Levee Screening Tool - Cedar Right Bank

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
BUILDING STRONG ® Do not include this Slide. This template is a guide for preparing power points presentations. The information requested is important.
Advertisements

Permanent Protection System Opinion of Probable Cost May 2010 Courtesy USACE Photograph Courtesy USACE.
A section has been added regarding Stream Restoration Design Criteria: A. Designs for stream restoration try to mimic natural conditions present in stable.
The Failure of Teton Dam
Click to continue…. Railroad Track wetland Image Date: December 2003.
Sandbagging Techniques
Lower Yellowstone River Diversion Dam Project – Phase II - Physical Modeling of the Rock Ramp BRT, COE, MTAO Update Meeting November 4, 2010.
Fort Bend Flood Management Association Flood Risk Reduction Symposium October 3rd, 2014 (Part-A) Brazos River at San Felipe - USGS Gage Fort Bend County.
US Army Corps of Engineers BUILDING STRONG ® Public Law 84-99, Rehabilitation and Inspection Program Mike deMasi Chief Emergency Management, PL Program.
HSDRRS Wave Overtopping Risk Reduction for Return Events Greater than 100 yr. By: John Monzon, P.E. Flood Protection Division Chief and Rickey Brouillette,
Taylor Creek Park Rehabilitation Project. Taylor Creek Park Rehabilitation In July 2012 a significant storm event caused significant damage in Taylor.
Watershed Dams in Georgia 1. –357 Total –195 High Hazard (NRCS) –NRCS constructed – owned by local sponsors –Most built between 1950s-1970s for flood.
Levee Seepage: Concerns, Evaluations, and Solutions Pete Nix, P. E
June 23, 2011 Southwestern Illinois Council of Mayors.
US Army Corps of Engineers BUILDING STRONG ® Methods for Determining Maximum Flood Elevations Landward of Failed Levees: An Example from the Great Missouri.
Detention / Infiltration Structure. Figure 21–1 Point Discharge and Downstream Stability Analysis Procedure.
Council Bluffs Value Engineering Workshop
The North Carolina Dam Safety Program. Our Responsibilities Administration and enforcement of the Dam Safety Law of 1967 and the supplementary Administrative.
2011 MADCS Conference.  FMA is a tool to help identify:  Priorities for rehabilitation  Improvements for operation, maintenance and data collection.
Welcome Rob Rash CEO/Chief Engineer St
MAINTENANCE PART 2. Inlet free of obstructions Inlet free of obstructions Adequate scour protection provided.
Floodplain Delineation of Indiana Streams Allison Craddock Tom Gormley Jessica Tempest Erin Wenger.
HEC-RAS US Army Corps of Engineers Hydrologic Engineering Center
Restoration of Chamberlain Creek Amy Clinefelter Riparian Wetland Research Program Restoration of Chamberlain Creek Amy Clinefelter Riparian Wetland Research.
Hydraulic Screening and Analysis Needed for USACE Review
Vegetation Establishment. Exposed soil occurs on all construction sites.
The sand filter has to be moved from this location. The embankment cross section used in the slope stability analysis did not include the sand filter.
Dam Failure Dams are generally an expensive structure that directly affect the economy of the area through power generation, flood control and water supply.
US Army Corps of Engineers BUILDING STRONG ® Consequence Assessment for Dam Failure Simulations Kurt Buchanan, CFM Economist Mapping, Modeling, and Consequences.
ASFPM – May 24, 2012 CASE STUDY – 408 PERMITTING AND LEVEE ACCREDITATION FOR WATERLOO, NEBRASKA ASFPM MAY 24, 2012 Presented by Randy Behm, PE, CFM Lalit.
1 ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE SEDIMENT CONTROL PLAN PLANNING APPROACH Issued May 2009 Level II: Introduction to Design Education and Certification for Persons.
US Army Corps of Engineers BUILDING STRONG ® Prioritizing Investments within the USACE Levee Safety Program Process and Methodology Overview Jason Needham,
