CS CS 5150 Software Engineering Lecture 19 Reliability 1

CS Administration Weekly progress reports Weekly progress reports are not required after this week's presentations and report.

CS Security Techniques: Barriers Place barriers that separate parts of a complex system: Isolate components, e.g., do not connect a computer to a network Firewalls Require authentication to access certain systems or parts of systems Every barrier imposes restrictions on permitted uses of the system Barriers are most effective when the system can be divided into subsystems with simple boundaries

CS Barriers: Firewall Public network Private network Firewall A firewall is a computer at the junction of two network segments that: Inspects every packet that attempts to cross the boundary Rejects any packet that does not satisfy certain criteria, e.g., an incoming request to open a TCP connection an unknown packet type Firewalls provide security at a loss of flexibility and a cost of system administration.

CS Security Techniques: Authentication & Authorization Authentication establishes the identity of an agent: What does the agent know (e.g., password)? What does the agent possess (e.g., smart card)? Where does the agent have physical access to (e.g., crt-alt-del)? What are the physical properties of the agent (e.g., fingerprint)? Authorization establishes what an authenticated agent may do: Access control lists Group membership

CS Example: An Access Model for Digital Content Digital material Attributes User Roles Actions Operations Access Policies

CS Security Techniques: Encryption Allows data to be stored and transmitted securely, even when the bits are viewed by unauthorized agents Private key and public key Digital signatures Encryption Decryption X Y Y X

CS Security and People People are intrinsically insecure: Careless (e.g., leave computers logged on, leave passwords where others can read them) Dishonest (e.g., stealing from financial systems) Malicious (e.g., denial of service attack) Many security problems come from inside the organization: In a large organization, there will be some disgruntled and dishonest employees Security relies on trusted individuals. What if they are dishonest?

CS Design for Security: People Make it easy for responsible people to use the system (e.g., make security procedures simple) Make it hard for dishonest or careless people (e.g., password management) Train people in responsible behavior Test the security of the system thoroughly and repeatedly, particularly after changes Do not hide violations

CS Programming Secure Software Programs that interface with the outside world (e.g., Web sites) need to be written in a manner that resists intrusion. For the top 25 programming errors, see: Common Weakness Evaluation: A Community-Developed Dictionary of Software Weakness Types. Insecure Interaction Between Components Risky Resource Management Porous Defenses Project management must ensure that programs avoid these errors.

CS Programming Secure Software The following list is from the SANS Security Institute, Essential Skills for Secure Programmers Using Java/JavaEE, Input Handling Authentication & Session Management Access Control (Authorization) Java Types & JVM Management Application Faults & Logging Encryption Services Concurrency and Threading Connection Patterns

CS Suggested Reading Trust in Cyberspace, Committee on Information Systems Trustworthiness, National Research Council (1999) Fred Schneider, Cornell Computer Science, was the chair of this study.

CS Dependable and Reliable Systems: The Royal Majesty From the report of the National Transportation Safety Board: "On June 10, 1995, the Panamanian passenger ship Royal Majesty grounded on Rose and Crown Shoal about 10 miles east of Nantucket Island, Massachusetts, and about 17 miles from where the watch officers thought the vessel was. The vessel, with 1,509 persons on board, was en route from St. George’s, Bermuda, to Boston, Massachusetts." "The Raytheon GPS unit installed on the Royal Majesty had been designed as a standalone navigation device in the mid- to late 1980s,...The Royal Majesty’s GPS was configured by Majesty Cruise Line to automatically default to the Dead Reckoning mode when satellite data were not available."

CS The Royal Majesty: Analysis The ship was steered by an autopilot that relied on position information from the Global Positioning System (GPS). If the GPS could not obtain a position from satellites, it provided an estimated position based on Dead Reckoning (distance and direction traveled from a known point). The GPS failed one hour after leaving Bermuda. The crew failed to see the warning message on the display (or to check the instruments). 34 hours and 600 miles later, the Dead Reckoning error was 17 miles.

CS The Royal Majesty: Software Lessons All the software worked as specified (no bugs), but... Since the GPS software had been specified, the requirements had changed (stand alone system now part of integrated system). The manufacturers of the autopilot and GPS adopted different design philosophies about the communication of mode changes. The autopilot was not programmed to recognize valid/invalid status bits in message from the GPS (NMEA 0183). The warnings provided by the user interface were not sufficiently conspicuous to alert the crew. The officers had not been properly trained on this equipment.

