Some Analysis of Coloring Experiments and Intro to Competitive Contagion Assignment Prof. Michael Kearns Networked Life NETS 112 Fall 2014.

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Some Analysis of Coloring Experiments and Intro to Competitive Contagion Assignment Prof. Michael Kearns Networked Life NETS 112 Fall 2014

Coloring Assignment: Experimental Design 30 graphs total 10 each from the following generative models –Erdos-Renyi –Small Worlds (multi-hop cycle with rewirings) –Preferential Attachment Controlled to keep number of edges and vertices constant Also designed graphs to elicit different running times for heuristics

Are Some Families Harder Than Others? Ordering Small World > Erdos-Renyi > Preferential Attachment holds with each pairwise comparison passing P < 0.05 significance.

Are Some Graphs Harder Than Others?

Are Some Players Better Than Others?

What Correlates With Population Solution Time? Methodology: Create vector of 30 population average solution times; Correlate with properties of graphs or other population properties.

Faster is Better: At the subject level, correlation between average solution time and average color changes/second = How Do People Play?

Histogram of max degree – degree of first vertex colored

Penn vs. Coursera: Average Solution Times

Next Assignment: Experiments in Competitive Contagion

Scenario Your are the head of marketing for the Red Widget Company You are tasked with creating the “viral spread” of Red Widgets on Facebook Widgets are very compelling: once someone learns about them via their friends, they simply must have one Your budget permits you to give away two Red Widgets to seed their spread Unfortunately, your counterpart at Blue Widget Co also has two seeds Red and Blue Widgets are identical except for color, and have extreme network/platform effects: you want to adopt the color your friends have For a given network, your goal is to win more market share than your Blue opponent(s)

Detailed Dynamics Red and Blue each pick two seeds (duplicates chosen randomly) At the first step, all neighbors of the seeds will adopt/buy a widget At the next step, all their neighbors will buy a widget In general, if step T is the first step at which some neighbor of v has adopted a widget, then v will adopt on step T+1 To decide which color widget to adopt, v looks at the number of Red and Blue widgets in their neighborhood, and adopts majority color (ties broken randomly) Any vertex in the connected component of any seed will eventually adopt Two sources of randomization: duplicate seeds, ties in neighborhoods

Discussion This is a (complex) game between Red and Blue Pure strategies: all choose(N,2) choices of 2 seeds Mixed strategies: all distributions over seed pairs Payoffs: number of adoptions won We will play a population opponent variant of this game Let pay(s1,s2) denote the (expected) payoff to Red when Red chooses seed set s1 and Blue chooses seed set s2 Let pay(s1,P) denote the (expected) payoff to Red when Red chooses seed set s1 and Blue chooses a seed set randomly according to distribution P Then payoff to Red is pay(s1,P), where P is the empirical distribution of seed choices of all your classmates/opponents In general, there is no right/best choice for s1: depends on P! Let’s go to the app

Questions Worth Pondering What does it mean for the population distribution P to be an equilibrium? If P is an equilibrium what can we say about different players’ payoffs? If P is an equilibrium and G is connected, what can we say about payoffs? What if G is not connected?

How We Will Compute Scores Let P be the population distribution of seed choices on graph G For every seed set s that appears with non-zero probability in P, we will compute its expected payoff with respect to P: –average of pay(s,s’) over many trials and many draws of s’ from P –enough draws/trials to distinguish/rank expected payoffs accurately We will then rank the s that appear in P by their expected payoffs If you played s on G, you will receive a number of points equal to the number of other players you strictly beat in expected payoff Example: Suppose s1, s2 and s3 appear in P, and have expected payoffs and population counts as follows: –s1: payoff 0.57, count 11; s2: payoff 0.48, count 71; s3: payoff 0.31, count 18 –if you play s1, your score is 71+18=89; if s2, your score is 18; if s3, your score is 0 If everyone plays the same thing, nobody receives any points You must submit seeds for all graphs in order to receive any credit Your overall score/grade for the assignment is the sum of your scores over all graphs, which will then be curved In general, there is no right/best choice for seeds: depends on P!

More Details You can (and should) change seeds as often as you like Important: Since P will change/evolve during the assignment, you should revisit your seed choices in response Deadline for assignment: 11:59PM on Monday November URL for app: Active at noon today