The Organization of the Firm Pertemuan 11-12 Matakuliah: J0434/EKONOMI MANAJERIAL Tahun: 2008.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy
Advertisements

Industrial Economics (Econ3400) Week 4 August 14, 2008 Room 323, Bldg 3 Semester 2, 2008 Instructor: Dr Shino Takayama.
Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Managerial Economics & Business Strategy Chapter.
Copyright © 2010 by the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin Managerial Economics & Business Strategy Chapter 6 The Organization.
McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2008 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved CHAPTER 1 Introduction to Corporate Finance.
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy
© 2009 Pearson Education Canada 20/1 Chapter 20 Asymmetric Information and Market Behaviour.
Financial Management I
PowerPoint Presentation by Charlie Cook Gordon Walker McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2004 McGraw Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 6 Vertical.
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy Chapter 1 The Fundamentals of Managerial Economics McGraw-Hill/Irwin Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and.
Overview I. Introduction II. The Economics of Effective Management
The Fundamentals of Managerial Economics
Chapter 11 Game Theory and Asymmetric Information
Introduction to Corporate Finance
1-1 Welcome ECON 6313 ECON 6313 Managerial Economics Fall semester, 2011 Professor Chris BrownChris Brown.
The Fundamentals of Managerial Economics Pertemuan 1-2 Matakuliah: J0434/EKONOMI MANAJERIAL Tahun: 2008.
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy
The Production Process and Costs Pertemuan 9 -10
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e Copyright © 2009 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Managerial Economics.
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e Chapter 15: Incentive Compensation McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy
David Bryce © Adapted from Baye © 2002 The Power of Suppliers MANEC 387 Economics of Strategy MANEC 387 Economics of Strategy David J. Bryce.
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e Chapter 14: Attracting and Retaining.
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e Chapter 3: Markets, Organizations, and the Role of Knowledge Copyright © 2009 by The McGraw-Hill.
The Nature of Industry Pertemuan
Segmenting, Targeting and Product Positioning Pertemuan 9 Matakuliah: J0114/Manajemen Pemasaran Tahun: 2008.
McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2008 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. 1 Introduction To Corporate Finance.
Managing in Competitive, Monopolistic, and Monopolistically Competitive Markets Pertemuan Matakuliah: J0434/EKONOMI MANAJERIAL Tahun: 2008.
Market Forces: Demand and Supply Pertemuan 3-4
An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure
The Organization of the Firm
Key Concepts and Skills
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy Chapter 1 The Fundamentals of Managerial Economics McGraw-Hill/Irwin Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and.
© 2005 McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited © 2003 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
7 - 1 Copyright © 2009 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
McGraw-Hill/Irwin © 2003 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
McGraw-Hill © 2004 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin 1.0 Introduction to Financial Management Chapter 1.
CHAPTER 1 The Fundamentals of Managerial Economics Copyright © 2014 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without.
Copyright © 2008 by the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin Managerial Economics, 9e Managerial Economics Thomas Maurice.
Chapter 1: Managers, Profits, and Markets McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2011 by the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Managerial Economics & Business Strategy Chapter.
Ch 14 Agency. Principal-Agent Relationship Principal owns an asset Agent works on principal’s behalf to preserve on enhance the value of the asset Problem.
Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 5e Chapter 19: Vertical Integration and Outsourcing McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2009 by The McGraw-Hill.
Slide 1  2002 South-Western, Thomson Learning Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategy, and Tactics by McGuigan, Moyer, & Harris PowerPoint Lecture.
Asymmetric Information
Copyright © 2008 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin 0 Chapter 1 Introduction to Financial Management.
McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2008 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. 1 Introduction To Corporate Finance.
CHAPTER 1 The Fundamentals of Managerial Economics Copyright © 2014 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without.
Economics of Strategy The Economics of Vertical Integration.
This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture by Brickley.
Copyright © 2006 Pearson Education Canada Organizing Production PART 4Firms and Markets 10 CHAPTER.
© 2004 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin Incentive Conflicts and Contracts.
EC 500 Chapter 6 The Organization of the Firm And Related Issues.
Copyright © 2008 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin 0 Chapter 1 Introduction to Financial Management.
McGraw-Hill/Irwin © 2004 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved. Vertical integration and outsourcing.
Organization of Firm. Learning Objectives: How do firms hire inputs of production? What are transaction costs? What is the Principal-Agent problem?
CHAPTER 10 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ETHICS
CHAPTER 1 The Role and Environment of Managerial Finance
CHAPTER 6 Introducing supply decisions ©McGraw-Hill Education, 2014.
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy Chapter 6 The Organization of the Firm.
CHAPTER FIVE Responsibility Accounting and Transfer Pricing.
제 6 장 기업의 조직 The Organization of the Firm. 개요 Overview I. Methods of Procuring Inputs n Spot Exchange n Contracts n Vertical Integration II. Transaction.
Human Resource Management: Gaining a Competitive Advantage Chapter 12 Recognizing Employee Contributions with Pay Copyright © 2013 by The McGraw-Hill Companies,
Copyright © 2010 by the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin Managerial Economics & Business Strategy Chapter 1: The Fundamentals.
Milgrom and Roberts (1992): Chapter 6 Economics, Organization & Management Chapter 6: Moral Hazard and Performance Incentives Examples of Moral Hazard:
Incentive Conflicts and Contracts
The Fundamentals of Managerial Economics
Presentation transcript:

The Organization of the Firm Pertemuan Matakuliah: J0434/EKONOMI MANAJERIAL Tahun: 2008

Bina Nusantara Managerial Economics & Business Strategy Chapter 6 The Organization of the Firm McGraw-Hill/Irwin Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy Copyright © 2008 by the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.

Bina Nusantara Overview I. Methods of Procuring Inputs –Spot Exchange –Contracts –Vertical Integration II. Transaction Costs –Specialized Investments III. Optimal Procurement Input IV. Principal-Agent Problem –Owners-Managers –Managers-Workers 6-4

Bina Nusantara Manager’s Role Procure inputs in the least cost manner, like point B. Provide incentives for workers to put forth effort. Failure to accomplish this results in a point like A. Achieving points like B managers must –Use all inputs efficiently. –Acquire inputs by the least costly method. $ Q Costs A B C(Q) 6-5

Bina Nusantara Methods of Procuring Inputs Spot Exchange –When the buyer and seller of an input meet, exchange, and then go their separate ways. Contracts –A legal document that creates an extended relationship between a buyer and a seller. Vertical Integration –When a firm shuns other suppliers and chooses to produce an input internally. 6-6

Bina Nusantara Key Features Spot Exchange –Specialization, avoids contracting costs, avoids costs of vertical integration. –Possible “hold-up problem.” Contracting –Specialization, reduces opportunism, avoids skimping on specialized investments. –Costly in complex environments. Vertical Integration –Reduces opportunism, avoids contracting costs. –Lost specialization and may increase organizational costs. 6-7

Bina Nusantara Transaction Costs Costs of acquiring an input over and above the amount paid to the input supplier. Includes: –Search costs. –Negotiation costs. –Other required investments or expenditures. Some transactions are general in nature while others are specific to a trading relationship. 6-8

Bina Nusantara Specialized Investments Investments made to allow two parties to exchange but has little or no value outside of the exchange relationship. Types of specialized investments: –Site specificity. –Physical-asset specificity. –Dedicated assets. –Human capital. Lead to higher transaction costs –Costly bargaining. –Underinvestment. –Opportunism and the hold-up problem. 6-9

Bina Nusantara Specialized Investments and Contract Length MB 0 L0L0 $ Contract Length 0 L1L1 MC MB 1 Longer Contract Due to greater need for specialized investments 6-10

Bina Nusantara Specialized Investments and Contract Length MB 0 L0L0 $ Contract Length 0 MC 0 Shorter Contract MC 2 L2L2 More complex contracting environment 6-11

Bina Nusantara Specialized Investments and Contract Length MB 0 L0L0 $ Contract Length 0 MC 0 Longer Contract MC 1 Less complex contracting environment L0L0 6-12

Bina Nusantara Optimal Input Procurement Substantial specialized investments relative to contracting costs? Spot Exchange No Complex contracting environment relative to costs of integration? Yes Vertical Integration Yes Contract No 6-13

Bina Nusantara The Principal-Agent Problem Occurs when the principal cannot observe the effort of the agent. –Example: Shareholders (principal) cannot observe the effort of the manager (agent). –Example: Manager (principal) cannot observe the effort of workers (agents). The Problem: Principal cannot determine whether a bad outcome was the result of the agent’s low effort or due to bad luck. Manager’s must recognize the existence of the principal-agent problem and devise plans to align the interests of workers with that of the firm. Shareholders must create plans to align the interest of the manager with those of the shareholders. 6-14

Bina Nusantara Solving the Problem Between Owners and Managers Internal incentives –Incentive contracts. –Stock options, year-end bonuses. External incentives –Personal reputation. –Potential for takeover. 6-15

Bina Nusantara Solving the Problem Between Managers and Workers Profit sharing Revenue sharing Piece rates Time clocks and spot checks 6-16

Bina Nusantara Conclusion The optimal method for acquiring inputs depends on the nature of the transactions costs and specialized nature of the inputs being procured. To overcome the principal-agent problem, principals must devise plans to align the agents’ interests with the principals. 6-17