VANET PRIVACY: MIDTERM PRESENTATION Lars Kivari and Mathias Masasabi June 17 th, 2013 L

 “A recurrent theme flows through Fourth Amendment cases: criminals devise new ways to commit crimes and evade the police; the police devise new ways to intercept communications and detect criminal conduct; and the courts are left to sort out the constitutional from the not in these new contexts.”  Congressional Research Service  L

OVERVIEW  Basic Information-VANET’s and Privacy  Our definitions of privacy and privacy specific to VANET’s  Privacy Protecting Laws  Court Cases  Our Contributions  Linking OnStar and Smartphones to VANET’s/Privacy  Digital Threats to VANET’s – Scenarios  FBI Statistics on Cellphone Tracking  Future Work L

WHAT IS A VANET?  Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks:  “A Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network, or VANET is a technology that uses moving cars as nodes in a network to create a mobile network.”  Source: WHAT IS PRIVACY?  Privacy:  According to the Oxford Dictionary, “privacy is the state or condition of being free from being observed or disturbed by other people”.  M

WHY VANETS?  1. Safety- Save lives (auto accidents and accidents cased by distractions)  2. Traffic- Manage traffic to reduce congestion (Ex. L.A. Traffic)  3. Internet Services- system to system communication (V2V receiving and relaying message to other vehicles) M

VANET SYSTEM MODEL In this photo, Car 1 is communicating with Car 2 to relay messages in regards to when a crash is imminent. Both cars work in conjunction with the Road-Side Unit (RSU) to relay the messages. Car 3 Car 4 Car 5 Car 6 Car 2Car 1 M

OUR DEFINITIONS:  PRIVACY - a person’s right to willingly refrain from disclosing personal information or experiences unto others whether it be a person, place or thing.  VANET PRIVACY - a person’s right to conceal both the physical and metaphysical information regarding their vehicle which may be linked to their personal effects or experiences connected to the vehicular ad hoc network (VANET), unable to be hacked or manipulated for malicious uses. L

SECURITY/PRIVACY  Based on our reading and the presentation given by Nathan Dragun at the Cyber Club meeting, there is no definitive way to safe guard a person, place, or things against all types of privacy invasions or threats. It is my interpretation that if you want privacy:  Don’t talk openly about sensitive or vulnerable information.  Don’t use cell phone that can be traceable (use ‘burner’ phones).  Live in secrecy if you have something to hide  If you have nothing to hide, why remain private? Preference.  FACT: The head of the FBI, J Edger Hoover, was notorious for wiretapping famous politicians during the 1960’s. M

PRIVACY PROTECTING LAWS  Wiretap Act (Title III): 1968  Has two purposes:  Protect the privacy of both oral and wire communications.  Explain precisely the circumstances and conditions under which oral or wire communication may be authorized.  “Although the original act covered only wire and oral communications, Congress amended it in 1986 to include electronic communications.”  SOURCE SOURCE  Computer Fraud Abuse Act:  “The CFAA is the federal anti- hacking law.  “This law makes it illegal to intentionally access a computer without authorization or in excess of authorization.”  “The CFAA is primarily a criminal law intended to reduce the instances of malicious hacking.”  SOURCE SOURCE L M

COURT CASES RELATED TO PRIVACY  Robbins v. Lower Merion School District  The suit alleged that the schools secretly spied on the students while they were in the privacy of their homes. School authorities surreptitiously and remotely activated webcams embedded in school-issued laptops the students were using at home. After the suit was brought, the school district, of which the two high schools are part, revealed that it had secretly snapped more than 66,000 images. The suit charged that in doing so the district infringed on its students' privacy rights.  SOURCE SOURCE M

COURT CASES RELATED TO PRIVACY CONT..  United States vs. Knotts: Surveillance on Public Roadways  “In United States vs. Knotts, law enforcement attached a tracking device to a can of chloroform, which was subsequently transported by the defendant in his car to a secluded cabin. The police used the tracking device to learn of his location and then obtained a warrant based on this information. When executing the search at the cabin, the police found a drug laboratory and materials to make illegal drugs. The question presented was whether this monitoring violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court held that since a “person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another,” this type of monitoring did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.”  SOURCE SOURCE L

OUR CONTRIBUTIONS  Linking OnStar and Smartphones to VANET’s/Privacy  Smartphone technology getting put into vehicles, invites threats  EX: OnStar saving people’s location information along with other personal information.  EX: Argument over whether or not a smartphone could be considered a ‘container’ (holding information that may result in an arrest), similar to a car with a trunk full of illicit drugs.  Digital Threats to VANET’s – Scenarios  Threat example’s:  Flooding: Sending a large number of malicious messages to vehicles so that there would be no way of deciphering which messages were valid and which were not.  Proposed Solution - VANET Trust (Greg and Neha)  Compromised Location/address information: By breaking into a car and looking up the address of the driver, the attacker could then monitor whether or not the person is at their home. Studying the target’s schedule could open the door for the attacker to stage a burglary while the person is gone.  Proposed Solution – Much like a desktop computer, a password or verification code would be necessary to access information.  FBI Statistics on Cellphone Tracking  Operation Stingray:  Enables law enforcement to listen in on conversations, telecommunications via mics integrated into cell phones. This system can also pick up and acquire neighboring cell phone conversation.  Cell phone tapping/bugging is said to be “very common” by Feds. L M

FBI STINGRAY OPERATIONS  From my Criminal Justice background, the Stingray is a government mechanism used to eavesdrop on peoples cell phone conservations. This type of technology can invade vehicle privacy because anyone in possession of the system can track your conversations, locations, and could result in exploitation or blackmail.  “The cell phone tracking tool is known as “Stingray” and according to a report in the Washington Times, a federal court was informed recently that the use of this spying device is “a very common practice” by federal investigators.” (Washington Times)Washington Times M

FUTURE WORK  Continue finding and analyzing threats related to VANET’s and vehicular privacy.  Analyze more legal court cases pertaining to smartphone privacy which can be applied to VANET’s to better understand legal issues. L