Varieties, Pt. 5

* As James reminds us at the beginning of these lectures, the topic of mysticism is an important one. * On a number of occasions James has indicated that mystical experiences are at the root of the religious experiences he has been exploring (413). * James acknowledges an immediate concern, what we could call a problem of access. * James himself was not prone to mystical states, so he is forced to take up an external viewpoint.

 The first task is to specify what we are talking about.  What makes a state of consciousness a mystical state? James identifies 4 markers.  There are two which James identifies as essential: 1. Ineffability: the content of mystical experience defies expression; as such, they must be directly experienced. 2. Noetic Quality: despite the fact that they are ineffable, they have epistemic significance as a window into a region of truth unavailable otherwise.  Two others are common, but inessential: 1. Transiency: mystical states are characteristically short-lived. 2. Passivity: mystical states are not willed. They are of a piece with other sorts of phenomenon already discussed (automatic writing). Importantly, though they are not willed, they leave a mark, they have continued resonance in the life of the mystic.

 Together, these four marks delineate a set of states of consciousness (what we could call a thought complex) that is distinct from other sets and are thus worthy of investigation.  In order to circumscribe this ‘mystical group,’ James follows his usual procedure of offering a range of examples intended to explore the mystical terrain (416).  At the end closest to the everyday experience, mystical consciousness encompasses such psychological phenomenon as the moment of insight (“Ah, I get it!”) to déjà vu to drug-induced expanded consciousness (424-7).

 On the basis of this review of these common forms of mystical consciousness, James offers a first approximation of the nature of mystical experiences.  First, they seem penumbral to our normal experience. That is, they seem to open the possibility that accompanying our everyday experience are other realms of experience requiring different forms of consciousness (422-3).  Secondly, as members of the same species, the everyday may turn out to be a more limited form of the more expansive and inclusive mystical experience (423).  Finally, mystical experiences themselves seem characteristically experience of unity (as opposed to the multiplicity characteristic of the everyday).

 This recognition of the experience of unity at the center of mystical consciousness brings us into the neighborhood of religious mysticism, the most common form of which is the “the experience of the more/greater.”  One common, only loosely religious, version of this is the experience of ecstatic unity with nature (cf., the Whitman poem, 431).  One distinct form which this experience of the greater takes is what James, following Bucke, calls “cosmic consciousness” (description 435).  Everything in his examples suggests the rarity and transiency of this sort of experience.

* Considering the ‘mystical group’ sufficiently delimited, James then turns to the question of the cultivation of these experiences. * The questions that he addresses are: “Is it possible to methodically cultivate mystical experience?” and “What might be purchased by such cultivation?” * In answer to the first question, he observes that many different religious traditions have developed methods of cultivation. * Hindu—Yoga—Samadhi. * Buddhism— —dhyana. * Islam—Sufi/Dervish—”Mystical transport,” absorption in God. * Christian—Catholic—Orison (prayerful meditation).

 This is the important question, inasmuch as it fixes the value and meaning of mystical experiences.  As a pragmatist, as we’ve seen, the value of what is cultivated lies in its fruits (e.g., 437).  One thing which seems to result from this cultivation is a sensitivity to a kind of truth (most importantly, theological or metaphysical truth) (cf., ftn., 447-8).  But there’s one big problem: incommunicability (442). What is the use of a truth that is not intersubjectively available?  Another result: profound (and also ineffable) emotional states and transformations and excitations of the psyche.

* As if incommunicability weren’t problem enough, the evaluation of mystical states is further complicated by the possibility of falsity (453). * In order to address this challenge, we need to more precisely specify the character of the ‘mystical group.’ * As James summarizes it, this group is characterized by four general traits: expansive optimism, typically monistic (pantheistic), anti- naturalistic, and other-worldly (460).

* Now we are in a position to address the big question: Do these experiences furnish any warrant for truth? * James says that to a certain extent they do: * Mystical states are, he insists, individually authoritative. * Mystical states do not, however, have any intersubjective authority. * Mystical states do contest the authority of ‘rational’ (naturalistic) consciousness. They do this by contesting its reality principle.

* This raises an important epistemological question: Does it make any sense to talk about a “private truth?” * Generally speaking, the answer is no. Truth requires “in principle” intersubjective verification. * James equivocates a bit here (467-8), but ultimately acknowledges that we need to turn to philosophy to answer the question.