Lectures in Microeconomics-Charles W. Upton The Cournot Model.

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Lectures in Microeconomics-Charles W. Upton The Cournot Model

Assumptions Two firms A, and B produce widgets

The Cournot Model Assumptions Two firms A, and B produce widgets The industry demand function is D D P Q

The Cournot Model Assumptions Two firms A, and B produce widgets The industry demand function is D Firm A produces q A ; firm B produces q B D P Q

The Cournot Model Assumptions Two firms A, and B produce widgets The industry demand function is D Firm A produces q A ; firm B produces q B Firm A takes its demand function as D -q B D P Q qbqb DaDa

The Cournot Model Assumptions Two firms A, and B produce widgets The industry demand function is D Firm A produces q A ; firm B produces q B Firm A takes its demand function as D -q B D P Q qbqb DaDa An important assumption, the heart of the Cournot model.

The Cournot Model Solving A’s problem D DaDa

The Cournot Model Solving A’s problem D DaDa MC MR

The Cournot Model Solving A’s problem D DaDa MC MR qa*qa* p*

The Cournot Model Symmetry Just as Firm A is choosing q A to maximize profits, so too is Firm B choosing q B to maximize profits.

The Cournot Model Symmetry Just as Firm A is choosing q A to maximize profits, so too is Firm B choosing q B to maximize profits. If B changes its output, A will react by changing its output.

The Cournot Model A Reaction Function We do the mathematical approach first and then the graphical approach.

The Cournot Model A Reaction Function The industry demand function Q = 100 – 2p.

The Cournot Model A Reaction Function The industry demand function Q = 100 – 2p. The inverse demand function is P = 50 – (1/2)Q

The Cournot Model A Reaction Function The industry demand function Q = 100 – 2p. The inverse demand function is P = 50 – (1/2)Q A’s demand function is then P = 50 –(1/2)(q A +q B )

The Cournot Model A Reaction Function A’s demand function is then P = 50 –(1/2)(q A +q B ) The firm’s profits are  = Pq A – 5q A

The Cournot Model A Reaction Function A’s demand function is then P = 50 –(1/2)(q A +q B ) The firm’s profits are  = [50 –(1/2)(q A +q B )]q A – 5q A

The Cournot Model A Reaction Function  = [50 –(1/2)(q A + q B )]q A – 5q A

The Cournot Model A Reaction Function  = [50 –(1/2)(q A + q B )]q A – 5q A  = 50 q A –(1/2) q A 2 – (1/2)q B q A – 5q A

The Cournot Model A Reaction Function  = [50 –(1/2)(q A + q B )]q A – 5q A  = 50 q A –(1/2) q A 2 – (1/2)q B q A – 5q A  = 45q A –(1/2)q A 2 – (1/2)q B q A

The Cournot Model A Reaction Function

The Cournot Model A Reaction Function

The Cournot Model A Reaction Function

The Cournot Model Symmetry There is a similar reaction function for B q B = 45 – (1/2)q A q A = 45 – (1/2)q B

The Cournot Model Solving for A’s Output q A = 45 – (1/2)q B q B = 45 – (1/2)q A q A = 45 – (1/2)[45 – (1/2)q A ]

The Cournot Model Solving for A’s Output q A = 45 – (1/2)[45 – (1/2)q A ] q A = (1/4)q A

The Cournot Model Solving for A’s Output q A = 45 – (1/2)[45 – (1/2)q A ] q A = (1/4)q A (3/4)q A = 22.5

The Cournot Model Solving for A’s Output q A = 45 – (1/2)[45 – (1/2)q A ] q A = (1/4)q A (3/4)q A = 22.5 q A = (4/3)22.5

The Cournot Model Solving for A’s Output q A = 45 – (1/2)[45 – (1/2)q A ] q A = (1/4)q A (3/4)q A = 22.5 q A = (4/3)22.5 q A = 30 q B = 30

The Cournot Model A Graphical Approach q A = 45 – (1/2)q B We want to use the reaction function to come to a graphical solution,

The Cournot Model A Graphical Approach q A = 45 – (1/2)q B When B produces nothing A should react by producing the monopoly output (45).

The Cournot Model A Graphical Approach q A = 45 – (1/2)q B When B produces nothing A should react by producing the monopoly output (45). When B produces the output of the competitive industry (90), A should react by producing nothing.

The Cournot Model A Graphical Approach q A = 45 – (1/2)q B When B produces nothing A should react by producing the monopoly output (45). When B produces the output of the competitive industry (90), A should react by producing nothing. Similar rules apply for B’s reactions.

The Cournot Model Graphing the Reaction Function A’s Output B’s Output

The Cournot Model Graphing the Reaction Function A’s Output B’s Output If B produces the competitive output, A produces nothing. If B produces nothing, A acts like a monopoly

The Cournot Model Graphing the Reaction Function A’s Output B’s Output A’s Reaction Function 45 90

The Cournot Model Graphing the Reaction Function A’s Output B’s Output A’s Reaction Function If A produces the competitive output, B produces nothing. If A produces nothing, B acts like a monopoly

The Cournot Model Graphing the Reaction Function A’s Output B’s Output A’s Reaction Function B’s Reaction Function 45 90

The Cournot Model Graphing the Reaction Function A’s Output B’s Output If A and B are off their reaction functions, they react and change output. Here B expands, A contracts

The Cournot Model Graphing the Reaction Function A’s Output B’s Output

The Cournot Model Graphing the Reaction Function A’s Output B’s Output If A is here, B wants to be here

The Cournot Model Graphing the Reaction Function A’s Output B’s Output If B is here, A wants to be here

The Cournot Model Equilibrium A’s Output B’s Output A’s Reaction Function B’s Reaction Function

The Cournot Model The Basic Steps Plot the reaction functions –If B produces nothing, A behaves like a monopoly –If B produces competitive output, A produces nothing Solve for their intersection

The Cournot Model End ©2003 Charles W. Upton