Key Management with the Voltage Data Protection Server Luther Martin IEEE P1619.3 May 7, 2007.

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Presentation transcript:

Key Management with the Voltage Data Protection Server Luther Martin IEEE P May 7, 2007

2 Overview  Key management with the Voltage Data Protection Server is motivated by the typical customer uses  An administrator defines policies at a central management console that pushes configuration and policy data to individual key servers  Management of symmetric keys is integrated with management of asymmetric keys (identity-based encryption)  Not really an API  Data is either Base64-encoded PKCS#7 or XML and is transported over HTTPS

3 Typical use of the Voltage Data Protection System - 1  Used to encrypt sensitive information in a database  Typically for PCI DSS compliance  In this case, encryption and decryption are both automated

4 Typical use of the Voltage Data Protection System - 2  Encrypting unstructured data in storage according to a security policy  Documents  Spreadsheets  Etc.  In this case, encryption may be automated but a human user may decrypt the data  May even be in a different security domain  “Federation”

5 Design goals  Must support multiple cryptographic algorithms  Must support multiple authentication methods for each algorithm  Must work across multiple security domains  May require user interaction  Could be an application

6 Components  Management console  Creates policies and pushes to key servers  Creates configuration data and pushes to key servers  Logs events and allows an authorized admin to review logs  Pulls logs from key servers  Key servers  Create and grant keys  Enforce policy  Log events  Users  Request keys  Request policy  Authenticate as needed

7 The world according to Voltage (simplified)

8 Downloading policy  Clients download policy from key server over HTTPS  A policy URL  Policy defines what keys a key server can create  Stored in a Base64-encoded PKCS#7 on the key server  Gives URL of where to request keys  Other administrative information Validity period of the policy How often clients should check for new policy Etc.  Knowing the policy URL is all that a client needs to start encrypting

