TANZANIA REVENUE AUTHORITY TRA TAX INCENTIVES AND EXEMPTIONS: CHALLENGES FOR TAX POLICY AND REVENUE ADMINISTRATION Presentation at International Workshop.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Moving Out of Aid Dependency Michael Atingi-Ego 2 nd Committee Panel Discussion United Nations, New York 16 November 2007.
Advertisements

STRENGTHENING FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT: PROPOSALS FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR Compiled by the UN-Sanctioned Business Interlocutors to the International Conference.
1 Macroeconomic and Policy Challenges International Monetary Fund Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not.
Comments on What are the constraints on inclusive growth in Zambia? Elena Ianchovichina and Susanna Lundström Arne Bigsten University of Gothenburg.
Tax Exemptions, Capital Flight and Tax Havens: The Role of Multinational Companies Savior Mwambwa Centre for Trade Policy and Development (CTPD) Zambia.
1 Using and Misusing Investment Incentives James Alm and David L. Sjoquist March 2008.
Mereseini Q. Waibuta Ministry of Finance (Fiji) 10 March, 2014 In Seoul, Korea Ministry of Finance PRESENTATION AT THE PLENARY SESSION DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION.
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 15 Finance and Fiscal Policy for Development.
DECENTRALIZATION AND RURAL SERVICES : MESSAGES FROM RECENT RESEARCH AND PRACTICE Graham B. Kerr Community Based Rural Development Advisor The World Bank.
Marek Jakoby Advisor to the State Secretary Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic Vienna February 24, 2005 STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL.
Role of Tax Incentives in Investment Policy Investment Policy Conference Vienna June 15, 2011.
Tax Revenue Forecasting John King Tax Policy Division Fiscal Affairs Department.
Centre for Tax Policy and Administration Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Taxation, Social Cohesion and Sustainable Development -
Macroeconomic Policy and Floating Exchange Rates
Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: Lessons for Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
GHANA’S AGENDA FOR SHARED GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT,
Workshop on Developing Corporate Bond Market Mr. Masato Miyachi Office of Regional Economic Integration Asian Development Bank Session 1: Overview of Corporate.
1 FAIR TAX COMPETITION ~ A Pillar of Positive Economic Reform A presentation by Jeffrey Owens Director, OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration (CTPA)
Achieving the MDGs: RBA Training Workshop Module 8: Developing the MDG-based poverty reduction strategy 9-12 May 2005.
UNDP Ukraine1 Investment Climate in Ukraine: Old and New Challenges Iryna Akimova, Chief Economic Advisor, UNDP Ukraine ABCDE, Amsterdam, th of May,
Presentation by Leonard Shang-Quartey ISODEC Accra.
Comments on “New Orleans: Political Economy of Public Money” by Aaron Schneider James Alm.
MENA-OECD Investment Programme Draft Policy Considerations on Incentives Working Group 3 Meeting Cairo, Egypt 6-7 September 2006.
Effectiveness of Investment Incentives in Developing countries Evidence and Policy Implications Investment Policy Workshop Vienna May 14, 2012.
1 Enhancing the Effectiveness of Fiscal Policy for Domestic Resource Mobilization Patrick N. Osakwe Chief, Financing Development, UNECA.
Competition Reforms in Bus transport sector In Zambia National Advocacy Plan (CREW Project) CREW NRG-IV Meeting, 22 nd April, Lusaka.
Recent and Upcoming Fiscal Reforms: Sri Lanka Dushni Weerakoon Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka.
Macro Economic Framework for Economic Growth Renzo Daviddi European Commission Liaison Office to Kosovo 8 June 2010.
Jobs agenda to get the economy moving Redesign public services to support the economy Revamp the tax system to incent economic growth How to turn things.
Influence of foreign direct investment on macroeconomic stability Presenter: Governor CBBH: Kemal Kozarić.
1 Hsin Chu, August 2012 Regulatory Impact Assessment Charles-Henri Montin, Senior Regulatory Expert, Ministry of economy and finance, Paris
INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE sustainable solutions for ending hunger and poverty Ghana Strategy Support Program Fiscal Decentralisation.
Egypt’s Economic Reforms: Achievements and Challenges Mustapha K. Nabli The World Bank Presentation for Cairo Investment Forum 9-10 December 2006.
Ivan Mikloš Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of the Slovak Republic Munich June 18, 2004 GROWTH FOR BETTER SOCIAL STANDARDS BETTER SOCIAL.
Making the case for a fair recovery Nicola Smith Head of Economic and Social Affairs, TUC.
Brazilian Ministry of Finance 1 Stimulating Growth, What Should Be Done? THE BRAZILIAN CASE BERNARD APPY XXV Meeting of the Latin American Network of Central.
1 Survey of Economic and Social Conditions in Africa, 2006 Economic Commission for Africa Fortieth Session of the Conference of African Ministers of Finance,
Page1 Decentralization of Functions International Conference on Governance and Accountability in Social Sector Decentralization Dana Weist
1 ENSURING AND SUSTAINING MACRO-ECONOMIC STABILITY 2010 Consultative Group / Annual Partnership Meeting Venue: La Palm Royal Beach Hotel, Accra Date: 23rd.
Taxation of mining products and fiscal transition Jean-François Brun Gérard Chambas CERDI Module 3.
INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT (PFM) Module 1.1 Definitions, objectives of PFM and its context.
Eesti Pank Bank of Estonia Andres Sutt Estonian Economy - on the course for soft landing? October 25, 2007.
Life Impact | The University of Adelaide University of Papua New Guinea Economic Development Lecture 20: Fiscal Policy.
Chapter 1 Introduction.
Managing Public Budget to Facilitate Economic Growth and Reduce Poverty Public Expenditure Analysis & Management Staff Training Course May , 2001.
Addressing the Medium- and Long- run Challenges: the Overall Policy Framework Lyubomir Datzov Deputy Minister of Finance Republic of Bulgaria May 2007.
1 How to Deal with Tax expenditures: Policy Options Minimize the use of tax expenditures! Compared to more developed countries, countries that suffer from.
Kathy Corbiere Service Delivery and Performance Commission
Budget Presentation 2010/2011 – 2013/2014 All Communities 28 January 2010.
1 Bosnia and Herzegovina: Creating a Stable Decentralized Fiscal System The World Bank.
Page1 Intergovernmental Aspects of Service Delivery Public Expenditure for Human Development Course Dana Weist PRMPS 12 November 2003.
MEDIUM TERM FINANCIAL PLAN ( ) Date : 8/10/2010 Decision No : 2010/28.
MINISTRY OF FINANCE ECONOMIC STABILITY AND INVESTMENT PLAMEN ORESHARSKI MINISTER OF FINANCE March 11, 2008.
Economic Challenges of Bulgaria Lecture at the Military Academy of Sofia, July 17, 2003 by Piritta Sorsa, IMF representative in Bulgaria.
The Uptake of Management Accounting Practices Among Malaysian Firms in SMEs Sector HAU YIN TING A EPPA 2033 PERAKAUNAN KOS SEMESTER 1 SESI 2014/2015.
ITCILO/ACTRAV COURSE A Capacity Building for Members of Youth Committees on the Youth Employment Crisis in Africa 26 to 30 August 2013 Macro Economic.
Karnataka Public Financial Management and Accountability Study Launch Presentation September 14, 2004.
Institute for Austrian and International Tax Law Cooperative compliance at the crossroad of different legal frameworks – Cooperative.
1 Financial Sector Development in Myanmar Presented by Mr. Nyo Aye Mr. Win Hteik Assistant Director Board Secretary Ministry of Finance Central Bank of.
CABRI and World Bank Institute Training Programme Budget Management and Public Financial Accountability Presented by: Matthew Simmonds Chief Director:
ACCELERATING UGANDA’S ECONOMIC GROWTH MOMENTUM
Challenges on Building Realistic Budgets-Zambia
2005/06 National Budget BUSA submission.
Budgeting systems : Monitoring and Evaluation
Albanian VET Strategy and Action Plan for the period
The Mozambique Experience Dr Pascoal Mocumbi
Financing Budget oversight: Problems and Solutions.
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Creating a Stable Decentralized Fiscal System
The Landscape for Financing Growth in the Caribbean
Presentation transcript:

TANZANIA REVENUE AUTHORITY TRA TAX INCENTIVES AND EXEMPTIONS: CHALLENGES FOR TAX POLICY AND REVENUE ADMINISTRATION Presentation at International Workshop on “Building The Domestic Revenue Base: Tax Morale And Taxation Of Natural Resources” held in Lusaka, April 18-19, 2012 by Adolf H. Ndunguru Manager, Public Finance Tanzania Revenue Authority April 19 th, 2012

TANZANIA REVENUE AUTHORITY TRA TAX INCENTIVES AND EXEMPTIONS: CHALLENGES FOR TAX POLICY AND REVENUE ADMINISTRATION OUTLINE Introduction Evidence on Effectiveness of tax incentives Political Economy of Tax Incentives The Achilles heel of Tax Incentives Challenges Strategies for the future conclusion

TANZANIA REVENUE AUTHORITY TRA Introduction Many governments in LDCs have been subjected to intensive pressure to sweeten their tax programmes to attract both FDIs and DDIs High reliance is placed on tax incentives, as a tool of investment (economic) policy (for several reasons including political economy) However, the ability of this tool to influence investment decisions remains a moot point In Tanzania Tax Incentives have given up around 3% of GDP in tax revenues on average with little to show in exchange In most countries, tax incentives and exemptions need major tax policy reforms 3

TANZANIA REVENUE AUTHORITY TRA Effectiveness Of Tax Incentives Various methodologies have been to employed to study the effectiveness of tax incentive:  Research on cost-benefits analysis, sector specific approaches etc  Investor Motivation surveys Tax Expenditures