Modern Urbanized Stream Water Quality Improvement Technologies Creating a Net Zero Water Quality Impact Solution in the Natural Environment.
TRADITIONAL WINDROW & TRENCH-FILL REVETMENTS, & A NEW INVENTION, VEGETATED TRENCH-FILL REVETMENT {All 3 are classified as “Setback Revetments”}
BUILDING STRONG ® Do not include this Slide. This template is a guide for preparing power points presentations. The information requested is important.
February Chagrin Loam Proposed Method of Management French Drain Vertical “Pit” Drains ~2 Feet Wide 10 Feet Deep 120 Feet Long 1 Foot 8 Inches.
Central Valley Flood Protection Board Meeting – Agenda Item No. 4E APPLICATION NO
Operations & Maintenance Considerations Dave Lawson Electrical Maintenance and Operations Supervisor.
9. Seepage (Das, chapter 8) Sections: All except 8.2, 8.6, 8.7, 8.8, 8.9.
Responses to Levee Certification Requests 1.Closures 2.Maintenance Plans 3.U/S and D/S Levee Tie-ins.
1 Three Rivers Levee Improvement Authority Follow-up on Twelve Compliance Issues Raised on February 26, 2007 March 22, 2007.
Riverside County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Murrieta Creek Flood Control, Environmental Restoration and Recreation Project June 2006.
DWR Maintenance Area Response to USACE Periodic Inspections Presented by: Noel Lerner, Chief, Flood Maintenance Office Mark List, Chief, Maintenance Support.
Stream Erosion and Transport
Dam Safety in the 21 st Century PFMA as a Dam Safety Tool – Joe Ehasz FERC Regulator Perspective – Doug Johnson USACE Perspective – Doug Boyer Owner Perspective.
Basic Hydraulics: Bridges. Definition & terminology Abutments Flow contraction.
US Army Corps of Engineers BUILDING STRONG ® Yakima Flood Control Project – Left Bank Yakima, Washington Dennis Fischer, P.E. Levee Safety Program Manager.
HAW CREEK, PIKE COUNTY, MISSOURI-TRIB TO SALT RIVER ERODING STREAM THREATHENING COUNTY ROAD #107, FOURTEEN FT TALL ERODING BANK WITHIN 4 FT OF THE ROAD,
BIM Bridge Inspection and Maintenance Technical Standards Branch Class B Bridge Inspection Course Grade Separation Inspection & Ratings Grade Separation.
Central Valley Flood Protection Board Meeting – Agenda Item No. 9A CVFPB MEETING – October 25, 2013.
US Army Corps of Engineers BUILDING STRONG ® Emergency Response Policy Revision Update ( ER & EP ) Jeffrey Jensen CECW-HS USACE Flood Risk Management.
MS Dam Safety Program Dusty Myers, P.E. Chief, Dam Safety Division.
US Army Corps of Engineers BUILDING STRONG ® Name of Levee Segment Presenter Name Presenter Title Duty Location Date of Presentation.
APPLICATION NO LEVEE DISTRICT No. 1 Of SUTTER COUNTY STAR BEND SETBACK LEVEE SUTTER COUNTY April 17, 2009.
OREGON IDAHO WYOMING COLORADO NEVADA NEW MEXICO TEXAS UTAH ARIZONA CALIFORNIA Rene Vermeeren, P.E., D.WRE Chief, Hydrology and Hydraulics Branch Los Angeles.
Ruttinger & Sons Engineering Designed by: Taylor Kasperick Jacob Wilson Loren Ruttinger Presented by: Loren Ruttinger.
International Levee Handbook Overview of the handbook Chapter 3 Functions, Forms and Failure of Levees.
International Levee Handbook Overview of the handbook Chapter 6 – Emergency Management and Operations.
West Sacramento Area Flood Control Agency November 10, 2011 Update on Current Levee Construction Projects and on the Southport Sacramento River Levee Early.
COMPETENT PERSON TRAINING for TRENCHING OPERATIONS
Tailings Dam Stability
Anthony Alvarado, PE, CFM National Hydraulic Engineering Conference
Bridges Reach analysis Fundamental tool for design
Objectives Upon completion of this module you should be able to:
4th Annual Construction Law Summit
Lesson Seven: Flood Works Monitoring
HEC-RAS US Army Corps of Engineers Hydrologic Engineering Center
Stream Crossing Replacement Policy
In-Stream Structures & Grade Control
Sacramento Environmental Commission January 2019.
Presentation transcript:

