Slide 1/8 07/17/03 EAP 57th IETF WIEN, Austria, July 13-18, 2003 “EAP support in smartcards” Pascal Urien & All ENST Draft-urien-EAP-smartcard-02.txt.

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Presentation transcript:

Slide 1/8 07/17/03 EAP 57th IETF WIEN, Austria, July 13-18, 2003 “EAP support in smartcards” Pascal Urien & All ENST Draft-urien-EAP-smartcard-02.txt

Slide 2/8 07/17/03 EAP EAP Support in Smartcard. Goals  Definition of an “universal” ISO 7816 interface, e.g. supporting most of EAP authentication protocols. EAP smartcard benefits  Network credentials are securely stored.  Smartcard bearer doesn’t know its network credentials (shared secret, asymmetric keys…)  EAP protocols are computed in a trusted environment.  Smartcard can’t be cloned.  Smartcard is blocked/unblocked by the user’s PIN-code Other aspects  Scalability. Half a billion smartcards produced in  Multiple form factors (ISO 7816 Credit Card Format, SIM GSM 11.11, USB…).  Sufficient cryptographic performances (RSA 2048 bits calculation in 500 ms), memory size around 128 kb, one Mb with the FLASH technology).

Slide 3/8 07/17/03 EAP Overview EAP / RADIUS EAP / LAN EAP / 7816 RADIUS802.1xISO 7816  Secure Authentication.  User authentication rather than computer authentication  One smartcard for several networks.  Interoperability between EAP smartcards. Smartcard Supplicant AuthenticatorRADIUS server EAP EAP Engine EAP profile EAP profile EAP-ID EAP-Type Crypto Key(s)

Slide 4/8 07/17/03 EAP Basic Concepts Identity  A pointer to a set of information that is needed for processing EAP-Messages, EAP-ID, EAP-Type, Cryptographic Keys User Profile, information meaningful for the terminal or the network (SSID, radio channel, X509 certificates…) Profile  Implementation recommendation for particular EAP- Type. PIN Management  EAP smartcard may be protected by a PIN code, only knew/managed by its bearer. EAP Application.  An EAP (smartcard) application may be associated to one or more EAP-Type. In that case it is started by a Select-AID command.

Slide 5/8 07/17/03 EAP EAP Smartcard Services 1/3 Four logical interfaces.  Network interface. Smartcard directly processes EAP messages (requests, notifications). EAP profiles definition. A set of rules (if needed) for supporting a particular authentication protocol (messages maximum size, …).  Operating System/Terminal interface. Identity management. Multiple triplets (EAP-ID, EAP-Type, cryptographic keys) are stored in the smartcard; a triplet is required by each network. User profile, typically an LDAP record stored in the smartcard (under discussion).  Management/Personalization interface. Identities & profiles download and update. Management could be done via dedicated EAP protocols (under discussion).  User Interface Personal Identification Number (PIN code) management

Slide 6/8 07/17/03 EAP EAP Smartcard Services 2/3 Secure EAP Framework EAP-MD5 EAP-SIMEAP-TLS OTHER IDENTITYEAP-IDEAP TYPE CRYPTO Key(s) PROFILE My-HomedadMD5Password- KeysCredentials EAP authentication protocols profiles Management Personalization Interface OS/Terminal Interface Get-Next-Identity() Get-Preferred-Identity() Get-Current-Identity() Set-Identity() Set-Multiple-Identity() Get-Session() Get-Profile-Data() Select-AID() Add-Identity() Delete-Identity() Network interface Process-EAP() Identity List User Interface Verify-PIN() Change-PIN() Enable-PIN() Disable-PIN() Unblock-PIN()

Slide 7/8 07/17/03 EAP EAP smartcard Services 3/3. SERVICE APDU CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Le COMMENTS Process-EAP Ax ii xx yyProcess an EAP message Add-Identity Ax xx 00Add an identity entry to the EAP smartcard Delete-Identity Ax xx 00Delete an identity entry Get-Current-Identity Ax xxGet the current identity Get-Next-Identity Ax xxExtract the identity from a circular list Get-Preferred-Identity Ax xxGet the preferred identity Set-Identity Ax xx 00Set the smartcard current identity Set-Multiple-Identity Ax xx 00Set an multiple identity Get-Profile-Data Ax 1A xxGet the subscriber profile. Get-Current-Version Ax 10 xx yy 00 02P1#0 is the EAP-Type, P2=0 EAP version, P2=1 WLAN Smartcard Consortium version Get-Session-Key Ax A6 00 ii 00 20Get the session key. Verify-PIN A Verify the user current PIN code Change-PIN A Change the user current PIN code Enable-PIN A Enable pin code use Disable-PIN A Disable pin code use Unblock-PIN A0 2C Unblock EAP smartcard Select-AID 00 A xx 00Start an EAP smartcard application

Slide 8/8 07/17/03 EAP EAP smartcard profiles. ProfileComments MD5Informative purpose EAP-SIMProfile for EAP-SIM EAP-TLSFragmentation issue under discussion PEAPUnder Discussion