9 Example policy – not very enlightening  -----BEGIN PKCS  MIIKKgYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIKGzCCChcCAQExCzAJBgUrDgMCGgUAMIIGfgYJKoZI hvcNAQcBoIIGbwSCBmswggZnAgEBBEECjrk1vLeEyC1gbZBiII8GpSNU7hVZeGEA aCwkaTUA8e6G3Rtynz2GFiHrrrLTu6h9IKeaM1ZhuShK+CTMdiVrEjCCAT8CAQEw TAYHKoZIzj0BAQJBAJ8H1gR9xlCYucz2uTzLayuTJi7AILgeRz4Lp6rEpy0j9eGO wBieiN8DvimMxmoEtNs4FfZRAxbHx7VVIcwKoPMwgZEGC2CGSAGG/R4BAQEBBEAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABBEECAmm7c2jAousQfwT1 myPOGhnHopYNvmRjaXs13efxL08k79KfSX/IEgcoRsnvbhRkfQDW30x85Om701UG W8vGjwIVAP/////////////v////////////MVIwUAYLYIZIAYb9HgEDAQIEQQKX 4RZI3e9oC3X/iuSx5i1NnbTW2Kq4yQ+jW9h7XtTGTfZ4rMlytgSsl1VpaWUXT7m4 Yhd7EgQtBP4SvELey3U4MB4XDTA0MDQyMjE4MDYwN1oXDTI5MDQxNjE4MDYwN1ox ggRmMBIGC2CGSAGG/R4BAwIKBAMCAQMwIAYLYIZIAYb9HgEDAgEBAf8EDhMMMDQw MjAzMjExNjE2MCAGC2CGSAGG/R4BAwIFAQH/BA4wDAYKYIZIAYb9HgIBATAsBgtg hkgBhv0eAQMCBgEB/wQaDBh2b2x0YWdlLmNvbSMwNDAyMDMyMTE2MTYwLwYLYIZI AYb9HgEDAgIBAf8EHRMbdm9sdGFnZS1wcy0wMDAwLnZvbHRhZ2UuY29tMC8GC2CG SAGG/R4BAwIHAQH/BB0MG3ZvbHRhZ2UtcHMtMDAwMC52b2x0YWdlLmNvbTBVBgtg hkgBhv0eAQMCAwEB/wRDE0FodHRwczovL3ZvbHRhZ2UtcHMtMDAwMC52b2x0YWdl LmNvbS9mb3JtcG9zdGRpci9zYWZlZm9ybXBvc3QuYXNweDBVBgtghkgBhv0eAQMC CAEB/wRDDEFodHRwczovL3ZvbHRhZ2UtcHMtMDAwMC52b2x0YWdlLmNvbS9mb3Jt cG9zdGRpci9zYWZlZm9ybXBvc3QuYXNweDCCAswGC2CGSAGG/R4BAwIEAQH/BIIC uDCCArQwggKwMIICcKADAgECAgEBMAkGByqGSM44BAMwFjEUMBIGA1UEAxMLdm9s dGFnZS5jb20wHhcNMDQwNDIyMTgwNjA1WhcNMjkwNDE2MTgwNjA1WjAlMSMwIQYD VQQDFBp2b2x0YWdlLmNvbSMwNDAyMDMyMTE2MTY6UzCCAbYwggErBgcqhkjOOAQB MIIBHgKBgQD2N0O2t9OUCRm+APvgYO1tEAPD1+heyLVFp5TgVABryChuhhtWdqXv cUCT6uA7+8pth2KWB6zvMR1FsBHHFb0Du2S3HvgaBqqhNRr+t1GvvP1/hfXyqhdL sAXKJNRntnbA4Srkkl4TfiGMWEidE+67k2aFLeTggTDn90hEqHHitQIVAO6MTSFm MJ777vg9hR76QUuHPqcjAoGAf+DTTEL/iLZwPHg2dAW7NQmHoEuaJZgVCtXVzrI6 C8axkSSEjgfxI0QPhnjgfAiPgnsWmJooxHvB62/kARCX6zFt5jjcr2gM7EnlYcwA Bw+PH8dWrQuGMQohwvUML2k/hEzhU+78p6J9h1hdWsoIR7yewuxiBWD+NpPn9UU2 3dQDgYQAAoGAG8tLodfqJNcquJfjpvXu7X/3hf7cnz+xNHEdEqMqTJOO5PVk9Ere nu0Aj50l84z+rJiGQvoXXtdeRVTxgqAgzlGXs/7FluF8cK2lpwBj5m1vQ3cAHzDA 8B1Rjr3qYGDdd8PkkOpxrJsNwArlKQidZZ2pRs+54ySwXRF9oVzKNUejQjBAMA8G A1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgEGMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRDGs9zRYnj 2a4128+czLGaCsi3aDAJBgcqhkjOOAQDAy8AMCwCFDJB6Vsqx1HxT6CzXWxCPMJA SEfhAhQ3BIm2DH2m8MrGiNl4JMlB66hwNKCCArYwggKyMIICcaADAgECAgEBMAkG ByqGSM44BAMwFjEUMBIGA1UEAxMLdm9sdGFnZS5jb20wHhcNMDQwNDIyMTgwNjA3 WhcNMjkwNDE2MTgwNjA3WjAlMSMwIQYDVQQDFBp2b2x0YWdlLmNvbSMwNDAyMDMy MTE2MTY6UDCCAbcwggEsBgcqhkjOOAQBMIIBHwKBgQCcmUTb9u179pw8RQn27eEi 4Mc1RY2JWl/wRwYE+F3ruAmBmo4m6gMmI5pvj4MtGfU+3ipPbugOAOB3DLu5w9R5 ejY+xpys0RK4iFfJ7NLZz7eAMQwbkidzBGBibWNQsxdmsvvSJLc+26g54pa8Crj8 gNO6H4LkgtHE4rpUO63Z5wIVAITwIvRyibeCMuBHjdsL6C7g9Jy/AoGBAJnU/8K+ NipTQ0TX+1Dx9+mWdHhjMLfTessLdC47kFmwYepxBz/ZKu4ZG9+wtpqu5Rod0340 Q3Jd4YcmtTKtMTiLp/Pm6QQn6bKchxJqjS27wVe7Ig4G3Z4zXc0Yie18vTPDpD1l oNy1KML+n8kTAJp1elpT/0CySeph7KVjgutHA4GEAAKBgBvVSd19wQhGwXGr7zvb jLi8wKRFvveo8PPlfSfHJgzNZrMvBK4HlcK/KsTx/6BxSlLf8E2Uaax8JGArhPuW K+RoTFURqe82/1bfE1tnNnVE1jUEcFJodEpN1zQRQ6i1TOMV+0nVpJlb9ylOp9E1 3kVY5+huCZM4MqbQQvDd/ExIo0IwQDAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MA4GA1UdDwEB /wQEAwIBBjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQU160Me2kzzl3w1cvJhf81RERMGVgwCQYHKoZIzjgE AwMwADAtAhUAgfWYot9R24alb8wuPD/2oWpA6ogCFEv9xddpdK78OLyOjHdMtFBl 8ipxMYHIMIHFAgEBMBswFjEUMBIGA1UEAxMLdm9sdGFnZS5jb20CAQEwCQYFKw4D AhoFAKBdMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8X DTA2MTIwODAyMTYzM1owIwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMRYEFBtovu1emwW496eAicS53o+Z dFXbMAkGByqGSM44BAEELjAsAhQoLURHiNst/mwFz7Fm+q31GDopDgIUXOGILtqM  YG2ajZgKJ/AGFeYkG7s=  -----END PKCS7-----

10 Getting keys  Clients request keys from key server and use to encrypt/decrypt data  Key identifier can be stored as an Attribute in a PKCS#7 encrypted- data content type  As defined in RFC 3852/CMS  Identifier includes information about key  OID of algorithm  Key length  URL of policy  Application (can’t enforce, but useful for licensing)  Recipient identifier (device, user, etc.)  Identifier is a Base64-encoded DER-encoded block that can be used for multiple purposes

11 Authentication  Authentication data can be passed with a key request  Optional  If a valid auth token is not present in a key request, the key server performs whatever auth is required by the security policy  May query user  May also query other data sources  Returns auth token to user upon success  User then requests the key using the valid auth token

12 Key request MHIwDAYKYIZIAYb9HgIBAQwgZGV2ZWxvcGVyLnZvbHRhZ2UuY29 tIzEwODjQwQDAaS6XQmLnZvbHRhZ2UuY29tNC26BBEAhzRCZWZv cmUEDL5lquI0eALv8A1JsnC4BOpwDAlub3RCZWZvcmUEDTA1MDg wODAwMDAwMFowIgwCaWQEHHNlbmRlckBkZjb20=

13 Server response  Response from server includes the key plus an identifier for the key  Identifier includes information about key  OID of algorithm  Key length  URL of policy  Application (can’t enforce, but useful for licensing)  Recipient identifier (device, user, etc.)

14 Key server response <vs:response xmlns:vs=" code="100" message="Symmetric Key Follows"> kMDkxODM0OWNudmtpdzR1MDkxdTJwdTE5OC0xOC0xMjc4MGhkeX b3VpeXNoMW5scmgxbmw0cnUxZm40ZjFucmo0bjRpdTs1aXUxNGk S1vNHU5MzQ4c3UxMDNqNC5kMWo0LmozNGtqMTNsazRqMWwzNGpo NHAxdTRwMWk0cGQxaXUzNHAxaXUzNHAxaXUzcDQxaXVwNG91MXA Gl1MXAzNHUxcDM0dXAxb3U0cDFpdTM0cDF1MzQxdTNwNDF1cDR1 A0dTFwMzR1MXAzNGl1cDEzaTR1cDF1NHAxdTM0cG8xdXA0dXA4d waWMxLmpsajE0cmxsY2kxdW5wMWNyaTFqcmkxamMuag==

15 User authentication  User identifier and key identifier are in the key request  Key server requires authentication per its security policy before granting keys  Configurable per user/device or group of users/devices  Shared secret  Active Directory  answerback  Q&A  X.509 client certificates  SecureID  Others

16 Summary  The key management capabilities of the Voltage Data Protection Server includes features that make it useful in a wide range of applications  Encryption and decryption may be automated but it is also easy for a human user to perform the same operations  Users/devices may even be in a different security domain  Wide range of authentication options  Same framework applies to asymmetric key management