CS Key Factors for Reliable Software Organization culture that expects quality Approach to software design and implementation that hides complexity (e.g., structured design, object-oriented programming) Precise, unambiguous specification Use of software tools that restrict or detect errors (e.g., strongly typed languages, source control systems, debuggers) Programming style that emphasizes simplicity, readability, and avoidance of dangerous constructs Incremental validation

CS Building Dependable Systems: Three Principles For a software system to be dependable: Each stage of development must be done well. Changes should be incorporated into the structure as carefully as the original system development. Testing and correction do not ensure quality, but dependable systems are not possible without systematic testing.

CS Building Dependable Systems: Organizational Culture Good organizations create good systems: Acceptance of the group's style of work (e.g., meetings, preparation, support for juniors) Visibility Completion of a task before moving to the next (e.g., documentation, comments in code)

CS Building Dependable Systems: Quality Management Processes Assumption: Good software is impossible without good processes The importance of routine: Standard terminology (requirements, specification, design, etc.) Software standards (coding standards, naming conventions, etc.) Regular builds of complete system Internal and external documentation Reporting procedures

CS Building Dependable Systems: Quality Management Processes When time is short... Pay extra attention to the early stages of the process: feasibility, requirements, design. There will be little time to redo mistakes in the requirements. Experience shows that taking extra time on the early stages will usually reduce the total time to release.

CS Building Dependable Systems: Specifications for the Client Specifications are of no value if they do not meet the client's needs The client must understand and review the requirements specification in detail Appropriate members of the client's staff must review relevant areas of the design (including operations, training materials, system administration) The acceptance tests must belong to the client

CS Building Dependable Systems: Changes Requirements System design Testing Operation & maintenance Program design Implementation (coding) Acceptance & release Feasibility study Changes

CS Building Dependable Systems: Change Change management: Source code management and version control Tracking of change requests and bug reports Procedures for changing requirements specifications, designs and other documentation Regression testing Release control

CS Building Dependable Systems: Complexity The human mind can encompass only limited complexity: Comprehensibility Simplicity Partitioning of complexity A simple component is easier to get right than a complex one.

CS Reliability Metrics Reliability Probability of a failure occurring in operational use. Perceived reliability Depends upon: user behavior set of inputs pain of failure

CS Reliability Metrics Traditional measures for online systems Mean time between failures Availability (up time) Mean time to repair Market measures Complaints Customer retention User perception is influenced by Distribution of failures

CS Metrics: User Perception of Reliability 1. A personal computer that crashes frequently v. a machine that is out of service for two days. 2. A database system that crashes frequently but comes back quickly with no loss of data v. a system that fails once in three years but data has to be restored from backup. 3. A system that does not fail but has unpredictable periods when it runs very slowly.

CS Reliability Metrics for Distributed Systems Traditional metrics are hard to apply in multi-component systems: A system that has excellent average reliability might give terrible service to certain users. In a big network, at any given moment something will be giving trouble, but very few users will see it. When there are many components, system administrators rely on automatic reporting systems to identify problem areas.

CS Requirements Metrics for System Reliability Example: ATM card reader Failure class ExampleMetric (requirement) Permanent System fails to operate1 per 1,000 days non-corrupting with any card -- reboot Transient System can not read1 in 1,000 transactions non-corrupting an undamaged card Corrupting A pattern ofNever transactions corrupts database

CS Metrics: Cost of Improved Reliability Time and $ Reliability metric 99% 100% Will you spend your money on new functionality or improved reliability? When do you ship?

CS Example: Central Computing System A central computer system (e.g., a server farm) is vital to an entire organization. Any failure is serious. Step 1: Gather data on every failure Many years of data in a data base Every failure analyzed: hardware software (default) environment (e.g., power, air conditioning) human (e.g., operator error)

CS Example: Central Computing System Step 2: Analyze the data Weekly, monthly, and annual statistics Number of failures and interruptions Mean time to repair Graphs of trends by component, e.g., Failure rates of disk drives Hardware failures after power failures Crashes caused by software bugs in each component

CS Example: Central Computing System Step 3: Invest resources where benefit will be maximum, e.g., Priority order for software improvements Changed procedures for operators Replacement hardware Orderly shut down after power failure Example. Supercomputers may average 10 hours productive work per day.