IPCablecom Security Eric Rosenfeld, CableLabs Sasha Medvinsky, Motorola Simon Kang, Motorola ITU IPCablecom Mediacom Workshop March 13, 2002 Geneva, Switzerland.

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Presentation transcript:

IPCablecom Security Eric Rosenfeld, CableLabs Sasha Medvinsky, Motorola Simon Kang, Motorola ITU IPCablecom Mediacom Workshop March 13, 2002 Geneva, Switzerland

Agenda IPCablecom Overview How it Works Services and Capabilities Security Goals of IPCablecom IPCablecom Security Architecture Security Mechanisms & Component Summary

What is IPCablecom? IPCablecom is a set of standards that define protocols and functional requirements for the purpose of providing Quality-of- Service (QoS) enhanced secure communications using the Internet Protocol (IP) over the cable television Hybrid Fiber Coax (HFC) J.112 network

IPCablecom Framework Broadband Modem Physical LayerMedia Access ControlInternet ProtocolIPCablecom Protocols Voice/Video Telephony Conferencing Video/Data Applications J.112 IPCablecom

Servers PSTN IPCablecom How it Works HFC J.112 Cable Modem CMTS (J.112 AN) Cable IP Network Internet Upgrade to IPCablecom + MTA

IPCablecom Architecture Managed IP Backbone (QoS Features) (Headend, Local, Regional) PSTN Media Gateway Signaling Gateway Call Management Server HFC access network (J.112) MTA Embedded MTA CMTS HFC access network (J.112) Cable Modem MTA Embedded MTA CMTS Media Gateway Controller OSS Back Office Media Servers Announcement Servers Conference Mixing Bridges... Billing Provisioning Problem Resolution DHCP Servers TFTP Servers Key Distribution Center (KDC) Cable Modem

IPCablecom : What Equipment? Home: –Embedded Multimedia Terminal Adapter (MTA) -- cable modem with RJ-11 jacks Headend: –Cable Modem Termination System (CMTS): J.112 AN –IPCablecom Servers: Call Management Server (CMS), Record Keeping Server (RKS), Device Provisioning Server, Key Distribution Center (KDC) –Gateways: To link IP calls to backbone or PSTN

And now the security…

Why do we need security? Threats to the IPCablecom Network –Threats exist because: Shared network Access in the users home Valued functionality –Types of threats: Network attacks Theft of service Eavesdropping Denial of Service

Security Services provided by J.112 Baseline Privacy Interface + (BPI+) –Privacy between the Cable Modem and CMTS DES encryption –Protection from theft of Service Authentication of Cable Modems via X.509 digital certificates –Enable secure code download to the Cable Modem Authentication of Cable Modem software image via X.509 Code Verification Certificate

BPI+ Applicability to IPCablecom Embedded MTAs rely on Cable Modem for secure code download Privacy of J.112 QoS messages prevents some denial of service attacks Theft of Service protection doesn’t apply: –CPEs behind a CM are not authenticated –IP Telephony servers also not authenticated Additional security at application layer is needed to protect IPCablecom services

IPCablecom Security Objectives End-to-end secure communication –Must be at least as secure as PSTN networks Protection for the user –Ensure privacy of media sessions Protection for the operator –Combat theft-of-service –Protect infrastructure Comprehensive plan –Who/What needs to protect and why? –When/Why do we protect this information? –How will we incorporate security?

