Terrorism Political in aims and motives Threatens to use or uses violence Designed to have far-reaching psychological impact beyond immediate victim or target Conducted by organizations with chain of command, or networks of individuals inspired by ideology of an existent terrorist group Perpetrated by a subnational or nonstate entity “These are public acts of destruction, committed without a clear military objective, that arouse a widespread sense of fear.” Source: Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, revised edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p. 40. Source: Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, third edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), p. 5.

Terrorism and religion Religion may be Peripheral: underscore nationalist separatist movements (e.g., former Yugoslavia and KLA) Central: deny the legitimacy and/or existence of enemy on theological grounds (e.g., Hamas and Hizbullah) Religion serves to legitimate and justify the group’s activities Not exclusive to any one tradition “For the religious terrorist, violence is first and foremost a sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative. Terrorism thus assumes a transcendental dimension, and its perpetrators therefore often disregard the political, moral, or practical constraints that may affect other terrorists.” (Hoffman, p. 88) “…in many of these cases religion has supplied not only the ideology but also the motivation and the organizational structure for the perpetrators.” (Juergensmeyer, p. 5) Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, third edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

Religious terrorism not inconsequential Religious terrorism now with us 1980: 4 percent of known international terrorist organizations had a religious basis 1994: 33 percent 1995: 46 percent 2004: 46 percent Religious terrorism causes more fatalities: 1998-2004: Religious terrorists responsible for 6 percent of recorded incidents and for 30 percent of total deaths. 1982-1989: Shi‘i Islamic terrorists responsible for 8 percent of international incidents and for 30 percent of total deaths. 1998-2004: Al Qaeda responsible for 0.1 percent of terrorist attacks and for 19 percent of total deaths. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, revised edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 85-86, 88.

Islam: Martyrdom and suicide attacks Martyrdom is highly controversial Suicide versus martyrdom Special status given to perpetrators: Shaheed batal - martyr heroes Istishahadi - he who martyrs himself According to some traditions, the martyr receives: Entry to Paradise; forgiveness of sins; 72 “black-eyed women”, or virgins, or houris; entry to Paradise for 70 family members; glory Family of the martyr will likely receive honor, material support Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, revised edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 158-163.

Suicide versus martyrdom “A suicide takes his life….But what we are talking about is killing yourself for your religion and your people. A suicide is someone tired of himself and Allah, but a mujahadin [holy warrior] is imbued with faith in Allah’s grace and generosity.” Suicide attack as martyrdom: Sacrifice in the service of Islam Often seen as a “cost-effective” tactic Clerics discourage use of indiscriminate violence Justifiable under Islam as a form of self-defense (e.g., Hizbullah’s attacks on the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon) Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, revised edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 160-161.

Pape on Suicide Terrorism:The Argument Strategic logic of suicide terrorism: allows terrorist groups to coerce modern liberal democracies into making territorial concessions Preferred strategy of an organization More destructive, 1980-2001 (excluding 9/11) Suicide attacks killed 13 persons on average compared to about one in other terrorist incidents only 3% of terrorist attacks suicide but accounted for 48% of total deaths Demonstrates commitment to the cause Signals willingness to escalate costs

Supporting Evidence Motivation and Targets of Suicide Terrorist Campaigns, 1980-2001 Source: Table 2 in Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 3 (August 2003): pp. 343-361, p. 349.

Critique of Pape Pape misses the “global jihad” Tends to only look at local, ethnonationalist fights Problematic data: Pape counts only number of (general) incidents rather than number of all attacks Terror campaigns not as successful as Pape claims Pape: 54 percent success rate Moghadam: 24 percent success rate Fails to explain Islamic flavor Pape does not explain why most suicide attacks are perpetrated by Islamic groups or why those attacks have been on the rise. Bottomline: Although Pape’s occupation thesis might explain some localized patterns of suicide terrorism, it falls short of explaining why a “globalization of martyrdom” has arisen. Source: Assaf Moghadam, ““Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the Globalization of Martyrdom: A Critique of Dying to Win,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, No. 8 (December 2006): p. 707-729.

Table 4: Success and failure of the 17 suicide terrorism campaigns (from Moghadam, “Suicide Terrorism,” p. 715) Campaign Date Outcome (Pape) Actual Outcome 1: Hezbollah vs. U.S., France Apr 83–Sep 84 Success Success 2: Hezbollah vs. Israel Nov 82–Jun 85 Success Success 3: Hezbollah vs. Israel, SLA Jul 85–Nov 86 No change No Change 4: LTTE vs. Sri Lanka Jul 90–Oct 94 Success Success 5: LTTE vs. Sri Lanka Apr 95–Oct 00 No change No Change 6: Hamas vs. Israel April 1994 Success No Change 7: Hamas/PIJ vs. Israel Oct 94–Aug 95 Success No Change 8: BKI vs. India August 1995 No change No Change 9: Hamas vs. Israel Feb 96–Mar 96 No change No Change 10: Hamas vs. Israel Mar 97–Sep 97 Success No Change 11: PKK vs. Turkey Jun 96–Oct 96 No Change No Change 12: PKK vs. Turkey Nov 98–Aug 99 No Change No Change 13: LTTE vs. Sri Lanka Jul 01–Nov 01 Success Success 14: Al Qaeda vs. U.S. Nov 95–Ongoing N/A No Change 15: Chechen Separatists vs. Russia Jun 00–Ongoing N/A No Change 16: Kashmir Separatists vs. India Dec 00–Ongoing N/A No Change 17: Hamas / PIJ vs. Israel Oct 00–Ongoing N/A No Change Total Success Rate 54% 24%