Levee Screening Tool - Cedar Right Bank March 2011 Yakima Flood Control Project – Right Bank Yakima, Washington Dennis Fischer, P.E. Levee Safety Program Manager Seattle District 2011 US Army Corps of Engineers BUILDING STRONG® United States Army Corps of Engineers 1

Levee Overview Seattle District (NWS) Yakima Flood Control Project – Right Bank The Yakima Flood Control Project is a complete system Segment ID 5505000022 Right bank of the Yakima River 24,000 feet in length The Yakima River Flood Control Project was authorized by the Flood Control Act, approved June 28, 1938 by Public Law 761 Operated and maintained by Yakima County Constructed between July 1947 and March 1948. Population at Risk: 16,115 (Day), 15,768 (Night) Identify the type of features, length, basic summary Date of Construction Basic Description of Features Major Modifications Since Original Construction Population at Risk (PAR) = people in the protected area based on census data. PAR is for the segment but may also represent the PAR for the system depending on top of levee elevation / H&H. District should confirm PAR and update if necessary.

Yakima Flood Control Project – Right Bank Yakima County, WA  The first (upstream) unit extends 1,593 feet along the right bank of the Naches River; the downstream end of this unit joins the Northern Pacific Railway embankment at the upstream end of the I‐82 Highway embankment (approximately Station 341+00 to 355+00).  The second unit extends downstream approximately 7,500 feet from the I‐82 Highway embankment along the right bank of the Naches and Yakima Rivers (approximately Station 355+00 to 417+00). It ends just south of the I‐82 overpass over E. Freeway Lake Road.  The levee’s third unit begins approximately 2000 feet to the southeast of the second unit, just east of I‐82, and continues along the right bank of the Yakima River to the abutment of the Terrace Heights Bridge approximately Station 188+00 to 257+00). It includes approximately 3,800 feet of levee that has been raised to project height, and was constructed under the Works Progress Administration (W.P.A.) Program.  The fourth unit, including about 300 feet of Works Project Administration (W.P.A) levee, extends approximately 8,500 feet downstream from the abutment of the Terrace Heights Bridge to approximately 0.3 mile upstream from the Moxee Highway Bridge (Highway 24). Approximate stations are Station 95+00 to 181+00.

Yakima Flood Control Project – Right Bank Yakima County, WA Infrastructure Amount Ambulance Providers 1 Chemical Industries 2 Correctional Facilities EMS Electric Substation Firestations Law Enforcement 5 Oil and Gas Pipelines Reservoirs Schools 4 The upstream end ties into a railroad embankment. The downstream end ties into a highway embankment. YAKIMA RIVER

Levee Screening Tool - Cedar Left Bank November 16, 2010 Summary of Hydraulics Yakima Flood Control Project – Right Bank was designed to protect against a 65,000 cfs flood. This was determined to be a 160-year flow. Analysis performed in 1974 determined that the levee was capable of protecting against a 55,000 cfs flow. This was determined to be a 100-year flow. Explanation of selected Toe Frequency and Top of Levee Frequency Basis for assumptions Historic Floods Historic failures. Include summary discussion of supplemental data entries. Doesn't necessarily have to be on the slide but presenter should discuss and summarize these data entries. United States Army Corps of Engineers

Summary of Hydraulics Frequency top of levee – 30 YR 30 Year Return Record Flood (2009) 48,200 cfs 75% of height 2 Year Event Authorized Capacity Frequency – 0.005 ACE Overtopped: No Failure: No Over 1000 times because the bottom of the levee on the back side is very low and in a lake. There are several cross sections in a row like this. The 25% elevation is approximately 1018 ft. The flood of record is from the 2009 flood. The original flood control project was completed in 1950. (Based on 1933 flood of record). Frequency top of levee – 30 YR Frequency design – 50,000 cfs Frequency toe of levee – 2 YR 0 events have caused performance problems Flood Events (years) – XXXX, XXXX, XXXX, XXXX, Largest event experienced – 2009 YR, 48,200 cfs , 4 feet below top of current levee. Percent Loaded 25% 50% 75% 100% Times Loaded (events) 1000+ 2