TANZANIA REVENUE AUTHORITY TRA Effectiveness Of Tax Incentives (cont’d) In LDCs experience with tax incentives has produced a mixed results, countries such as Mauritius and Malaysia with tangible success from their incentive scheme Most countries however have had little to show in exchange for the incentives they have offered still, despite suffering sizable revenue loss, have maintained generous tax incentive schemes. Mauritius has undergone a significant turnaround in reforming its tax incentive structure cutting tax expenditure as a percentage of from 3.23% in 2006 to 1.46% in Outcome: revenue growing at 15-20% rates, sound real GDP growth at 5% on average

TANZANIA REVENUE AUTHORITY TRA Effectiveness Of Tax Incentives (cont’d) Econometric studies on investment incentives in developing countries are scanty, mainly due lack of good firm level data on investment in these countries. To mitigate this problem, several approaches, including investors motivation survey methods, have been used to determine whether incentives are effective in encouraging investments The balance of evidence suggests that, for many developing countries, fiscal incentives do not effectively counterbalance unattractive investment climate conditions such as poor infrastructure, macroeconomic instability, and weak governance and markets.

TANZANIA REVENUE AUTHORITY TRA Effectiveness Of Tax Incentives (cont’d) investors have confirmed that while incentives were not an important factor in their decisions to invest, they would ask for them anyway because incentives improved their bottom lines Asked whether incentives are important a US investor responded: "Tax exemption is like a dessert; it is good to have, but it does not help very much if the meal is not there.“ An Investor Motivation Survey 2012 (Sebastian, James and Mikra Krasniqi, 2012) in Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania found out that only 7.9% (39 out of 450 cases) of all respondents in all three countries said that they would not have invested without tax and fiscal incentives they received.

TANZANIA REVENUE AUTHORITY TRA Effectiveness Of Tax Incentives (cont’d)

TANZANIA REVENUE AUTHORITY TRA Political Economy of Tax Incentives 9 Discretionary Incentives popular with politicians Incentives have non-transparent costs Role of Governance Bargaining for Incentives

TANZANIA REVENUE AUTHORITY TRA Achilles heel of Exemptions Although the case against tax incentives is not widely appreciated among policy makers, it is a critically important parameter of sustainable revenue policy design. tax incentives lead to revenue losses, create loopholes for tax avoidance and further erode the tax base, complicate tax administration and make revenue collection less efficient, introduce distortions in resource allocation, impair transparency and accountability, and rarely deliver favourable results

TANZANIA REVENUE AUTHORITY TRA Selected Challenges Assessing their effectiveness Controlling ‘exemptions creep’ pressure from lobby powers Agreeing on the proper incentives recipe- balancing economic vs political interest Combating the race to the bottom effects of incentives Putting in place effective administrative monitoring machineries

TANZANIA REVENUE AUTHORITY TRA Selected Challenges (cont’d) Achieving simplicity in the tax system Building data base for informed analysis Ensuring predictability of tax revenues

TANZANIA REVENUE AUTHORITY TRA Strategies for the Future Increase Transparency  Undertake Tax Expenditure Analysis- allows the costs to be scrutinized by the public  Place a budget on tax incentives Reduce Discretion  ensuring that incentives are granted transparently, through legislation.  This ensures the role of the legislature  Even if a ‘big’ deal has to be given ensure that criteria is defined 13

TANZANIA REVENUE AUTHORITY TRA Strategies for the Future Action should be coordinated among neighboring countries. Avoidance of tax Competition –Race to the Bottom Selectivity in tax incentive recipe. Avoid period holidays in favour of other investment-linked or performance-based incentives, investment tax credit, Investment allowance accelerated depreciation Tighten administration - reduce leakage in the usage of Tax Incentives by periodically study their effectiveness - allow the public to see for themselves if incentives work. 14

TANZANIA REVENUE AUTHORITY TRA Conclusion The benefits of tax incentives on investment are widely exaggerated costs are widely underestimated. Exemptions have significant proximity with of illicit capital flight with the application of tax incentives This bias in favour of incentives arises partly from weaknesses in tax policy analysis, and partly from political pressures that inherently favour special interest groups. Revenue mobilization is the central purpose of the tax system, countries should agree in principle that the existing tax incentive programmes are not sustainable and therefore they should be re-designed to ensure prudent tax revenue management. 15

TANZANIA REVENUE AUTHORITY TRA Conclusion (cont’d) Countries should be cautious about offering incentives that create substantial revenue risks, either directly or indirectly. All tax incentives should be incorporated in or carefully coordinated with the relevant tax legislations, shunning as much as it possible from discretionary tax incentive. effective monitoring machinery in the implementation of projects that receive discretionary fiscal benefits contingent on performance criteria are required Learning from successful reforms in implementing and managing tax incentives. Limit the granting of incentives to location specific investments 16

TANZANIA REVENUE AUTHORITY TRA THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION