Securing Data in ePassports Policy Issues ICAO/NTWG

John Davies Director of Systems, UK Passport Service Chairman NTWG PKI Task Force

ICAO/NTWG The presentation will address: Why secure electronic data? Why use PKI/encryption? How a globally interoperable PKI could work for passports

ICAO/NTWG To ensure the electronic data was loaded by the appropriate passport issuing authority To ensure the electronic data has not been overwritten or amended in any way. To protect inappropriate access to data by unauthorised persons or organisations. Why secure electronic data?

ICAO/NTWG –Biometric information Portrait Data (mandatory) Finger print and iris data (optional) –Personal details from the passport biodata page ( name, date of birth, passport number, etc.) e-Passports will initially contain the following electronic data:

ICAO/NTWG –e-Passport specifications will offer read only access to the electronic data and will not initially offer any updating facility. –This limitation will facilitate a simple form of security implementation in the first instance.

ICAO/NTWG There is a tension between : –Ensuring the electronic data is secure from inappropriate access –Ensuring the electronic data can be accessed easily by immigration authorities.

ICAO/NTWG The PKI scheme is based on open access but allows individual states to choose optional additional security methods to protect personal data.

ICAO/NTWG PKI is a well established method of protecting and authenticating data held on computer chips. No other scheme offers equivalent security for chip technology. Why use a public key infrastructure (PKI)?

ICAO/NTWG The proposals do not include encryption for basic personal data or the facial biometric. Encryption of fingerprint or iris data could be considered by states who choose to use these forms of biometric, but encryption specifications have not been developed. Why use encryption?

ICAO/NTWG –A peer-based environment with each state independent and autonomous with respect to passport security. –An agreed means of sharing and updating public keys. The PKI scheme proposes:

ICAO/NTWG –Generate key sets and protect from unauthorised access. –Manage distribution of country signing certificates using bilateral secure diplomatic means. –Manage certificate revocations when a key is compromised. –Facilitate dissemination of information about public keys via ICAO public key directory. Responsibilities for states issuing e- passports:

ICAO/NTWG –RSA or DSA or elliptic curve and related hashing algorithms are included in the specifications. The PKI specifications recognise many individual states already have a PKI infrastructure :

ICAO/NTWG –Maintain up to date information about public keys and certificate revocations on their systems. –Provide suitable reader infrastructures. PK1 responsibilities for states reading e-Passports :

ICAO/NTWG –To provide an efficient and reliable public key directory –Ensure the directory is only updated by member states. –Provide open access to public key information to participating states and organisations. ICAO Responsibilities:

ICAO/NTWG –Aimed at specialists familiar with PKI. –Proposes a technical framework and guidelines to enable each country to develop secure e-Passports. The PKI Technical report:

ICAO/NTWG The technical report includes an annex on PKI and security threats. This is intended to aid individual states with their own risk analysis and mitigation decisions.