Performance History Yakima Flood Control Project – Right Bank has never overtopped. Yakima Flood Control Project – Right Bank has never breached. Flood conditions during the three months following construction resulted in considerable berm erosion and loss of levee. This required emergency repairs on several levee sections in the form of additional riprap placement and other protective work. These repairs were completed June 23, 1948. In 1966, 1100 feet of the levee at the Moxee Branch Bridge crossing was repaired and a new river channel approximately 3000 feet long was excavated. Flood damage occurred in November and December 1995 and February 1996 near river miles 113 and 114. A 450‐foot section of the levee required repair. In 1996, 400 feet of rock toe was rebuilt and 50 feet of levee toe was rebuilt and riprap bank protection added. The May 1997 flood caused 200 feet of the levee toe to be lost to river scour upstream of the Terrace Heights Bridge. The levee slope was re-graded, the toe was rebuilt, and rock was replaced on the riverward slope. Performance history is critical to our understanding of the segment / system. The history of PL8499 and emergency flood fighting as well as any major rehabilitation should be presented. Add slides as necessary to adequately cover the performance history. On Segment Map show area/ reaches with major seepage, boils, instability, flood fighting, overtopping, erosion, etc. Indicate % of height of the levee / floodwall/culvert at which problems start to occur. May be able to capture some or all of this information on previous slide otherwise show it here

Performance History In 1999, the City of Yakima modified the levee along the Naches River and Yakima River at Bergland Lake, Rotary Lake, and near Boise Cascade Park. The levee was raised along the riverward side of the lakes and a new section of levee was constructed between the original levee and the I‐82 embankment. The levee was damaged in January 2009 (Project Information Report, YAK‐5‐09) and the USACE has repairs underway and/or in design to repair the following four areas: 535 lineal feet near Boise Cascade Park to repair toe scour, loss of embankment and riverward armor. 200 lineal feet near the Railroad Trestle across the Yakima River, to repair toe scour and loss of armor protection due to sloughing. 275 lineal feet near the playground to repair toe scour and sloughing resulting in near vertical slopes near the Playground. 861 lineal feet at Buchanan Lake to repair seepage sections. 1100 LF of toe scour and loss of riverward armor and embankment at the Arboretum section. Performance history is critical to our understanding of the segment / system. The history of PL8499 and emergency flood fighting as well as any major rehabilitation should be presented. Add slides as necessary to adequately cover the performance history. On Segment Map show area/ reaches with major seepage, boils, instability, flood fighting, overtopping, erosion, etc. Indicate % of height of the levee / floodwall/culvert at which problems start to occur. May be able to capture some or all of this information on previous slide otherwise show it here

Geomorphology / Foundation Geology The soils are identified primarily as layers of loamy sand, sand and gravel with cobbles, and small boulders to 10 inches with some soils with clay. Composite Geologic Log (All Test Holes) Depth (feet) USCS Description 0-2 SM Sandy loam, some clay 2-4 SP Coarse sand with gravel 4-7 Coarse sand with gravel, boulders The soils are identified primarily as layers of loamy sand, sand and gravel with cobbles, and small boulders to 10 inches with some soils with clay. A note on Sheet No. 1 states that borrow material for the levees was to be taken from the banks and the channel of the river. The 1955 Operation and Maintenance Manual indicate that the predominant levee materials generally are coarse‐grained, but that silty soils may have been used for construction along some segments. The information provided for review contains no further description of the foundation materials or materials used in existing levee construction, and no further information on the engineering characteristics of those materials. Test pits were not dug deeper than 7 feet. Pits were dug in July 1946.

Geomorphology Location of seepage. Area has been repaired. The soils are identified primarily as layers of loamy sand, sand and gravel with cobbles, and small boulders to 10 inches with some soils with clay. A note on Sheet No. 1 states that borrow material for the levees was to be taken from the banks and the channel of the river. The 1955 Operation and Maintenance Manual indicate that the predominant levee materials generally are coarse‐grained, but that silty soils may have been used for construction along some segments. The information provided for review contains no further description of the foundation materials or materials used in existing levee construction, and no further information on the engineering characteristics of those materials.

Typical Sections Levee Embankment Elev. 1020 ft 12 ft 2.0 1.0 3.0 Riverside Landside Pg 327 of HDR’s report seems to support the hydraulic fill thing and a couple other places reference it. Be sure to identify any levee that was constructed using hydraulic fill vs compacted in lifts. Provide a brief description of the embankment materials and the foundation geology. Is the levee section homogeneous or is it zoned. Was it built all at once or in stages over many years. Has there been any major rehabilitation. Include waterside and land side berms to the sketch if necessary. Show or describe cut-off-walls, toe drains and or relief well systems if present. Combine with slide on Foundation Geology when convenient. Toe Elevation 1008 Approx Crest Height: 2 - 15 Ft Crest Width: 12 Ft Foundation Geology: Loamy sand, sand and gravel with cobbles Levee Materials /Zoning: Hydraulic Fill/Homogeneous Riverside Erosion Protection: Riprap and Sod

Original Levee Geometry Typical Section 1940 As-built Original Levee Geometry Crown Width 12 Feet Landward Levee Height 2 -15 Riverward Slope 3 H:1V Landward Slope 2 1954 As-built Riprap was added and the levee centerline was raised during later repairs and mods for a large part of the levee.

