Testing for Subadditivity of Vertically Integrated Electric Utilities Keith Gilsdorf.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
1 Banking Services for Everyone? Barriers to Bank Access and Use Around the World Thorsten Beck Asli Demirgüç-Kunt Maria Soledad Martinez Peria The World.
Advertisements

F-tests continued.
U NNATURAL MONOPOLIES IN LOCAL TELEPHONE By Richard T. Shin * and John S. Ying* Sifat-E-Sharmeen Econ 435.
 Introduction  Simple Framework: The Margin Rule  Model with Product Differentiation, Variable Proportions and Bypass  Model with multiple inputs.
Conference on Irish Economic Policy Union membership and the union wage Premium in Ireland Frank Walsh School of Economics University College Dublin
Lignite Project By Ramic, Haris. GLOBAL OUTLOOK FOR ENERGY World energy consumption is projected to increase at about 1.8%/year between 2000 and 2030(driven.
John Kwoka RESTRUCTURING THE U.S. ELECTRIC POWER SECTOR: A REVIEW OF RECENT STUDIES.
If economic analysis is to be at all useful, then the multiproduct setting must be addressed. Concepts such as decreasing average cost and economies of.
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE OF PUBLIC OWNERSHIP: EVIDENCE FROM U.S. ELECTRIC UTILITIES John Kwoka Professor of Economics Northeastern University.
 New reforms have been passed to modernize the Swiss electricity sector.  Legal (transmission and generation are separate legal entities) and functional.
LEON COURVILLE Regulation and Efficiency in the Electric Utility Industry.
TARIFF REGULATION IN THE NIGERIAN ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY
Do Markets Reduce Costs? Assessing the Impact of Regulatory Restructuring on the Efficiency of Electricity Generation Nancy L. Rose MIT and NBER COMPETE.
Capital Structure and Leverage
Effective competition review : Mobile February 2001.
Testing for subadditivity of Vertically Integrated Electric Utilities.
Regulatory Preferences and Two-Part Tariffs: The Case of Electricity. by Micheal C Naughton. Presented by Julius Kimutai.
Chapter 2 – Economic Concepts of Regulation Public Utility – for-profit firm whose operations were strictly controlled so as to not jeopardize the public.
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy
Capsim Success Measures
Finance 510: Microeconomic Analysis
ARE COMBINATION GAS AND ELECTRIC UTILITIES MULTIPRODUCT NATURAL MONOPOLIES? - Merrile Sing Presentation Eco 435 Date 31 January 2012.
Foundations of Modern Trade Theory: Comparative Advantage
The Determination of Costs Howard Davies. Objectives n To examine the relationship between inputs and outputs n To identify the most important determinants.
The Click Company. Overview Analyze advertising & sales rep data in 40 randomly selected territories Influence that sales rep and advertising has on annual.
The Production, Cost and Technology of Health Care
Cogeneration.
The Costs of Production 1 22 C H A P T E R Costs exist because resources Are scarce Productive Have alternative uses Use of a resource in a specific.
Long-Run Production Costs Everything is Variable.
10.1 Chapter 10 –Theory of Production and Cost in the Long Run(LR)  The theory of production in the LR provides the theoretical basis for firm decision-making.
Competition and Regulation Interface in Developing Countries: Realities from the Power Sector By Ama Asantewah Ahene* and Emmanuel A. Codjoe** *Institute.
1 Transmission Development at Ameren and in the Midwest ISO Mid-America Regulatory Conference Maureen A. Borkowski June 8, 2010.
ECONOMIC HYPOTHESIS ILLUSTRATION ABOUT SOFTWARE QUALITY INFLUENCE ON BUSINESS PERFORMANCE Karthik Ramachandran.
Existence of Natural Monopoly in Multiproduct Firms Competition Policy and Market Regulation MEFI- Università di Pavia.
1 Empirical Testing of Competitive Conditions in Banking.
Subadditivity of Cost Functions Lecture XX. Concepts of Subadditivity Evans, D. S. and J. J. Heckman. “A Test for Subadditivity of the Cost Function with.
Distance and Home-market Effect: Japanese Local Port Trade with the Asia Region Yushi Yoshida Faculty of Economics Kyushu Sangyo University.
Distributional Implications of Power Sector Reforms in the Philippines WONDIELYN Q. MANALO-MACUA University of Tsukuba.
Investigation into evidence for economies of scale in the water and sewerage industry in England and Wales Presentation of Findings Water UK City Conference,
Unit 2: Elements of a Market Economy
The Promise of Different Types of Environmental Management Systems (EMSs) for Voluntary Governance Paper Prepared for presentation at Environmental Policy:
Estimation of the pass-through and welfare effects of the tariff reduction for yellow corn in Peru between 2000 and 2011 Cecilia Matta Jara & Ana Vera.
Leader-Follower Framework For Control of Energy Services Ali Keyhani Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering The Ohio State University
Natural Gas – Some Regulatory Issues Oil & Gas Industry Practice.
Competition and Inflation in CESEE: A Sectoral Analysis * Reiner Martin (ECB) Julia Wörz (OeNB) Dubrovnik, June 2011 *All views expressed are those of.
Allocation of CO 2 Emission Allowances in RGGI Dallas Burtraw, Karen Palmer, Danny Kahn Resources for the Future Presentation to RGGI Stakeholder Meeting.
Selected Geothermal Resource Topics from a Utility Perspective Geothermal Power Generation Workshop May 11, 2003 Ken Dragoon PacifiCorp
Investment Analysis Lecture 7 Industry Analysis.
Production Economics Chapter 7
Electricity Power Market: Competitive and Non-competitive Markets Ito Diejomaoh.
1 A latent information function to extend domain attributes to improve the accuracy of small-data-set forecasting Reporter : Zhao-Wei Luo Che-Jung Chang,Der-Chiang.
State Regulation in the Natural Monopoly Sphere Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Regulation of Natural Monopolies ALMATY – 2006.
The Costs of Production Please listen to the audio as you work through the slides.
DATA COLLECTION William McCarty Chairman Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission September 9-10 Riga, Latvia.
Japanese Electricity Market M. Hossein Javidi Iran Electricity Market Regulatory Organization & Administrative Department for Electricity Market Regulatory.
Dr. Godius Kahyarara Senior Lecturer, Economics Department, University of Dar-es-Salaam.
CARILEC. An Association of Electric Utilities CARILEC An Association of Electric Utilities The Caribbean Electric Utility Service Corporation (CARILEC)
Zsuzsanna Csereklyei & David Stern
F-tests continued.
IAEE 2017 Conference , Singapore 20th June 2017
Natural Monopolies 2017.
Heteroskedastic Stochastic Cost Frontier Approach in the Estimation of Cost Efficiency of Tunisian Water Distribution Utilities Tawfik Ben Amor,PhD and.
Chow test.
Subadditivity of Cost Functions
TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER NO. DESCRIPTION PAGE NO.   Abstract
When Robots come to town: What does automation do to Local Industrial Space Markets? Bill Wheaton MIT, CRE Senior Consultant, CBRE.
Technology and Costs Lecture 4
1/16/2019 Univ. of Chicago/Argonne Agents 2002, Oct. 12, 2002 Introduction to Electricity Regulation Randal C. Picker Leffmann Professor of Commercial.
economics CHAPTER 4 : THEORY OF PRODUCTION and cost
Dr. Richard A. Rosen Tellus Institute – Boston, MA
Presentation transcript:

Testing for Subadditivity of Vertically Integrated Electric Utilities Keith Gilsdorf

Research Questions Do integration economies make the cost function subadditive? What impact does capacity utilization have on production costs? What effect does the utility’s sales output mix have on production costs?

Methodology Gilsdorf uses a multiproduct cost framework where an integrated firm is a multiproduct firm producing an output from each production stage. In this case, the outputs are generation (G) and transmission/distribution (T) of electricity. To test for subadditivity compares estimated cost functions of firms in his sample to two hypothetical firms

Subadditivity Condition The utility’s cost function is globally subadditive at output vector u 0 = ( G 0, T 0 ) if C ( u 0 ) < C ( u* ) + C (u 0 - u* ) for all u* ≤ u 0.

Hypothetical Firms Hypothetical firm A’s and B’s output denoted by u A and u B C(u A ), C(u B ), and C(u 0 ) represent total production cost for firms A, B, and the observed single firm, respectively. If C(u A ) + C(u B ) > C(u 0 ) subject to u A + u B = u 0, then the cost function is subadditive at output level u 0 over the admissible region.

Defining the Admissible Region For the hypothetical firms Constraint One u 0 = G 0 + T 0 G 0 = (φG* + G m ) + [(1 – φ) G* + G m ] T 0 = (wT* + T m ) + [(1 – w) T* + T m ] where 0≤ φ ≤1 and 0≤w≤1 and G m and T m are the minimum observed output levels for goods G and T.

Defining the Admissible Region For the hypothetical firms Constraint Two R L < (φG* + G m ) / (wT* + T m ) < R u R L < [(1-φ) G* + G m ] / [(1-w) T* + T m ] < R u where R L and R u are the smallest and largest observed output ratios in the sample. This constraint keeps the degree of specialization for the hypothetical firms within the range of specialization observed in the sample.

Given these constraints, C(u A ) = C(φG* + G m, wT* + T m ) C(u B ) = C[(1 – φ) G* + G m,(1 – w) T* + T m ] and C(u 0 ) = C(u A +u B ) The measure of subadditivity is calculated as Sub (φ,w) = [C(u 0 ) – C(u A ) – C(u B )] / C(u 0 ) If Sub(φ,w)<0, the cost function is subadditive at u 0 for the particular φ and w combination.

Variable Description The multistage cost function contains two outputs (G and T), three input prices (wages, fuel, and capital services), and three hedonic variables (customer density, capacity utilization, and percentage of sales to ultimate customers). See pages for a more in depth discussion of variables. Note: Analysis concentrates on fossil fuel steam plants because other production technologies, like nuclear and hydroelectric, differ substantially.

Cost Function lnC = β 0 + Σ β i lnY i + Σ γ j lnP j + Σ α i lnZ i + ½ ΣΣ β ij lnY i lnY j + ½ ΣΣ γ ij lnP i lnP j + ½ ΣΣ α ij lnZ i lnZ j + ΣΣ δ ij lnY i lnP j + ΣΣ σ ij lnZ i lnP j + ΣΣ λ ij lnY i lnZ j where Y i = outputs P j = input prices Z i = hedonic variables

Results Subadditivity Test – Sixteen companies returned estimates that suggest subadditivity, but none are statistically significant. Implying integration economies do not make the multistage cost function subadditive. Capacity Utilization – Increased utilization reduces production costs in all but sixteen cases (although only ten are statistically significant). Sales-Output Mix – Sales-ouput mix estimates are negative in sixty cases (nine statistically significant). Implying production costs may fall with increased, but not complete, specialization in retail sales.

Conclusion Results imply vertically integrated utilities are not multistage natural monopolies. However, the results do not necessarily support complete industry divestiture since economies of scope between stages may exist in the absence of subadditivity. The evidence provides some support for the hypothesis that scope economies exist between retail sales and wholesale activities. A complete separation of the activities would entail a loss of efficiency. Analysis offers support for regulatory policies which encourage higher annual utilization rates, including ensuring non-discriminatory access to transmission service.