IPCablecom Security Objectives Use open standards whenever possible Conduct a risk assessment Provide a reasonable level of security Specify Interface security –No device or operator network security Assume operators must have reasonable network management security policy Require J.112 networks with BPI+ enabled

IPCablecom Security Architecture

Security Mechanisms Kerberos –Centralized network authentication via a Key Distribution Center (KDC) –Public Key Initialization (PKINIT) Digital Certificates are used to authenticate the MTA to the KDC and KDC to MTA –Key Management Allows MTAs and CMSs to agree on cryptographic keys for secure communications

Security Mechanisms IPsec –IP-layer security protocol (IETF standard) –Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Transport mode for end-to-end security Privacy/authentication/integrity of payload –3DES, HMAC SHA1 or HMAC MD5 –Initial Authentication & Key Management provided by: Kerberos+PKINIT for MTAs Internet Key Exchange (IKE) with pre-shared keys for infrastructure components (CMS, CMTS, RKS, Gateways)

Security Mechanisms SNMPv3 security –SNMPv3 is used to monitor & manage MTAs –Initial Authentication & Key Management Kerberos+PKINIT –Message Authentication & Integrity HMAC MD5 algorithm –Privacy (optional) DES algorithm

Security Mechanisms Call Signaling Security –NCS, TCAP/IP, ISTP, and TGCP Protocols –Protocol security provided by IPsec –Mix of authentication & key management technologies: IKE with pre-shared keys for servers –Default for IPsec, comes bundled with off- the-shelf implementations Kerberos+PKINIT for MTAs –Needed to address scalability issues on the CMS-MTA interface

Security Mechanisms RTP/RTCP (Media Stream) –Initial Authentication Each end-point (MTA or MG) authenticated by the Call Management Server –Key Management Via IPsec-secured Network-based Call Signaling (NCS) –Privacy Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) –Authentication & Integrity (optional) MMH (Multilinear Modular Hash)

Key Distribution Center (KDC) The only standalone security component in IPCablecom Acts as a trusted third-party authentication service Implements: –Kerberos version 5 –PKINIT w/X.509 digital certificates

Multimedia Terminal Adapter X.509 Digital Certificates for authentication –IP Telephony Root CA Certificate –MTA Manufacturer CA Certificate –MTA Device Certificate MTA Private Key FIPS Cryptographic Module –Level 1 required (minimal physical security) –Additional physical security recommended for higher value services Random Number Generator AES, MMH, IPsec, Kerberos+PKINIT Embedded J.112 CM with BPI+

Device Provisioning Server Authentication & Key Management –Kerberos+PKINIT authentication Integrity & Privacy –SNMPv3 security Authentication –HMAC MD5 Privacy (optional) –DES

PSTN Gateways Media Gateway Controller (MGC) –IPsec,IKE w/pre-shared keys for call signaling Media Gateway (MG) –AES, MMH for media stream –IPsec, IKE w/pre-shared keys for call signaling Signaling Gateway (SG) –IPsec, IKE w/pre-shared keys for call signaling

Other Components Cable Modem Termination System (CMTS) –J.112 Access Node (AN) w/BPI+ –IPsec w/pre-shared keys and RADIUS authentication for QoS interface with CMS Call Management Server (CMS) –IPsec w/pre-shared keys –IPsec w/Kerberized Key Management for MTAs Record Keeping Server (RKS) –IPsec w/pre-shared keys for billing events

On-Net to Off-Net Media Path PSTN Cable Modem MTA Media Gateway Hi Mom. How are you today? HmDMSmB7HTKgEwLE3aSmttcBY AizqPicdTZKyXxVp7A4GxaPw/BH7 kwYtuKxEr3nPS70i15nB+z7miTw2 TXwrc+pYGO+FNvIScRQIrlaOqwY UMLF+5LjagzZSlbX8rrw+Y2uE21Y ZJxIirVuTX/tZI9af16nz75VcF5x0N4 YRAjtjwpo3GW0CK+B4ihcg/6 MTA Encrypts MG Decrypts Hi Mom. How are you today? CMTS RTP / RTCP AES, MMH

Summary IPCablecom provides QoS-enhanced secure communications Security is a major component and is integrated into the architecture A range of security protocols and services are used IPCablecom security architecture is fully defined in the J.170 recommendation

For More Information… Eric Rosenfeld CableLabs PacketCable Security Architect Sasha Medvinsky Motorola Senior Staff Engineer Simon Kang Motorola International Regulatory and Standards Specialist