Repair Sections 1988 Dike Widening 1980 Flood Damage Repair 1997 Toe Repair 1980 Flood Damage Repair 1996 Flood Damage Repair

Repairs following 2009 flood Repair Sections Repairs following 2009 flood 2012 Planned Boise Cascade Repair

Buchanan Lake HEC-RAS Cross Section Buchanan Lake Section Left Bank Levee Right Bank Levee 2011 Buchanan Lake Seepage Repair According to the local sponsor, Buchanan Lake does not fluctuate with Yakima River water levels. Yakima River Buchanan Lake Buchanan Lake HEC-RAS Cross Section

Review of Assessment Ratings Inspection Ratings are taken from the 2010 Periodic Inspection report performed by HDR. Ratings are often too conservative. Show all of the items rated in the LST in the table Focus the discussion on the primary factors and any indicators with an “M”, or “U”. Discuss any situation where the RA rating differed substantially from the ICW rating. Include substantial documentation / justification in the notes block. See follow up slide for example of table format. ADJUST TEST BLOCKS AS NEEDED TO PROVIDE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RATING

EMBANKMENT SEEPAGE SUPPORTING PHOTOS ADD PHOTOS OR OTHER SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION AS NEEDED Station 398+00: Five large trees, >6-in DBH, and dense brush on landward slope, covers 250-ft length of levee. Station 166+00 to 170+00: 13 large trees, greater than 12-in DBH, along landward toe, several more within 5 ft of levee toe.

Culverts Yakima Levee culverts were installed in 1949 and 1953. Yakima Levee Culverts were video inspected in May of 2010. The video inspections revealed heavy sediment, debris, corrosion, small perforations and root penetrations. The CMP culverts are 60+ years with signs of deterioration. Therefore, an unacceptable rating was assigned. FG27 – Corrosion & Minor Deformation. [Left Bank] Culvert #1 – 184+06 (Original stationing) is 24” with 14-gage galvanized metal Corrosion ranging from minor to significant was observed on the visible portions of corrugated metal culverts at Stations 176+00, 181+00, and 215+00. The section on culverts does not match the current conditions observed and should be updated. Two slide gates near Station 375+00 (YAKR0218) should be repaired. PI plan states that a flap gate at station 44+00 has been repaired and debris has been removed from all flap gates FG7A – Root Penetrating Wall. [Right Bank]

Assessment Ratings Embankment Seepage Performance Mode ICW Rating LST Rating Comment Embankment and Foundation Seepage and Piping Unwanted Vegetation Growth (1) U Several large trees, including Cottonwoods, are present in the landward slope of the levee. Trees in the landward slope can cause an increase in seepage through the levee. Additionally, thick brush prevents inspection of the levee slopes and toe. Encroachments (3) A HDR identified several encroachments in the levee area including power poles, gates, and debris off the levee toe; however, the encroachments identified are not expected to significantly increase the likelihood of failure due to foundation seepage and piping. Settlement (7) M The section identified as having settled was designed and approved to be lower than the surrounding levee. This section has not been surveyed recently but is not expected to be lower than designed levels. It is not expected that this section is an indication of seepage damage. Cracking (9) No evidence of cracking was identified during inspection. EXAMPLE OF TABLE: Highlight primary factors and any other item needing discussion. Add as many tables as necessary to cover the rated performance modes / items. FULLY DOCUMENT JUSTIFICATION FOR EACH RATING IN THE COMMENT COLUMN. Eventually tables will be supplied directly from the LST. Seepage is highlighted because it is the primary factor

