ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMSFALL 2001COPYRIGHT © 2001 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS eCommerce Technology Lecture 10 Micropayments II

ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMSFALL 2001COPYRIGHT © 2001 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Remote Micropayments Remote micropayments –Buyer is not physically in seller’s presence –Can’t insert card into vendor’s machine –No physical goods, only information goods if micropayment will work, goods must be cheap, e.g. $0.01 –Subscriptions, credit cards, checks, ACH (even PayPal) too expensive Examples: web pages, stock quotes,news articles, weather report, directory lookup Need instant service for large numbers of 1¢ transactions + reasonable profit to payment provider

ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMSFALL 2001COPYRIGHT © 2001 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Remote Micropayment Parties Users (buyers) Vendors (sellers) Brokers (intermediaries) –issue “scrip” (virtual money) to users –redeem scrip from vendors for real money Assumptions –User-Broker relationship is long-term –Vendor-Broker relationship is long-term –User-Vendor relationship is short-term

ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMSFALL 2001COPYRIGHT © 2001 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Micropayment Efficiency Providers need to process a peak load of at least 2500 transactions/second Public-key cryptography is expensive –1 hash = 10 symmetric encryptions = 10,000 RSA signature verifications Need to minimize Internet traffic –Servers must be up –More servers required, longer queues, lost packet delay –Remove the provider from the process (user + vendor only) For small payment amounts, perfection is not needed –Losing a micropayment –Keep micropayment fraud low

ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMSFALL 2001COPYRIGHT © 2001 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Payword Based on “paywords,” strings that will be accepted by vendors for purchases User authenticates himself to a broker with one signature verification, establishes means of paying “real” money for paywords User sets up with broker a linked chain of paywords to be used with a specific vendor. (Linking is used to make authentication of the paywords very cheap.) User pays vendor by revealing paywords to vendor Marginal cost of a payment: one hash computation

ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMSFALL 2001COPYRIGHT © 2001 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Payword User sets up Payword account with a broker (pays real money) Broker issues user a “virtual card” (certificate) –broker name, user name, user IP address, user public key Certificate authenticates user to vendor User creates payword chains (typical length: 100 units) specific to a vendor

ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMSFALL 2001COPYRIGHT © 2001 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Buying Paywords User visits broker over secure channel (e.g. SSL), giving coordinates of bank account or credit card: U, A U, PK U, T U, $ U Broker issues a subscription card C U = { B, U, A U, PK U, E, I U } SK B Vendor will deliver goods only to A U USER NAME USER ADDRESS USER PUBLIC KEY USER CERTIFICATE COORDINATES OF BANK ACCOUNT OR CC BROKER NAME EXPIRATION DATE USER INFORMATION (CARD #, CREDIT LIMIT) BROKER PRIVATE KEY

ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMSFALL 2001COPYRIGHT © 2001 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Making Payment Commitment to a payword chain = promise by user to pay vendor for all paywords given out by user before E –N = value in jetons needed for purchases (1 payword = 1 jeton) –W N = last payword, a random value chose by user User creates payword chain backwards by hashing W N W N-1 = H(W N ); W N-2 = H(W N-1 ) = H(H(W N )), etc., giving W = { W 0, W 1,... W N-1, W N } User “commits” this chain to a vendor, sends M = { V, C U, W 0, D, I M } SK U VENDOR NAME EXPIRATION DATE OF COMMITMENT EXTRA INFORMATION (VALUE OF CHAIN) USER PRIVATE KEY “FIRST” PAYWORD EXPENSIVE: REQUIRES DIGITAL SIGNATURE  CAN EASILY COMPUTE THIS WAY  DIFFICULT TO COMPUNTE THIS WAY M IS VENDOR SPECIFIC AND USER-SPECIFIC (NO USE TO ANYONE ELSE)

ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMSFALL 2001COPYRIGHT © 2001 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Making Payment, cont. Vendor can use PK U and PK B to read the commitment to know that U is currently authorized to spend paywords. User “spends” paywords with the vendor in order W 1, W 2,..., W N. To spend payword W i, user sends the vendor the unsigned token P = { W i, i }. To verify that P is legitimate, vendor hashes it i times to obtain W 0. If this matches W 0 in the commitment, the payment is good. If V stores the last payword value seen from U, only one hash is needed. (If last hash was W i, when vendor receives W i+1, can hash it once and compare with W i.) P does not have to be signed because hash is one-way.

ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMSFALL 2001COPYRIGHT © 2001 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Settlement with Payword Even if vendor has no relationship with broker B, can still verify user paywords (only need broker’s public key) For vendor to get money from B requires relationship Vendor sends broker B a reimbursement request for each user that sent paywords with M, W L (last payword received by vendor) Broker verifies each commitment using PK U and performs L hashes to go from W L to W 0 Broker pays V, aggregates commitments of U and bills U’s credit card or debits money from U’s bank account

ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMSFALL 2001COPYRIGHT © 2001 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Payword Payment Properties Payment and verification by vendor are offline (no use of a trusted authority). Payment token P does not reveal the goods Fraud by user (issuing paywords without paying for them) will be detected by the broker; loss should be small Vendor keeps record of unexpired paywords to guard against replay

ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMSFALL 2001COPYRIGHT © 2001 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS MicroMint Brokers produce “coins” having short lifetimes, sell coins to users Users pay vendors with coins Vendors exchange the coins with brokers for “real” money BROKER CUSTOMER VENDOR SOURCE: SHERIF NEW COINS SPENDING OF COINS TRANSFER OF INFORMATION PURCHASE NEW COINS RETURN UNUSED COINS EXCHANGE COINS FOR OTHER FORMS OF VALUE

ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMSFALL 2001COPYRIGHT © 2001 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Minting Coins in MicroMint Idea: make coins easy to verify, but difficult to create (so there is no advantage in counterfeiting) In MicroMint, coins are represented by hash-function collisions, values x, y for which H(x) = H(y) If H() results in an n-bit hash, we have to try about 2 n/2 values of x to find a first collision Trying c 2 n/2 values of x yields about c 2 collisions Collisions become cheaper to generate after the first one is found

ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMSFALL 2001COPYRIGHT © 2001 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Coins as k-way Collisions A k-way collision is a set { x 1, x 2,..., x k } with H(x 1 ) = H(x 2 ) =... = H(x k ) It takes about 2 n(k-1)/k values of x to find a k-way collision Trying c 2 n(k-1)/k values of x yields about c k collisions If k > 2, finding a first collision is slow, but subsequent collisions come fast If a k-way collision { x 1, x 2,..., x k } represents a coin, easily verified by computing H(x 1 ), H(x 2 ),..., H(x k ) A broker can easily generate 10 billion coins per month using one machine

ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMSFALL 2001COPYRIGHT © 2001 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Selling MicroMint Coins Broker generates 10 billion coins and stores (x, H(x)) for each coin, having a validity period of one month The function H changes at the start of each month Broker sells coins { x 1, x 2,..., x k } to users for “real” money, records who bought each coin At end of month, users return unused coins for new ones

ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMSFALL 2001COPYRIGHT © 2001 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Spending MicroMint Coins User sends vendor a coin { x 1, x 2,..., x k } Vendor verifies validity by checking that H(x 1 ) = H(x 2 ) =... = H(x k ). (k hash computations) Valid but double-spent coins (previously used with a different vendor) cannot be detected at this point At end of day, vendor sends coins to broker Broker verifies coins, checks validity, checks for double spending, pays vendor (Need to deal with double spending at this point)

ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMSFALL 2001COPYRIGHT © 2001 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Detecting MicroMint Forgery A forged coin is a k-way collision { x 1, x 2,..., x k } under H() that was not minted by broker Vendor cannot determine this in real-time Small-scale forgery is impractical Forged coins become invalid after one month New forgery can’t begin before new hash is announced Broker can issue recall before the month ends Broker can stay many months ahead of forgers

ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMSFALL 2001COPYRIGHT © 2001 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Millicent Vendors produce vendor-specific “scrip”, sell to brokers for “real” money at discount Brokers sell scrip from many vendors to many users Scrip is prepaid: promise of future service from vendor Users “spend” scrip with vendors, receive change BROKER USER VENDOR SOURCE: COMPAQ USER SPENDS VENDOR SCRIP FOR INFORMATION TRANSFER OF INFORMATION (CHANGE IN MESSAGE HEADER) USER BUYS BROKER SCRIP ($ WEEKLY) BROKERS PAY FOR VENDOR SCRIP ($$$ MONTHLY) (¢ DAILY) USER EXCHANGES BROKER SCRIP FOR VENDOR SCRIP (AS NEEDED)

ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMSFALL 2001COPYRIGHT © 2001 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Millicent Broker –issues broker scrip to user –exchanges broker scrip for vendor scrip –interfaces to banking system –collects funds from users –pays vendors (less commission) User –buys broker scrip from brokers –spends by obtaining vendor-specific scrip from broker Vendor –sells scrip to brokers –accepts vendor scrip from users –gives change to users in vendor scrip

ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMSFALL 2001COPYRIGHT © 2001 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Q A &