The RCN and the War in the Atlantic

RCN: established in 1910 u --pre-war role: fisheries and coastal surveillance u --limited size due to inter-service rivalries and lack of political support

The Growth of the RCN u 1939: 13 warships (six destroyers)/3,000 men u 1945: 400 warships/100,000 personnel u Third largest Allied navy/third largest in the world u Is the whole story?

The Central Wartime Role u convoy escorts u hunting U-Boats

The Importance of the RCN u without convoy escorts, no convoys, no bomber offensive, no assaults in North Africa, and Italy, no D-Day, no victory.

The Challenge of the RCN u A different, wider role/outdated equipment – RCN was planning a “traditional navy” against air attack and surface raiders u 1940: Canadian destroyers are sent to help defend the Channel – Convoys vs. U-Boats was not a priority – Plans for a conventional navy change as U-Boat threat develops

1941: Convoy duties begin u British and American discussions find the Royal Canadian Navy in charge of Western Atlantic u A role for which the Convoys and crews are unprepared u The Bad Time: July -December 1942

The Corvette: The basic ship of the RCN (Canadian built/Canadian manned) u small, and maneuverable: a jack-of-all-trades u “cheap and nasties” u 200 feet long: a “wet” ship u crew: 85 u Intended for inshore duty u Ill-trained and unprepared crews Sandy McClearn, “Flower Class: Corvette” g/navhist/canada/ww2/f lower/

The Corvette’s Problems u Out of date equipment u asdic (sonar); u navigation (standard vs. gyro compasses); u radio direction finding (radar) often unavailable u By 1943, new ships were being outfitted, but not the ones on the water

ID #20928 Credit: National Archives of Canada / PA

The Convoys Begin...Badly u 23 June 1941 HX 133 – 58 ships protected by 1 destroyer and 3 corvettes – 6 ships lost u Confused tactics: to defend the convoys, or attack the U-Boats? u September 1941: SC 42 – 64 ships protected by 1 destroyer and 3 corvettes – 16 ships lost vs. 14 U-Boats – “most escorts are equipped with one weapon of approximate precision--the Ram” u November 1941: SC 52 returns to Canada – only convoy ever turned back by U-Boat threat during the entire war

The Crisis of 1942 u RCN role increases in the Atlantic u Royal Navy reluctant to share new technology, when technology is all important u The “Happy Time” (early 1942) – 100 Allied merchant ships sunk monthly u September 1942: Gulf of St. Lawrence closed to shipping

ONS 154 u Christmas 1942 u 45 ships 600 miles due west of Ireland u 5 Canadian escorts u 27 December: contact with U-Boat Group ‘Spitz’ (20 U-Boats attack) u 4 ships lost: 486 personnel lost

The End of the Beginning u The British ask the Canadians to withdraw their escorts for training. –A blow to Canadian pride u RCN forced to reevaluate a war fought largely by reservists. u The Canadian convoy escorts pulled out for further training

1943: The Battle of the Atlantic Turns u Increased air cover closes the Atlantic "gap" u Better convoy tactics u Better technology: "The hedgehog" u German “shark” codes broken – allows Allies to divert routes

: The RCN hunts U- Boats u The RCN tries to build its “big fleet” but the Corvettes are still needed u The U-Boats are hard to find--and kill u January-June 1943: 100 German U-Boats sunk u Canadian ships left out of the campaign that would kill the U-Boats u Not enough ships equipped for the hunt

U-Boat Kills by RCN u Between May 1943 and May 1945 – 1943: 2 – 1944: 15 – 1945: 3 – Total 20 u But how many convoys were saved from U- Boat attacks?

The Final Cost: Royal Canadian Navy u enlistments: men; 6500 women u 471 fighting vessels u Convoy; anti-submarine warfare u 24 vessels sunk u 2024 fatal casualties

Further reading: u Marc Milner, “The Implications of Technological Backwardness: The Canadian Navy ” in Milner, Canadian Military History: Selected Readings, Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993: u “Why was the RCN so poorly equipped?” (310) u What implications did this have?