A BU D HABI B RUSSELS D UBAI F RANKFURT H ONG K ONG L ONDON M ADRID M ILAN M UNICH N EW D ELHI N EW Y ORK P ARIS S INGAPORE S TOCKHOLM T OKYO W ASHINGTON.

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Presentation transcript:

A BU D HABI B RUSSELS D UBAI F RANKFURT H ONG K ONG L ONDON M ADRID M ILAN M UNICH N EW D ELHI N EW Y ORK P ARIS S INGAPORE S TOCKHOLM T OKYO W ASHINGTON DC Competition Law Association "What is an object infringement?" The consequences for business Nigel Parr 1 December

A BU D HABI B RUSSELS D UBAI F RANKFURT H ONG K ONG L ONDON M ADRID M ILAN M UNICH N EW D ELHI N EW Y ORK P ARIS S INGAPORE S TOCKHOLM T OKYO W ASHINGTON DC "Agreement and/or concerted practice" Tendency to run the two concepts together –C-238/05 Asnef-Equifax: no need for specific characterisation –"a partnership for unlawful purposes" Classic concerted practices raise fewer object difficulties Commercial agreements raise difficult issues

A BU D HABI B RUSSELS D UBAI F RANKFURT H ONG K ONG L ONDON M ADRID M ILAN M UNICH N EW D ELHI N EW Y ORK P ARIS S INGAPORE S TOCKHOLM T OKYO W ASHINGTON DC Incentives for regulators to find object infringements "per se prohibition sensibly conserves resources of competition authorities and the justice system" (Kokott AG in T-Mobile) Reduced proof requirements –presumptively anti-competitive ("by their very nature") –but what is presumed – consumer harm? –no need to take account of "concrete effects" –avoids sophisticated economic analysis Reduced scope for exemption? –black-listed/hardcore restrictions "unlikely to fulfil the conditions of Article 81(3)" (Art 81(3) Guidelines p46) Burden of Proof Shifts –on to the "defendant" under Article 81(3) –CFI unwilling to interfere with Commission's "margin of appreciation" in economic assessment

A BU D HABI B RUSSELS D UBAI F RANKFURT H ONG K ONG L ONDON M ADRID M ILAN M UNICH N EW D ELHI N EW Y ORK P ARIS S INGAPORE S TOCKHOLM T OKYO W ASHINGTON DC Commercial implications Commercial Agreements –horizontal –vertical Commercial relationships –competitors –customers

A BU D HABI B RUSSELS D UBAI F RANKFURT H ONG K ONG L ONDON M ADRID M ILAN M UNICH N EW D ELHI N EW Y ORK P ARIS S INGAPORE S TOCKHOLM T OKYO W ASHINGTON DC Commercial Agreements Horizontal –"each economic operator must determine its own policy" (Irish Beef) –block exemptions little help in practice –"self assessment" re exemption uncertain process; reversed burden –cf s65(1)(b) FTA '73: an enterprise "ceases to be carried on at all … in consequence of an agreement" –favours/mergers/structural transactions: opportunity to obtain clearance Vertical –Whish's object box: RPM and parallel trade –But Tobacco: "arrangements between each manufacturer and each retailer that restricted the ability of each of these retailers to determine its selling prices independently, by linking the [maximum] retail price of a manufacturer's brand to the retail price of a competing brand of another manufacturer" (OFT PN 25/4/08) –no consideration of exemption criteria in SO

A BU D HABI B RUSSELS D UBAI F RANKFURT H ONG K ONG L ONDON M ADRID M ILAN M UNICH N EW D ELHI N EW Y ORK P ARIS S INGAPORE S TOCKHOLM T OKYO W ASHINGTON DC Commercial Relationships Horizontal –"any direct or indirect contact between [economic] operators by which an undertaking may influence the conduct on the market of its actual or potential competitors or disclose … its decisions or intentions concerning in its own conduct on the market …" (T-Mobile) –be very cautious Vertical –customer/supplier discussions entirely legitimate –"hub and spoke" infringement in Toys/Kit –"hard cases make" bad law –Court of Appeal formulation must be adhered to and not glossed –third limb is key: the information is used in determining pricing; consequences should not be ignored