Assessment Ratings Embankment Seepage (Continued) Performance Mode ICW Rating LST Rating Comment Embankment and Foundation Seepage and Piping Animal Control (10) M Several areas were identified that had multiple burrows 4-in. in diameter. Two burrows of 6 and 8 inch diameter were identified. The burrows did not appear to extend horizontally into the levee prism and are located in overbuilt sections. The burrows identified are not expected to pose a threat to the levee system but could create preferential seepage paths through the levee. Culverts/Discharge Pipes (11) U Video inspection of the culverts was performed in Fall 2010, but the videos were not available to the HDR inspectors prompting the “U” inspection rating. Interior culvert photos from the 2010 video inspections were received from Yakima County and reviewed. Upon review of the inspection pictures, a few of the culverts displayed heavy sediment, debris, corrosion, small perforations and root penetrations. Video inspection was only performed on a portion of the culverts in this levee system. The conditions observed during the inspection are expected to reflect the condition of the remaining culverts. The interior condition combined with the age of the pipes prompted the inspection team to contradict the findings of the supplemental culvert assessment tab and assign an unacceptable rating for culverts. It has been noted seepage has occurred at many of the locations of past repairs based on various documents provided by the USACE. No specific locations or information on these past seepages was provided. More significant seepage could occur under higher river stages. EXAMPLE OF TABLE: Highlight primary factors and any other item needing discussion. Add as many tables as necessary to cover the rated performance modes / items. FULLY DOCUMENT JUSTIFICATION FOR EACH RATING IN THE COMMENT COLUMN. Eventually tables will be supplied directly from the LST. Seepage is highlighted because it is the primary factor

Assessment Ratings Embankment Seepage (Continued) Performance Mode ICW Rating LST Rating Comment Embankment and Foundation Seepage and Piping Underseepage Relief Wells/Toe/Drainage Systems (14) N/A No relief wells or toe drains exist on this levee. Seepage (15) A M No evidence of seepage was indentified during inspection; however, repairs at Buchanan Lake in 2011 were made to restore two sections evidencing seepage. Due to this instance of seepage, Buchanan Lake was evaluated as the critical section. All sections have been repaired, but the potential exists for additional seepage in these areas due to free draining materials encountered in the levee embankment and foundation and the location of the levee relative to the former river channel. The rating team does not expect seepage that initiates a piping failure mode. Head will dissipate uniformly through the embankment and foundation; not allowing for conditions in which critical exit gradients will be exceeded. The seepage is expected to be controlled and ultimately not a major failure mode concern. Buchanan Lake contains water year-round, lowering the differential water head across this tallest levee section. The local sponsor has stated that the lake does not noticeably respond to increases in Yakima River water surface elevation. Although the levee ties into a railroad embankment, the railroad and levee embankment materials are similar and should perform similarly. The railroad section is buttressed by an elevated road on the landward side, the base of this section measures approximately 180 feet in width giving confidence that this railroad section is not the critical seepage section. Seepage analysis for this levee system is not retained in the records of the Seattle District. It has been noted seepage has occurred at many of the locations of past repairs based on various documents provided by the USACE. No specific locations or information on these past seepages was provided. More significant seepage could occur under higher river stages. EXAMPLE OF TABLE: Highlight primary factors and any other item needing discussion. Add as many tables as necessary to cover the rated performance modes / items. FULLY DOCUMENT JUSTIFICATION FOR EACH RATING IN THE COMMENT COLUMN. Eventually tables will be supplied directly from the LST. Seepage is highlighted because it is the primary factor

EMBANKMENT STABILITY SUPPORTING PHOTOS ADD PHOTOS OR OTHER SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION AS NEEDED Station 166+00 to 170+00: 13 large trees, greater than 12-in DBH, along landward toe, several more within 5 ft of levee toe. Station 137+00: 2x2-ft wide and 5-in deep depression on landward slope near crown. Just downslope from utility pole.

