European Commission, DG Competition, Directorate G, Cartels Interface Between Leniency and Settlements in European Commission proceedings Sari Suurnäkki,

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Presentation transcript:

European Commission, DG Competition, Directorate G, Cartels Interface Between Leniency and Settlements in European Commission proceedings Sari Suurnäkki, Deputy Head of Unit, Cartels Directorate, European Commission European Competition Day Brno, Czech Republic 13 May 2009

European Commission, DG Competition, Directorate G, Cartels Roadmap for making fight against cartels more effective Creation of Cartel Directorate Improved investigating techniques Improving the leniency programme and establishing a coherent system of leniency within jurisdictions that apply Article 81 EC Revised guidelines on fines Introduce a settlement system

European Commission, DG Competition, Directorate G, Cartels Leniency Programme: key elements A tool to uncover and put an end to cartels Immunity for the first one Important reductions for subsequent applicants that make decisive contribution to the investigation –significant added value –race between applicants –fixed bands, up to 50% reduction

European Commission, DG Competition, Directorate G, Cartels Leniency programme in practice Increase in number of cartel cases decided: – : 11 – : 10 – : 33 – (on average 7 per year) Substantial reductions in fines: –E.g. in the car glass case Asahi got 50% reduction which reduced its fine by €.

European Commission, DG Competition, Directorate G, Cartels Settlements in cartel cases: why? “For us, the fundamental driver of the settlements package is the need to maximise efficiency in order to improve enforcement.” “Settlements are an option for companies which, in full knowledge of the strength of the Commission case and having been able to argue their case, prefer to admit liability and qualify for a reduction in the fine.” (Neelie Kroes, Fiesole, 19 September 2008)

European Commission, DG Competition, Directorate G, Cartels Incentives to settle During the settlement discussion companies will be able to express their views on –Commission objections and evidence –Factors to be taken into account for fines calculation Companies will also benefit from –shorter procedure –reduction of fine Publicity aspect

European Commission, DG Competition, Directorate G, Cartels Cartel fines pre and post appeals

European Commission, DG Competition, Directorate G, Cartels Settlement procedure: key elements Full investigation Exploring the parties interest to settle Bilateral settlement discussions Company admits liability in a settlement submission and states a maximum for a fine Shorter Statement of Objections and Decision in a quicker timeframe

European Commission, DG Competition, Directorate G, Cartels Combined outcome: increased deterrence and effectiveness More efficient handling of cases More cartel investigations/decisions Focus on new cases → Higher probability of being detected