Pay for Performance? CEO Compensation and Acquirer Returns in BHCs Kristina Minnick, Bentley College Haluk Unal, University of Maryland and FDIC CFR Liu.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
8-3: Corporations, Mergers, and Multinationals
Advertisements

Unit 4 Econ EOC Review.
Local Gambling Preferences and Corporate Innovative Success Yangyang Chen, Monash University Edward J. Podolski, La Trobe University S. Ghon Rhee, University.
(Univ. of Southern California)
CEO hedging opportunities and the weighting of performance measures in compensation Shengmin Hung Hunghua Pan* Taychang Wang 12/06/
A test of the free cash flow hypothesis: The case of bidder returns Larry H.P. Lang Rene M. Stulz Ralph A. Walkling (Journal of Financial Economics 29,
Extraordinary Acquirers
REPETITIVE CROSS-BORDER MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS Amrita Nain, Kyeong Lee, and Emma Xu 2014 LFE Workshop in Financial Economics Higher School of Economics,
At the heart of any free economy is its capital markets. Investors put their money in these capital markets with the expectation of a return on their investment.
Corporate Finance -M&A
Acquiring Acquirers: New evidence on the drivers of acquirer’s announcement returns in corporate takeovers Ludovic Phalippou – Oxford University Fangming.
Executive Compensation and Risk Taking in the Property and Casualty Insurance Industry Mark Browne (U Wisconsin) Yu-Luen Ma (Illinois State U) Ping Wang.
Determinants and Dynamics of Dividend Payouts by REITs by Milena Petrova, Syracuse University Andrew Spieler, Hofstra University.
Extraordinary Acquirers Discussant: Chao Chen Fudan University.
Shared Auditors in Mergers and Acquisitions Lubomir Litov University of Arizona & Wharton Financial Institutions Centre, Univ. of Pennsylvania.
The Role of Equity Underwriting Relationships in Mergers and Acquisitions Hsuan-Chi Chen Anderson School of Management, University of New Mexico Keng-Yu.
Operating Performance and Free Cash Flow of Asset Buyers Steven Freund Alexandros P. Prezas Gopala K. Vasudevan (Financial Management 32, 2003, )
1 Performance and Compensation – evidence of optimal contracting by Sun, Li and Liu Discussant: Oliver M. Rui The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Divestment, Remuneration and Corporate Governance in Mature Firms Michelle Haynes University of Warwick Steve Thompson University of Nottingham Mike Wright.
Jim Hsieh (George Mason) Dolly King (UNC Charlotte) NTU, 12/10/2010.
M&A size effect on wealth effect: A panel analysis for China security market Liyan Han, Xiaomeng Wang School of Economics and Management, Beihang University,
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives By: Michael Jensen, and Kevin Murphy.
Drake DRAKE UNIVERSITY MBA Finance 200 Financial Management Drake University Summer 2005.
Common and Preferred Stock Financing
Dario Focarelli (ANIA and Università di Roma “La Sapienza”) Alberto Franco Pozzolo (Università degli Studi del Molise and Ente Luigi Einaudi) The Changing.
Guilty until Proven Innocent: The Economic Consequences of the Initiation and the Outcome of Internal Investigations of Option Backdating Discussion CAPANA.
20 Financing with Derivatives ©2006 Thomson/South-Western.
Financial Markets and Corporate Strategy
Pay for performance? CEO Compensation and Acquirer Returns in BHCs by Kristina Minnick, Haluk Unal and Liu Yang Discussion by Santiago Carbó-Valverde University.
1-1 CHAPTER 1 An Overview of Financial Management.
Differences in Acquirer Motivations, Announcement Effects, Target Characteristics, and Financing in Private versus Public Acquisitions: The Case of REITs.
Private and Public Merger Waves
Jim Hsieh (George Mason) Qinghai Wang (Georgia Tech) NTU, 12/11/2008.
1 On the Efficiency of Internal and External Corporate Control Mechanisms Walsh, James P. and Seward, James K. (1990), Academy of Management Review, 15.
The Industrial Organization of Bond Underwriting Market with Bank Entry: Evidence from Underwriting Fees Wei-Ling Song Drexel University & Wharton Financial.
Determinants of Credit Default Swap Spread: Evidence from the Japanese Credit Derivative Market.
Discussion of Aslan-Grinstein: Political Contributions and CEO Pay Rotterdam, May 2012 Moqi Xu, LSE 1.
A signaling theory of acquisition premiums: evidence from IPO targets Jeffrey Reuer Tony W. Tong Presented by Carla Fernández-Corrales, Fall 2014 Academy.
“Earnings Management and Initial Public Offerings: The Case of the Depository Industry” Adams, Carow and Perry CFR Workshop October 25, 2006 Discussant.
The Perverse Effects of Investment Bank Rankings: Evidence from M&A League Tables François Derrien, HEC Paris Olivier Dessaint, HEC Paris November 8, 2012.
Comparing financial institutions. Credit Unions A cooperative financial institution that is owned and controlled by its members and operated solely to.
Discussion of Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders Authors Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Charles C.Y. Wang Yale-ECGI-Oxford Conference November.
Mergers & Acquisitions BA 469 Prof. Dowling Spring Term, 2007.
Law 514 Corporations Instructor: Dwight Drake Copyright 2005 Dwight Drake. All Rights Reserved. Business Planning: Closely Held Enterprises www. drake-business-planning.com.
Financial Management Chapter 17.
Tunneling or Propping: Evidence from Connected Transactions in China By Winnie Peng, K.C. John Wei and Zhishu Yang Presenter: Winnie Peng, HKUST NTUICF,
 Finance is concerned with resource allocation as well as resource management, acquisition and investment. Simply, finance deals with matters related.
CEOs and the Product Market: When are Powerful CEOs Beneficial? Minwen Li, Yao Lu, and Gordon Phillips Southwestern University of Finance and Economics.
The Influence of Corporate Internal Governance on the Wealth Effect of R&D Expenditure Increases Shao-Chi Chang National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan.
Cash holdings, corporate governance, and acquirer returns Seoungpil Ahn and Jaiho Chung May 11, 2012.
Do Higher Paid CEOs Weather the Storm Better
A signaling theory of acquisition premiums: Evidence from IPO targets
Anchoring & Acquisitions
Acquirer-target social ties and merger outcomes
FIN 592Competitive Success/tutorialrank.com
FIN 592 Education for Service-- tutorialrank.com.
Comovement in Investment
The Choice Among Acquisitions, Alliances, and Divestitures
The Performance Effects of Gender Diversity on Bank Boards
2018/12/31 What Can Deter Catering? Information Environment, Governance, and Agency Problem of Overvalued Equity Shing-yang Hu Department of Finance, National.
A signaling theory of acquisition premiums: Evidence from IPO targets
Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance 刘铭锋
Audra L. Boone, Erik Lie, Yixin Liu
What are friends for? CEO Networks, Pay and CG
The acquisitiveness of youth: CEO age and acquisition behavior
Capital structure, executive compensation, and investment efficiency
Peer Effects on Corporate Cash Holdings
Board Structure, Antitakeover Provisions, and Stockholder Wealth
What Data is in WRDS?.
Literatures of Stock market
Presentation transcript:

Pay for Performance? CEO Compensation and Acquirer Returns in BHCs Kristina Minnick, Bentley College Haluk Unal, University of Maryland and FDIC CFR Liu Yang, UCLA

2 CEO Compensation in BHCs

3 Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity Change of the CEO's wealth (in $000s) given a 1% change in stock price

4 Histogram of PPS

5 CEO with the Highest Total Compensation (by Year)

6 Our Paper Research Question –Does higher pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) lead to value-enhancing managerial effort? Application –Mergers and acquisitions Tests –Decisions to acquire –Market reaction: announcement returns to stock- and bond-holders –Change of operating performance after mergers

7 Related Literature Corporate governance and acquisitions –Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2001) –Harford and Li (2007) –Falato (2007) –Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) Governance in banks –Bliss and Rosen (2001) –John, Mehran and Qian (2007) –Adams and Mehran (2003)

8 Our Data Completed acquisitions in the banking industry as identified from the SDC Platinum in the period of 1990 to 2005 Data available –Financial data from Compustat Bank and Call Reports –Stock prices from CRSP –Compensation data from ExecuComp Final sample –178 deals made by 65 acquiring BHCs –The control sample contains 700 bank-years that are not related to M&A Robustness check –Comprehensive governance dataset with: board structure, anti-takeover provisions, and institutional ownership –Bond return data from LBBD

9 Dependent Variable: 1: Acquire=Y 0: Acquire=N Probability to Acquire (Table IV)

10 Probability to Acquire –Banks with low PPS are more likely to acquire, controlling for other characteristics Banks in the first quartile of PPS are 24% more likely to acquire as compared to banks in the last quartile Moving from high-PPS group (mean + stdev) to low-PPS group (mean – stdev) lowers the acquisition probability by 37%

11 Acquirer Announcement Returns

12 Acquire Returns by PPS Group The difference in CAR between Low- and High- PPS group is 71bps.

13 Stock Returns (Table 7) One standard deviation increase of PPS will increase CAR by 0.51% Dependent Variable: CAR(-1,1)

14 Bond Returns (Table 9) Dependent Variable: BAR(-1,1) High PPS also benefits bond- holders!

15 Change of Operating Performance (Table 10) Acquirers with high pre- acquisition PPS also improve more in their operating performance.

16 Conclusion High pay-for-performance sensitivity lead to value-enhancing mergers –Banks with high PPS are less likely to acquire –Market react positively to acquiring banks with high PPS –Following acquisitions, acquirers with high pre- acquisition PPS improve more in operating performance