Secure phone for Vigor2820Vn-ZRTP DrayTek Corp 2010.

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Presentation transcript:

Secure phone for Vigor2820Vn-ZRTP DrayTek Corp 2010

Outline Vigor2820 WEB UI Why DrayTek’s secure phone Demo Motivation for secure phone Terminology Q & A 6 6

Motivation Motivation for secure phone Terminlogy Current release Future plan Demo Vigor2820 WEB UI Demo Why DrayTek’s Secure Phone Easy to eavesdrop conventional VOIP phone call (Wireshark) High demand for secure VOIP phone call (Business)

Terminlogy Motivation for secure phone Terminlogy Current release Future plan Demo Vigor2820 WEB UI Demo Why DrayTek’s Secure Phone ZRTP Zimmermann RTP Key Exchange Protocol (Diffie-Hellman key exchange) In the end: (1) generates a shared secret (2) generates SAS (short authentication string) for detecting man in the middle attack SRTP Secure RTP Use the shared secret to encrypt/decrypt RTP

Motivation for secure phone Terminlogy Current release Future plan Demo Vigor2820 WEB UI Demo Why DrayTek’s Secure Phone Terminlogy (cont.) SIP RTP Stage 1: Stage 2: SIP ZRTP Stage 1: Stage 2: SRTP Stage 3: Ordinary VOIP call: Secure VOIP call:

Motivation for secure phone Terminlogy Current release Future plan Demo Vigor2820 WEB UI Demo Why DrayTek’s Secure Phone Terminlogy (cont.) SIP ZRTP Stage 1: Stage 2: SRTP Stage 3: Secure VOIP call: Zfone + softphone

Motivation for secure phone Terminlogy Current release Future plan Demo Vigor2820 WEB UI Demo Why DrayTek’s Secure Phone Why DrayTek’s Secure Phone Key exchange method is not standardized => incompatible between different brands. ZRTP: draft to specify it, and it's up to draft 14 already, will become RFC soon. Implies: zrtp + srtp will be the standard protocols for secure phone. DrayTek should be the first company in the world that supports ZRTP+SRTP secure phone feature (i.e. zfone compatible).

Motivation for secure phone Terminlogy Current release Future plan Demo Vigor2820 WEB UI Demo Why DrayTek’s Secure Phone Vigor2820 WEB UI

Demo -Video Motivation for secure phone Terminlogy Current release Future plan Demo Vigor2820 WEB UI Demo Why DrayTek’s Secure Phone ZRTP/SRTP Application Diagram

Demo -Video Motivation for secure phone Terminlogy Current release Future plan Demo Vigor2820 WEB UI Demo Why DrayTek’s Secure Phone Non-Secure Phone Video Demo

Q & A