BB84 Alice Encodes her information randomly in one of the two bases… For example, Basis ABasis B ᅵ0〉= 0ᅵ+〉= 0 ᅵ1〉= 1ᅵ-〉= 1

BB84 Alice prepares 16 bits in the following bases, BAABAABAAAABBBBA Thus the following states are sent to Bob:

BB84 Bob receives the stream of qubits and measures each one in a random basis: ABAABAAABABBBBAB Alice’s bits Alice’s bases BAABAABAAAABBBBA States sent

BB84 So Bob gets Alice’s bits Alice’s bases BAABAABAAAABBBBA States sent Bob’s bases ABAABAAABABBBBAB

BB84 Then Alice and Bob compare their measurement bases, not the results, via a public channel. Alice’s bits Alice’s bases BAABAABAAAABBBBA States sent Bob’s bases ABAABAAABABBBBAB Bob’s results

BB84 Bob receives the stream of qubits and measures each one in a random basis: ABAABAAABABBBBAB So he gets, **0**0*0*0*+--** Then Alice and Bob compare their measurement bases, not the results, via a public channel.

BB84 So Bob and Alice are left with 7 useable bits out of 16 _ _ 0 _ _ 0 _ 0 _ 0_ _ _ These bits will be the shared key they use for encryption.

BB84 Now enter Eve… She wants to spy on Alice and Bob. So she intercepts the bit stream from Alice, measures it, and prepares a new bit stream to Bob based on her measurements…

BB84 So how do we know when Eve is being nosy? Well… Eve doesn’t know what bases to measure in, so she would have to measure randomly and 50% of the time she will be wrong…

BB84 Thus, of the bits Bob measures in the correct bases, there is 50% that eve had changed the basis of the bit. And thus it is equally likely that Bob measure 0 or 1 and thus an error is detected 25% of the time. Eve is found in the errors!

BB84 Eve creates a detectable error 25% of the time AliceEveBobResult No measurementGood bit value No measurementDiscarded Good value, Eve gains information 50% chance Eve creates an error Discarded

BB84 In a world with perfect transmissions, all Bob and Alice have to do is publicly compare a few bits to determine if any error exists. Errors exist in reality, thus the only way to detect Eve is to notice an increase in errors. Thus the transmission process must not have an error rate higher than 25%.

BB84 Alice’s transmitter might sent multiple photons, which Eve could skim Standard Encryption enhancing protocols can prevent Eve from gaining partial information

BB84 Eve creates a detectable error 25% of the time:

EPR Uses entangled qubits sent from a central source Alice and Bob measure qubits randomly and independently After measuring, they compare measurement bases and proceed as in BB84

EPR Advantage over BB84 is that Eve can now be detected using rejected qubits Eve causes non-violation of Bell inequality – Eve’s measurement is a hidden variable

B92 Uses only two non-orthogonal states: ᅵ θ 〉and ᅵ θ’ 〉 Polarized at θ and –θ from vertical 0 < θ < π/4

B92 Example at θ= π/8 : Encoding:Decoding:

B92 Each bit is either successfully received or an “erasure” Best measurement protocol gives erasure probability of | 〈 θ | θ’ 〉 | = cos(2 θ)

B92 Eve’s presence revealed by: High error rate High erasure rate Erasure rate increase can be avoided; result is then like BB84

Current State of Affairs Commercial quantum key distribution products exist

Current State of Affairs Current fiber- based distance record: 200 km (Takesue et al)

Current State of Affairs Demonstrated free-space link: 10 km

Future Prospects Ground-to-satellite, satellite-to-satellite links General improvement with evolving qubit-handling techniques, new detector technologies