Copyright © 2004 South-Western 22 Frontiers of Microeconomics.

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Copyright © 2004 South-Western 22 Frontiers of Microeconomics

Copyright © 2004 South-Western ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION information asymmetryA difference in access to relevant knowledge is called information asymmetry.

Copyright © 2004 South-Western Hidden Actions: Principals, Agents, and Moral Hazard Moral HazardMoral Hazard Moral hazard refers to the tendency of a person who is imperfectly monitored to engage in dishonest or otherwise undesirable behavior. Employers can respond to the moral-hazard problem in various ways: Better monitoring. High wages. Delayed payment.

Copyright © 2004 South-Western Hidden Actions: Principals, Agents, and Moral Hazard Moral HazardMoral Hazard An agent is a person who is performing an act for another person, called the principal. The principal is a person for whom another person, called the agent, is performing some act.

Copyright © 2004 South-Western Hidden Actions: Principals, Agents, and Moral Hazard Adverse SelectionAdverse Selection Adverse selection refers to the tendency for the mix of unobserved attributes to become undesirable from the standpoint of an uniformed party.

Copyright © 2004 South-Western Hidden Actions: Principals, Agents, and Moral Hazard Example of Adverse Selection: Many time potential buyers may not even consider used cars because they surmise that the sellers know something bad about the cars. This is also known as the lemons problem. Insurance—People with hidden health problems are more likely to want to buy health insurance than those with good health In certain labor markets, if a firm reduces the wage it pays, high productivity workers tend to quit.

Copyright © 2004 South-Western Signaling to Convey Private Information How do Markets respond to Asymmetric Information? Signaling Signaling refers to an action taken by an informed party to reveal private information to an uninformed party. Screening Screening occurs when an action taken by an uniformed party induces an informed party to reveal information.

Copyright © 2004 South-Western Asymmetric Information and Markets The study of asymmetric information gives us new reason to be wary of markets. When some people know more than others do, the market may fail to put the resources to their best uses.

Copyright © 2004 South-Western Asymmetric Information and Public Policy Although asymmetric information may call for government action, three facts complicate the issue: Private markets can sometimes deal with information asymmetries on their own The government rarely has more information than the private parties. The government itself is an imperfect institution

Copyright © 2004 South-Western POLITICAL ECONOMY public choicePolitical economy (public choice ) is the application of economic methods to the study of how government works. Problems Associated with How Government Determines Public Policy The Condorcet Paradox Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem The Median-Voter Theorem Self-interested Politicians

Copyright © 2004 South-Western The Condorcet Voting Paradox Third choice Second choice First choice BAC ACB CBA Percent of electorate Type 3Type 2Type 1 Voter Type

Copyright © 2004 South-Western The Condorcet Voting Paradox The Condorcet Paradox occurs when the majority rule fails to produce transitive preferences for society. Transitive preferences imply that if A is preferred to B, and B is preferred to C, then A is preferred to C.

Copyright © 2004 South-Western Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem Arrow’s impossibility theorem is a mathematical result which shows that, under certain conditions, there is no scheme for aggregating individual preferences into a valid set of social preferences.

Copyright © 2004 South-Western Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem No Voting System Can Satisfy All of the Following Unanimity Transitivity Independence of irrelevant alternatives No dictators

Copyright © 2004 South-Western Median Voter Theorem The median voter theorem is a mathematical result that shows that if voters are choosing a point along a line and each voter wants the point closest to his most preferred point, then majority rule will pick the most preferred point of the median voter.

Copyright © 2004 South-Western BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS Recently, a field called behavioral economics has emerged in which economists make use of basic psychological insights to examine economic problems. Some politicians are motivated by self-interest. Some politicians sacrifice the national interest to solidify their base of voters.

Copyright © 2004 South-Western BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS People aren’t always rational: People are overconfident People give too much weight to a small number of vivid observations People are reluctant to change their minds. People care about fairness as demonstrated by the ultimatum game People are inconsistent over time.