Factorization of a 768-bit RSA modulus 20103575 Jung Daejin 20103453 Lee Sangho.

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Presentation transcript:

Factorization of a 768-bit RSA modulus Jung Daejin Lee Sangho

Contents RSAMotivateNFSConclusion

RSA Public Key Algorithm Key generation 1.Choose prime # p,q 2.N = pq 3.Φ (N) = (p-1)(q-1) 4.Choose e such that 1<e< Φ (N) and e and Φ (N) are coprime 5.Find d such that de ≡ 1 (mod Φ (N))

Abstract - 1 Congruence of squares (n : composite integer) GCD(x-y, n), GCD(x+y, n) -are non-trivial factors of n -the probability is at least ½

Abstract - 2 Congruence of smooth squares ◦ B-smooth if the prime factors of |v| are at most B. ◦ If r(v i ) = v i 2 mod n are B-smooth for many v we can find subset such that ◦ Then, ※ The more # of v, the more chance to factor n.

Abstract - 3 Motivation of NFS (1) ◦ v 1, v 2 with relation (a,b) (b1, b2 bound) ◦ Relation (a,b) (a,b: coprime integer. b>0) ◦ f 1 (X), f 2 (X) ∈ Z[X] (with degree d1, d2, monic/irreducible) ◦ f 1 (m) ≡ f 2 (m) ≡ 0 mod n ◦ v k = b d k f k (a/b) ∈ Z (k=1,2)

Abstract - 4 Motivation of NFS (2) ◦ Q( α k ) = Q[X]/(f k (X)) (k=1,2)  Theorem Given a monic, irreducible polynomial f(x) with rational coefficients, a root θ ∈ C of f(x), and the associated ring Q ( θ ), the following hold: Q( θ ) = Q[X]/(f(X)) Q( θ ) is a field

Abstract - 5 Motivation of NFS (2) ◦ a-b α k ∈ Z[ α k ]  have norm v k  belong to first degree prime ideals in Q( α k ) of norms equal to the prime factors of v k ◦ These prime ideals have bijective pair (p, r mod p) (p: prime, f k (r) ≡ 0 mod p) ◦ A first degree prime ideal corresponding to such a pair (p, r mod p) has norm p and is generated by p and r- α k

Abstract - 6 Motivation of NFS (3) ◦ Φ k : Z[ α k ] -> Z/nZ (k=1,2) ◦ Φ 1 (a-b α 1 ) ≡ Φ 2 (a-b α 2 ) mod n ◦ Finding a linear dependency modulo 2 among vectors ◦ Subset S will be made such that ◦ Φ 1 ( τ 1 2 ) ≡ Φ 2 ( τ 2 2 ) mod n ◦ Φ 1 ( τ 1 ) = x, Φ 1 ( τ 2 ) = y, (x 2 ≡ y 2 mod n)

Abstract - 6 RSA Factoring challenge ◦ RSA-768   768-bit / 232-digit  Award $50000 USD but Retracted

NFS Steps ◦ Polynomial selection step  Find 2 good quality polynomials to use. ◦ Sieving step  Sieve the possible relations ◦ Matrix step  Find the dependency with matrix built with relations. ◦ Square root step  Find the x,y with

NFS - 2 Polynomial selection step(1) ◦ Criteria  d 1 ∈ N order, m : slightly smaller than n 1/d 1 d 1 > 1, d 2 = 1 (best quality polynomials) leading coefficient of f 2 is 10 or 11 prime factors equal to 1 mod 6 with at most one other factor < leading coefficient of f 1 is a multiple of

NFS - 3 Polynomial selection step(2) ◦ BSI produced 3 polynomial / selected one of them ◦ Above polynomials fit it the criteria.

NFS - 4 Polynomial selection step(3) Parameter selection must be done ◦ Smoothness bounds / Sieving region S(Z X Z >0 ) Non-zero integer x is (b k, b l )-smooth if with the exception of 4 prime factors between b k, b l, all remaining prime factors of |x| are at most b k. (b l ≥ max(b 1,b 2 ))

NFS - 5 Polynomial selection step(4) b 1 =1110 8, b 2 =210 8, b l = 2 40 (High Performance ) b 1 = , b 2 =10 8, b l = 2 40 (Low Performance) |a| ≤ & 0<b< (above values are guided by experience)

NFS - 6 Sieving step(1) Lattice sieving ◦ More efficient(harder) than Line sieving Pair (prime, root) = (q,s) (where q | f k (s)mod q) ◦ Fix a pair Q, L Q is defined as integer linear combinations of the vectors (q,0), (s,1) ∈ Z 2 ◦ S Q = S ∩ L Q ◦ Special Prime q divides b d 1 f 1 (a/b) for each (a,b) ∈ S Q

NFS - 7 Sieving step(2) Lattice sieving ◦ For each pair P for f 1 for which prime is bounded by b 1, mark the points in their intersection L P ∩ S Q ◦ Repeat pairs Q until we find enough relations have been found In Practice, fix bounds I, J ◦ S Q ={iu+jv : i,j ∈ Z, -I/2 ≤i< I/2, -J/2 ≤j< J/2,} ( Author used I = 2 16, J = 2 15 )

NFS - 8 Sieving step(3) During the process ◦ 480 million pairs for special q between 450 million and 11.1 billion ◦ Removing duplications(27.4%) ◦ Uniqueing was done ◦ Removing Singletons with clique removal Result ◦ relations ◦ prime ideals ◦ (It took about 2 years)

NFS - 9 Matrix step(1) In this step, we find dependency in the relations To achieve optimal performance, we build a binary matrix(good one). n X n matrix was built (n=192,796,550)

NFS - 10 Matrix step(2) Wiedemann algorithm (1) ◦ Given non-singular matrix M over F 2, b ∈ F 2 d, to solve the system Mx=b (F:minimal polynomial of M with at most d degree) Then we can denote x as

NFS - 11 Matrix step(3) Wiedemann algorithm (2) (m i,j the jth coordinate of the vector M i b / t ≥0 / 1≤ j ≤ d ) 1.2d+1 consecutive terms of the linear recurrence 2.We can calculate F i ’s with Berlekamp-Massey algorithm 3.Then we can calculate solution with F i ’s (Total 119 days)

NFS - 12 Square root step The last step on NFS 460 linear dependencies modulo 2 => 460 independent chances of about ½ to factor RSA-768 With the algorithm proposed in “Square roots of products of algebraric numbers” (It took 1 hour 40 minutes)

Conclusion -1 Factor p & q p = q = bit / digit (20:16 GMT on December 12, 2009)

Conclusion -2 Warning about RSA ◦ 1024-bit RSA modulus will be not broken within next five year. ◦ After that, all bets are off.

Thank you!! Q & A