Assessment Ratings Embankment Stability Performance Mode ICW Rating LST Rating Comment Embankment Stability Unwanted Vegetation Growth (1) U M Large trees are present at levee toe on both sides of the levee. Overturned trees can uproot parts of the levee embankment and reduce levee stability. No large trees were present on levee slopes. Therefore, a minimally acceptable rating was given. Encroachments (3) A HDR identified several encroachments in the levee area including power poles, gates, and debris off the levee toe. These encroachments will not affect slope stability. Slope Stability (5) A slope 1.6H:1V was identified in one location on the landward slope. No evidence was identified that would indicate slope stability failure in this section. No evidence of slope instability was identified in the rest of the levee. Slope stability failures were not evident during recent high water events and are not expected during full loading. Slope stability analysis is not kept in the records of the Seattle District. Settlement (7) The section identified as having settled was designed and approved to be lower than the surrounding levee. This section has not been surveyed recently but is not expected to be lower than designed levels. It is not expected that this section is an indication of embankment instability. Two apparent low areas near Station 417+00 (YAKR0149) and Station 357+00 (YAKR0212) One area at approximate Station 417+00 (YAKR0149) appears to be about 1 foot lower than the older levee crown surface and may need to be surveyed to verify appropriate elevation and repaired as appropriate. It is not known if this is related to settlement or perhaps grading and construction activities in the area following flooding in 1996.

Assessment Ratings Embankment Stability Performance Mode ICW Rating LST Rating Comment Embankment Stability Depressions/Rutting (8) U M Depressions were identified deeper than 1 ft near utility poles on the levee. The depressions are most likely related to improper compaction during construction but should be monitored to determine if they are indications of more general bank instability. The depressions are not expected to pond water due to their geometries. Cracking (9) A No evidence of cracking was identified during inspection. Underseepage Relief Wells/Toe/Drainage Systems (14) N/A No wells or toe drains exist on this levee. EXAMPLE OF TABLE: Add as many tables as necessary to cover the rated performance modes / items. Highlight primary factors and any other item needing discussion. FULLY DOCUMENT JUSTIFICATION FOR EACH RATING IN THE COMMENT COLUMN. Eventually tables will be supplied directly from the LST. Slope Stability is highlighted because it is the Primary factor.

EMBANKMENT EROSION SUPPORTING PHOTOS ADD PHOTOS OR OTHER SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION AS NEEDED Station 210+00: Several hundred feet of significant erosion of the levee toe and lower slope. Station 193+00: Riprap eroded away a 20-ft long area. Apparent exposure of levee core, fine-grained soils. Other area, just upstream, seems to be starting as well. Velocity at toe estimated at 8 to 10 fps.

EMBANKMENT EROSION SUPPORTING PHOTOS ADD PHOTOS OR OTHER SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION AS NEEDED Station 211+00: Bank erosion along 200 ft of bank at levee toe. There was riprap at this location one year prior to inspection. Station 192+00: Bank is undercut, eroding at outside of bend where river approaches at high angle.

Assessment Ratings Embankment Erosion Performance Mode ICW Rating LST Rating Comment Embankment Erosion Sod Cover (2) A Sod cover is in acceptable condition. Erosion / Bank Caving (6) U Several sections have experienced severe erosion. The levee system has a history of erosive damage which has required a number of repairs. It is likely that more erosion will occur during heavy loading in the levees current condition. Although the levee ties into a railroad embankment, the railroad is setback from the mainstem of the Naches River and not as susceptible to damaging scour and erosion. Therefore, the railroad section is not the critically analyzed section. Riprap Revetments & Bank Protection (12) M Gravel bedding has been exposed at the toe of some riprap. Portions have the riprap toe have been eroded. Damaged sections are isolated but still pose a hazard to levee integrity. Revetments other than Riprap N/A Revetments other than riprap are not incorporated in the levee. Travis Goss in Sep 2011 – the damage at the arboretum section is bad but more localized than HDR stated. The slope does get significantly steeper below a certain point. There also significant erosion damages at Kiwanis Park, Boise Cascade, RR Trestle, and NC Machinery. These damages are detailed in PIR 2009 report. NC Machinery was repaired during emergency floodfighting. Damages to all others but the arboretum will be repaired in summer 2012. Sections of the Yakima Right Bank levee system have experienced severe erosion near Station 211+00 (YAKR0130) and 192+00 (YAKR0141). Riprap has been removed and the gravel bedding is exposed near Stations 161+00, 162+00, 158+00, 155+00 (YAKR0017, 0018, 0022, 0023). Several areas of scour and erosion along the riverward slope were observed near Stations 193+00 and 192+00 (YAKR0139, and 0141), near Station 211+00 (YAKR0130) and near Station 257+00 (YAKR0073). The portion of levee where loss of toe rock was observed from approximate Station 155+00 to 166+00 (YAKR0019), included four locations where bedding was exposed (near Stations 155+00, 158+00, 161+00 and 162+00 [YAKR0023, 0022, 0017 and 0018, respectively])

