R EGIMES IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES Regime = common constellation of politics, policy and institutions Two key differences with regimes in Rich Democracies.

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Presentation transcript:

R EGIMES IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES Regime = common constellation of politics, policy and institutions Two key differences with regimes in Rich Democracies Much less stable Conflict more likely to result in violence Institutions more fragile Policies more erratic Greater diversity Types Authoritarian developmental (S. Korea, Taiwan) Economic development and improved citizen capability Authoritarian predatory (Nigeria, Zaire (DRC)) Neither development nor capability Developmental democracies (Chile, Costa Rica, Mauritius) Development and improved citizen capability Fragmented democracies (Brazil, India, Philippines) Some development and some citizen capability

A UTHORITARIAN D EVELOPMENTAL : P OLITICS Geographical and political circumstances Threatened by powerful enemies (S. Korea by N. Korea; Taiwan by China); needed support of citizens; prosperity would lend legitimacy Threats of internal unrest: rapid industrialization would raise living standards and reduce conflict Absence of rich natural resources These challenges (conditions) gave elites incentives to promote economic development and share wealth Advantages: colonized by Japan (developed infrastructure); had model of state-led growth; enormous economic and military aid (U.S., anticommunist allies) Appealed to nationalism, anticommunism Built support in specific constituencies Among entrepreneurs/capitalists through credit, tariffs, anti- union labor policy) Among farmers through (agricultural extension programs; land reform) In short run, workers paid much of the cost of industrialization; over time, enjoyed more benefits (increased literacy, social mobility, better jobs, wage increases)

A UTHORITARIAN D EVELOPMENTAL : P OLICIES Goal = rapid industrialization; long-term competitiveness Initially, pursued import substitution industrialization (ISI) Over time, manufactured for export, export- oriented industrialization (EOI) To compete in world markets in price and quality Did not use market capitalism model Instead, used Japan’s state-led development model Government played an important role in promoting key sectors through incentives (loans, credit, etc.) Social welfare targeted well-off and key allies Invested in wealth-sharing mechanisms: universal public education, land reform, promoted small and medium-sized businesses

A UTHORITARIAN D EVELOPMENTAL : I NSTITUTIONS Centralized political system Power concentrated in small elite (executive) Elected legislatures, courts, and local government not effective checks Strong and coherent state Effective policy implementation Government officials autonomous (shielded from pressures), competent, professional (corruption minimized) Officials executed policies as leadership intended Close relationship to business community Frequent consultation Institutions devoted to legitimation and security Elections gave façade of democratic accountability Schools and media towed government line Iron fist: huge armies, massive security apparatus, repression of dissent

P REDATORY : P OLITICS Least successful authoritarian regimes in economic and human development Rulers have little incentive No military threats (no need to industrialize to produce weapons) Oil, diamonds, gold (natural resources) reduce incentives to industrialize, educate citizens) Rely on foreign aid Plagued by ethnic, linguistic, regional conflicts Class interests submerged (lack business/working class to assert interests) Loyalties built on narrow coalitions based on ethnic, linguistic, regional loyalties Cemented through clientelism = patron (powerful) gives client (less powerful) favors (patronage) in return for support Government positions (bureaucracy, police, army) with access to salaries and income from corruption State contracts, valuable licenses in return for kickbacks, political favors Divide and rule tactics; intimidation Clientelist politicians draw support from narrow, geographically defined constituencies; concentrate on providing patronage to supporters Large parts of population receive little benefit or support (health care, education, safety)

P REDATORY : P OLICIES Goal of leaders = enrich themselves, families, followers Economic development policies means to concentrate wealth in elite hands ISI led to accumulation of wealth by leaders Human development policies Education and health care provide opportunities for making money School, clinic construction – kickbacks, graft

P REDATORY : INSTITUTIONS Weak states: without capacity to implement policy and without autonomy from powerful individuals Political parties without clear policy goals Weak legislatures (without significant role in policy, checking executive) Bureaucracies riddled with corruption Personal considerations key Massive corruption by elites permeates bureaucracy Few incentives to follow rules State unable to deliver basic goods and services Inadequate infrastructure Limited protection of property rights Inefficient firms protected Inefficient management of foreign investment, aid

T YPOLOGY OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES Table 8.1, 225 Why do authoritarian regimes vary in their promotion of economic and human development? Why are some developmental while others are predatory? Incentives leaders have to build broad or narrow coalitions of support Quality of state institutions available for implementing policies Kinds of groups and social classes available for constructing coalitions of support

D EMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTAL : P OLITICS Commitment to democracy, economic growth, and human development (increasing citizens’ capability) Leaders view goals as mutually reinforcing Consolidating democracy requires convincing social groups/classes they benefit from democracy Meet needs of poor; do not threaten interests of wealthier groups Economic growth through market; policies improve capability of peasants and workers Capitalists reassured regime supports economic growth; in turn, pay higher taxes Workers and rural poor assured by improved education, health care, and pensions (progress slow) Trade-offs require broad-based social democratic political parties, federations of labor and business, state bureaucracies that are capable and coherent Compromise gives political influence to agricultural workers, small farmers, and urban workers (beyond clientelist relationships)

D EMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTAL : P OLICIES Strong social democratic parties Capitalist economic growth with substantial safety nets Minimal state ownership of enterprises Growth with equity Export-led growth and integration into global market Substantial social welfare programs Strengthened labor union bargaining power with employers Increased citizens’ capability (in terms of infant mortality, life expectancy, and literacy)

D EMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTAL : I NSTITUTIONS Stable, broad-based political parties Capable, coherent state bureaucracies Encompassing labor and business federations Parties appeal to broad groups of voters through policies that aim to promote growth with equity Agricultural laborers, small farmers, urban workers, parts of middle class Important part of governing coalitions Broad-based labor and business federations Represent workers and businesses in most sectors Prevents narrowly based unions or business associations from seeking benefits only for their members at expense of society (narrow agendas) Makes bargaining easier Strong, autonomous states Make, implement policies favoring broad categories of population (especially poor, disadvantaged) State bureaucracies with capable officials; more coherent, successful policy-making and implementation

F RAGMENTED DEMOCRACIES : P OLITICS Fragmented political parties, interest associations, and states Parties win elections by utilizing patronage and appealing to narrow groups of voters based on racial, ethnic, religious, regional identities Interest groups represent specific groups with narrow interests State often beset by bureaucratic infighting Tend to emerge in countries with large inequalities in wealth, power, citizen capability; large and diverse populations Wealth concentrated in hands of elite Diversity makes broad-based interest associations, political parties difficult to form Politicians appeal to upper income groups (owners of large businesses, urban middle class, large commercial farmers) Clientelism inhibits peasants and workers Rulers engage in identity politics (submerging class differences; avoids having to promise change in distribution of income/wealth) Politicians also engage in populism Governments target benefits to privileged groups, organized workers Local elites manipulate elections (electoral democracies: frequent violations of civil and political rights)

F RAGMENTED DEMOCRACIES : POLICIES Benefits of economic and social policies go mainly to wealthier business people, some union leaders, large farmers, and middle class ISI protects businesses; gives subsidies to large farmers Educational, health care, retirement, unemployment spending geared to upper- and middle-classes Policies biased toward urban middle-class and wealthy, but some improvements in lives of poor Declining poverty rates

F RAGMENTED DEMOCRACIES : INSTITUTIONS Fragmented political institutions Multiple political parties, interest groups, federal systems Create obstacles to improve health, education, and safety for the poor Rich do not need broad-based associations or political parties to promote interests (can use personal connections, narrow interest associations) Parties rely on patronage and/or appeals to racial and ethnic identity rather than presenting consistent policies Legislators focus on pork barrel projects, local benefits Often benefiting middle and upper income groups the most Do little to promote capabilities Fragmentation within the state prevents implementation of coherent programs (bureaucratic infighting and political competition for ministry positions, patronage opportunities)

T YPOLOGY OF D EMOCRATIC REGIMES Table 8.4, 236 Differences in ability to promote citizens’ capability Incentives leaders have to build broad or narrow coalitions of support Quality of state institutions available for implementing policies Groups and social classes available for constructing coalitions of support Also used to differentiate between authoritarian developmental and authoritarian predatory Extent to which political parties and interest groups are broad-based or fragmented Poor and marginalized citizens can be effective politically only when they have broad-based parties and associations to represent them

C OMPARING CAPABILITY Physical well-being Authoritarian developmental and developmental democratic regimes lowest rates of absolute poverty (Table 8.5, 237) and best records on health (infant mortality, life expectancy) (Table 8.6, 238); predatory regimes the worst Informed decision-making In terms of adult literacy (Table 8.7, 239), a similar pattern emerges (from best to worst): Authoritarian developmental  developmental democracy  fragmented democracy  predatory Safety Likewise with political stability/violence and rule of law (Table 8.8, 240): developmental democracy  fragmented democracy  predatory Civil and political rights From best to worst in terms of civil liberties, political rights (Table 8.9, 241): developmental democracy  fragmented democracy  authoritarian developmental  predatory