DNSEXT-63 Next steps in Trust Anchor Management for DNSSEC Ólafur Guðmundsson

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Presentation transcript:

DNSEXT-63 Next steps in Trust Anchor Management for DNSSEC Ólafur Guðmundsson

Current Status 2 drafts: –Threshold n out of m –Timers IPR claim filed against both drafts –Patent is issued in Israel –License terms Royalty free –Clause about references causes problems for some implementers IPR holder wants to update IPR statement with new terms but not posted yet

Larger picture Lack of DNSSEC KEY management is may soon become the excuse “de Jour” for not doing DNSSEC Large TLD’s will not deploy DNSSEC any time soon without a market.  In early deployment “configured” trust anchors will be the rule  The need for configured trust anchors may never go away

Next steps: WG needs to get more active on this issue or DROP IT completely WG owes the proposals: –DISCUSSION –FEEDBACK –Selection criteria –Timeline

Why we need Trust Anchor Management (TAM) Secure Entry Points.SE enables all domains with DS to be trusted Root will always need TAM. COMORG “.” DE ISUKSE IETF OGUDISOCDENIC wwwOPS RFCPAF

Trust Anchor: Timers One optional protocol change –DNSKEY Revoke bit  Invalidates DS/DNSKEY fast, this is a revocation schema for DNSSEC  “immediately” is within the traditional DNS sense of:  zone update propagation delay + TTL

Resolver Trust Anchor State Machine NB: Differs slightly from ID version!

Trust Anchors: n out of m Larger DNSKEY set required

The state machine

Open Mike Comments on proposals Comments

Next Step Advance –One –Both –Neither Take discussion to mailing list