48-inch CMP culvert with flapgate near Station 416+00. CULVERT GATE CLOSURE Culvert Gate Closure 48-inch CMP culvert with flapgate near Station 416+00. Operating Plan & Experience A No installation is required during a flood event. Operating Environment & Access The flapgate is functioning properly. No problems have been observed with this flapgate during recent high-water events and none are expected under full loading. Condition & Recent Maintenance (Primary Factor) The flapgate in good condition. No equipment is missing or damaged. Miscellaneous Issues No miscellaneous issues affecting ability to set closure structure. CMP culvert under levee. Flap gate on outlet and trash rack at inlet. Inlet partially blocked by debris, outlet partially blocked by rocks. On drawings, installed by City of Yakima in 1999. Station 416+00: Flap gate on 48” culvert.

Consequence Data Summary Weighted Fatality Rate 0.22% Threatened Population w/o warning 5,607 Estimated Loss of Life w/o warning 12 Number of structures Inundated 4,413 Economic Damages $563,318,250 Infrastructure Amount Ambulance Providers 1 Chemical Industries 2 Correctional Facilities EMS Electric Substation Firestations Law Enforcement 5 Oil and Gas Pipelines Reservoirs Schools 4 The public schools in this protected area generally draw from the residential areas protected by this levee. For this reason, the school population is accounted for in the general population at risk. Review / repeat of consequence data.

Emergency Preparedness Levee Screening Tool - Cedar Right Bank March 2011 Emergency Preparedness Evacuation Planning = Minimally Acceptable. Yakima County created an emergency action plan in 2007 that established authorities and procedures for evacuation planning and execution. No evacuation map has been created. Community Awareness = Minimally Acceptable. Flood fighting teams are familiar with the equipment needed for flood fighting but no specific community awareness efforts have been made to raise awareness of the hazards surrounding the levees. Flood Warning Effectiveness = Acceptable. The Yakima County emergency action plan includes authorities and procedures for flood warnings. The plans involve use of several media for flood warning. 5.2.1.2 Emergency Supplies and Equipment – “A” The local sponsor has a stockpile of sandbags and provided an electronic copy of the flood fighting equipment and materials inventory developed by the County. All materials are in their shops. USACE noted additional sandbags could be supplied in a short time frame if necessary. This was rated as Acceptable. Yakima County developed and adopted a Flood Emergency Response plan in October of 2007. 6.1.1.2 Flood Preparedness and Training The sponsor has indicated that County staff and road crews are familiar with the requirements for flood preparedness and have adequate training to perform the work; however, the County has no written flood response plan. A flood response plan should be written as recommended in the Levee Owner’s Manual for Non‐Federal Flood Control Projects (USACE 2006). United States Army Corps of Engineers

Assessment Rating Summary Primary Factors Embankment & Foundation Seepage - M Embankment Stability - A Erosion - U Culvert Gate Closure - A This slide is included to be a “refresh” of the most important items rated just before going to the summary / results.

Major Contributors to Overall Risk Rating Identify the major contributors to risk . Cut and past the table from the Results Tab.

Major Contributors to Risk Prior to Capacity Exceedance Identify the major contributors to risk prior to capacity. In order they are Embankment and Foundation Seepage and Piping, Embankment Stability, Embankment Erosion, Closure Systems, Flood Wall Stability, and Flood Wall Under seepage and piping. Cut and past the bar chart from the Results Tab. Label the “bars” on the graph.

Segment Ratings Compared to All Segments This table is currently not available. It is being developed. Please leave the blank slide with the heading as a place holder.

Performance Index vs Life Loss Overtopping Prior to Overtopping In notes down here add numerical values for Life Loss and Performance Index for Prior-to- Capacity Exceedance and Capacity Exceedance.

Performance Index vs Economic Damages In notes down here add numerical values for Economic Loss and Performance Index for Prior-to- Capacity Exceedance and Capacity Exceedance.

Performance Index vs Property Loss In notes down here add numerical values for Economic Loss and Performance Index for Prior-to- Capacity Exceedance and Capacity Exceedance.

Recommended LSAC Rating Prior to Capacity Exceedance LSAC = xx Capacity Exceedance LSAC = xx Recommended LSAC = xx Add Reasons for adjusting LSAC rating Provide “blank” for National Rollup