The Evolution of Trading and Military Strategies: An Agent-Based Simulation 1 August 2003 David L. Rousseau Assistant Professor Department of Political.

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The Evolution of Trading and Military Strategies: An Agent-Based Simulation 1 August 2003 David L. Rousseau Assistant Professor Department of Political Science 235 Stiteler Hall University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia, PA Phone: (215) Fax: (215) and Max Cantor Department of Political Science and the School of Engineering and Applied Science University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia, PA Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 28-31, 2003, Philadelphia, PA. Please send comments to the first author. This file contains the simulation figures from Rousseau and Cantor (2003). The remaining figures appear in the text of the paper.

Figure 8: Output From The Baseline Model A) Distribution of traits in the landscape at iteration 1000 (Attribute=1 shown in black). B) Distribution of War shown by black lines connecting nodes. C) Distribution of Trade shown by green lines connecting nodes. F) Change in the Percentage of States Having Traits 1, 2, 12, &13 Across Time. G) Average Number of Wars, Trade, and Gini Coefficient Across Time D) Spatial Distribution of Wealth (Blue above 1000 and Red Below 1000 Power Unites)

Figure 10: H1: Increasing the Gains From Trade A) Distribution of traits in the landscape at iteration 1000 (Attribute=1 shown in black). B) Distribution of War shown by black lines connecting nodes. C) Distribution of Trade shown by green lines connecting nodes. F) Change in the Percentage of States Having a Traits 1, 2, 12, &13 Across Time. G) Average Number of Wars, Trade, and Gini Coefficient Across Time D) Spatial Distribution of Wealth (Blue above 1000 and Red Below 1000 Power Unites)

Figure 11: H2: Offense Dominance A) Distribution of traits in the landscape at iteration 1000 (Attribute=1 shown in black). B) Distribution of War shown by black lines connecting nodes. C) Distribution of Trade shown by green lines connecting nodes. G) Average Number of Wars, Trade, and Gini Coefficient Across Time D) Spatial Distribution of Wealth (Blue above 1000 and Red Below 1000 Power Unites) F) Change in the Percentage of States Having a Traits 1, 2, 12, &13 Across Time.

Figure 12: H3: Permitting Trade with Non-Neighbors A) Distribution of traits in the landscape at iteration 1000 (Attribute=1 shown in black). B) Distribution of War shown by black lines connecting nodes. C) Distribution of Trade shown by green lines connecting nodes. G) Average Number of Wars, Trade, and Gini Coefficient Across Time D) Spatial Distribution of Wealth (Blue above 1000 and Red Below 1000 Power Unites) F) Change in the Percentage of States Having a Traits 1, 2, 12, &13 Across Time.

Figure 13: H5: Altering the Exit Payoffs Baseline Model0.10 Exit Payoffs0.90 Exit Payoffs Wars: Line Connections Trades: Line Connections Gene Prevalence Over Time Power Level Relative to Start Trade, War and Inequality Across Time

Figure 14: Absolute versus Relative Payoffs in the Trade Game Absolute PayoffsRelative Payoffs Wars: Line Connections Trades: Line Connections Gene Prevalence Over Time Power Level Relative to Start Trade, War and Inequality Across Time

Figure 15: Rapid Learning Representative Runs A) Distribution of traits in the landscape at iteration 1000 (Attribute=1 shown in black). B) Distribution of War shown by black lines connecting nodes. C) Distribution of Trade shown by green lines connecting nodes. G) Average Number of Wars, Trade, and Gini Coefficient Across Time D) Spatial Distribution of Wealth (Blue above 1000 and Red Below 1000 Power Unites) F) Change in the Percentage of States Having a Traits 1, 2, 12, &13 Across Time.

Figure 16: Simultaneously Raise Trade Benefits and War Costs A) Distribution of traits in the landscape at iteration 1000 (Attribute=1 shown in black). B) Distribution of War shown by black lines connecting nodes. C) Distribution of Trade shown by green lines connecting nodes. G) Average Number of Wars, Trade, and Gini Coefficient Across Time D) Spatial Distribution of Wealth (Blue above 1000 and Red Below 1000 Power Unites) F) Change in the Percentage of States Having a Traits 1, 2, 12, &13 Across Time.

Figure 17: Simultaneously Allow Rapid Learning, Increased Trade Benefits, & Increased War Costs A) Distribution of traits in the landscape at iteration 1000 (Attribute=1 shown in black). B) Distribution of War shown by black lines connecting nodes. C) Distribution of Trade shown by green lines connecting nodes. G) Average Number of Wars, Trade, and Gini Coefficient Across Time D) Spatial Distribution of Wealth (Blue above 1000 and Red Below 1000 Power Unites) F) Change in the Percentage of States Having a Traits 1, 2, 12, &13 Across Time.

Figure 18: Relative Gains, Rapid Learning, Increased Trade Benefits, & Increased War Costs A) Distribution of traits in the landscape at iteration 1000 (Attribute=1 shown in black). B) Distribution of War shown by black lines connecting nodes. C) Distribution of Trade shown by green lines connecting nodes. G) Average Number of Wars, Trade, and Gini Coefficient Across Time D) Spatial Distribution of Wealth (Blue above 1000 and Red Below 1000 Power Unites) F) Change in the Percentage of States Having a Traits 1, 2, 12, &13 Across Time.