Proposed Tactical Framework Telecomm Regulation Onno W. Purbo

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Presentation transcript:

Proposed Tactical Framework Telecomm Regulation Onno W. Purbo

References

Outline Policy Goals Method in injecting competition. Interconnection. Competitive safeguards.

Guaranteed Competition

Why competition? A policy framework to establish, foster, and regulate competition is critical to the delivery of benefits expected and demanded by consumers. Competition rewards entrepreneurship, responsiveness and enthusiasm, it punishes sluggishness and indifference.

Policy goals in injecting Competition Remove legal barriers that protect existing monopoly providers from competition by new entrants. Take affirmative steps to promote competition in sectors of the market. consider introducing competitive safeguards to protect against the exercise of market power by incumbent carriers during the transition to competition.

Method In Injecting Competition Restricting methods and modes of entry can cause investment distortions and result in higher prices to consumers. It is by allowing the marketplace to select preferred approaches that policymakers encourage efficient entry.

Method In Injecting Competition Facilities-based competition Unbundling of network elements Resale

Method - Consequences a technologically neutral policy fosters innovative systems and alternative facilities designed to meet the needs of the marketplace.

Why?

Why – Facility based? a facilities-based competitor is not constrained by existing, possibly obsolete embedded plant and instead can install the newest, most efficient technology. the competitor will be able to supply new or additional services such as faster transmission and switching speeds or higher bandwidth capacity, and may be able to do so at lower costs than the incumbent.

Why – Facility-based? Facilities-based competitors not only directly benefit their customers but also create competitive pressure for the incumbent to upgrade its network. In addition, facilities-based entry allows the marketplace to drive competition with less regulatory presence.

Why – unbundling? It reduces entry barriers by allowing new entrants to begin offering service without having to construct an entire network. On a longer term basis, it prevents the incumbent carrier from exploiting any residual monopoly power that may arise. it allows new entrants additional avenues of innovation.

Unbundling – Incumbent. Required to provide any requesting telecommunications carrier non- discriminatory access to elements of the incumbent's network on an unbundled basis on rates, terms and conditions that are just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory. Required to provide any reasonable method of interconnection, including physical collocation or virtual collocation, or interconnection at a point between the incumbent's and new entrant's network.

Why – Resale? Can serve a multi-faceted role in promoting and sustaining competition in telecommunications services. May be an effective entry vehicle for new entrants that may initially lack the necessary capital to build their own networks. Allow small competitors, which will not become facilities-based providers, to offer service.

Why – Resale? resellers may stimulate usage of the incumbent's network, and thus may benefit the incumbent facilities-based provider and further growth of the entire sector. Resellers may resell an entire service without modification, which is referred to as Total Service Resale. Resellers may also choose to obtain some services from the underlying carrier and combine them with services that they provide themselves.

Why – Resale? For smaller countries, resale provides some of the benefits of competition even if the total amount of telecommunications traffic generated is insufficient to attract multiple facilities- based carriers.

Resale – limitations. The reseller is limited to a greater or lesser extent by the technical features and functions of the underlying carrier's network. Resale alone does not put competitive pressure on wholesale rates and services - the regulator must retain some degree of control over the pricing, terms and conditions of the wholesale offering.

Interconnection – Competitive Success Interconnection! The price of interconnection (or transport and termination), for example, could serve as a significant barrier to entry for new networks Interconnection charges are reciprocal and based on the long run incremental cost of providing the interconnection on the incumbent’s network.

Competitive Safeguards Outright Prohibition on Providing the Competitive Product or Service. Price Caps for Regulated Monopoly Services. Separate Subsidiary Requirement. Tariffing Requirements. Accounting Separation. Imputation Requirements. Service Quality Reporting Requirements. Cont’d..

Competitive Safeguards Resale Requirements. Unbundling Requirements. Comparably Efficient Interconnection Requirements. Network Interface Disclosure Requirements. Customer Proprietary Network Information Requirements. Prompt and Sure Resolution of Disputes.

Separate Subsidiary Requirement Maintain separate books of account Utilize separate officers and personnel Employ separate marketing activities Not share common equipment or facilities Adhere to certain restrictions on information flows that would unfairly benefit the competitive affiliate

Proposed Steps – Indonesia. Nail down the competitive safeguards. Make sure interconnection. Start with resale requirement. Continued with unbundling network elements. Aim for facilities-based competition.