1 Multi Kingdom AAA Security using Kerberos v5 Kaushik Narayan.

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Presentation transcript:

1 Multi Kingdom AAA Security using Kerberos v5 Kaushik Narayan

10-Dec-2000HCL Cisco Offshore Development Center 2 Kerberos Operation

10-Dec-2000HCL Cisco Offshore Development Center 3 Associations and Contexts u Association is relationship between two communication endpoints. u Contexts consist of specific context attributes that are used to establish, maintains and release associations. u Context operations. u Context attributes. u Negotiation attributes.

10-Dec-2000HCL Cisco Offshore Development Center 4 Kerberos Security Contexts u Security contexts cover only the Kerberos application exchange and not the communication with the KDC. u Kerberos session keys form the context attributes which can be employed by AAA servers for creating a secure communication channel. u An authentication transaction is a pre- requisite.

10-Dec-2000HCL Cisco Offshore Development Center 5 Modes of Operation u End to End mode. u Hop by Hop mode. u End to End and Hop by Hop mode. u Any to Any mode

10-Dec-2000HCL Cisco Offshore Development Center 6 End to End mode AAA exchanges Kerberos End to End Security Context AAA Server AAA Server AAA Server AAA Server Kingdom1Kingdom3 Kingdom4 Kingdom2

10-Dec-2000HCL Cisco Offshore Development Center 7 Hop by Hop Mode AAA exchanges Kerberos Hop by Hop Security Context AAA Server AAA Server AAA Server AAA Server Kingdom1Kingdom3 Kingdom4 Kingdom2

10-Dec-2000HCL Cisco Offshore Development Center 8 End to End with Hop by Hop AAA exchanges Kerberos Hop by Hop Security Context Kerberos End to End Security Context AAA Server AAA Server AAA Server AAA Server Kingdom1Kingdom3 Kingdom4 Kingdom2

10-Dec-2000HCL Cisco Offshore Development Center 9 Any to Any Mode AAA Server AAA Server AAA Server AAA Server Kingdom1Kingdom3 Kingdom4 Kingdom2 AAA exchanges Kerberos Hop by Hop Security Context Kerberos End to End Security Context

10-Dec-2000HCL Cisco Offshore Development Center 10 Dependency on Data Modeling u Capabilities of intermediate AAA servers needs to be defined. u There needs to be a model that defines data that intermediate AAA servers with different capabilities need to inspect or modify in different application scenarios. u Use of attribute policies is an alternative.

10-Dec-2000HCL Cisco Offshore Development Center 11 Capabilities Discovery u The source AAA server needs to have the knowledge of the kingdoms that the request must traverse. u Needs to discover capabilities of AAA servers in each of these kingdoms. u Topology knowledge is not required.

10-Dec-2000HCL Cisco Offshore Development Center 12 Sessions u The authentication transaction would perform the Kerberos AS and TGS exchange. u Kerberos anonymous tickets can be employed to create kerberos security contexts with intermediate kingdoms. u Multiple security contexts can be created and destroyed by AAA servers during the lifetime of the main session. u Security contexts operations would form a session and these security context sessions would be sub- sessions of the main session.