QR 38, 2/15/07 Extensive form games I.Writing down a game II.Finding the equilibrium III.Adding complexity.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
An Introduction to Game Theory Part V: Extensive Games with Perfect Information Bernhard Nebel.
Advertisements

GAMES IN EEXTENSIVE AND STRATEGIC FORM Topic #7. Review: A Best Reply Given a strategy choice by the other player, your best reply to it is the strategy.
Look Forward, Reason Back
5. Combining simultaneous and sequential moves.
Alpha-Beta Search. 2 Two-player games The object of a search is to find a path from the starting position to a goal position In a puzzle-type problem,
Pondering more Problems. Enriching the Alice-Bob story Go to AGo to B Go to A Alice Go to B Go to A Go to B Go shoot pool Alice.
Nash’s Theorem Theorem (Nash, 1951): Every finite game (finite number of players, finite number of pure strategies) has at least one mixed-strategy Nash.
M9302 Mathematical Models in Economics Instructor: Georgi Burlakov 3.1.Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information Lecture
Game Theory Assignment For all of these games, P1 chooses between the columns, and P2 chooses between the rows.
ECON 100 Tutorial: Week 9 office: LUMS C85.
BASICS OF GAME THEORY. Recap Decision Theory vs. Game Theory Rationality Completeness Transitivity What’s in a game? Players Actions Outcomes Preferences.
Clicker Question-A Chicken Game 0, 0 0, 1 1, 0 -10, -10 Swerve Hang Tough Swerve Hang Tough Player 2 Pllayer 1 Does either player have a dominant strategy?
1 1 Deep Thought BA 592 Lesson I.3 Sequential Move Theory At first I thought, if I were Superman, a perfect secret identity would be “Clark Kent, Dentist”,
3. Basic Topics in Game Theory. Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ Outline 3.1 What is a Game ? The elements of a Game The Rules of the.
Stackelberg -leader/follower game 2 firms choose quantities sequentially (1) chooses its output; then (2) chooses it output; then the market clears This.
Non-Cooperative Game Theory To define a game, you need to know three things: –The set of players –The strategy sets of the players (i.e., the actions they.
Decision Analysis. What is Decision Analysis? The process of arriving at an optimal strategy given: –Multiple decision alternatives –Uncertain future.
4 Why Should we Believe Politicians? Lupia and McCubbins – The Democratic Dilemma GV917.
QR 38 3/22/07, Strategic moves and structure-induced equilibria I. Strategic moves II. Credibility III. Strategic moves as institutional choice.
SCIT1003 Chapter 2: Sequential games - perfect information extensive form Prof. Tsang.
Adverse Selection Asymmetric information is feature of many markets
EC102: Class 9 Christina Ammon.
Chapter 9: Economics of Strategy: Game theory
1 1 Lesson overview BA 592 Lesson I.10 Sequential and Simultaneous Move Theory Chapter 6 Combining Simultaneous and Sequential Moves Lesson I.10 Sequential.
Games with Sequential Moves
Basics on Game Theory For Industrial Economics (According to Shy’s Plan)
QR 38, 2/13/07 Rationality and Expected Utility I. Rationality II. Expected utility III. Sets and probabilities.
1 Introduction APEC 8205: Applied Game Theory. 2 Objectives Distinguishing Characteristics of a Game Common Elements of a Game Distinction Between Cooperative.
1 search CS 331/531 Dr M M Awais A* Examples:. 2 search CS 331/531 Dr M M Awais 8-Puzzle f(N) = g(N) + h(N)
QR 38, 2/6/07 Overview of game theory I. Strategic interaction II. Game theory and international relations III. Deterrence.
QR 38 Signaling I, 4/17/07 I. Signaling and screening II. Pooling and separating equilibria III. Semi-separating equilibria.
Chapter 6 Extensive Games, perfect info
Static Games of Complete Information: Subgame Perfection
Game Theoretic Analysis of Oligopoly lr L R 0000 L R 1 22 The Lane Selection Game Rational Play is indicated by the black arrows.
Alpha-Beta Search. 2 Two-player games The object of a search is to find a path from the starting position to a goal position In a puzzle-type problem,
© 2006 Prentice Hall, Inc.A – 1 Operations Management Module A – Decision-Making Tools © 2006 Prentice Hall, Inc. PowerPoint presentation to accompany.
An introduction to game theory Today: The fundamentals of game theory, including Nash equilibrium.
Games of Incomplete Information. These games drop the assumption that players know each other’s preferences. Complete info: players know each other’s preferences.
Excursions in Modern Mathematics, 7e: Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. 15 Chances, Probabilities, and Odds 15.1Random Experiments and.
Chapter 9 Games with Imperfect Information Bayesian Games.
“Life must be understood backward, but … it must be lived forward.”
EC941 - Game Theory Prof. Francesco Squintani Lecture 5 1.
Dynamic Games & The Extensive Form
Public Policy Analysis MPA 404 Lecture 24. Previous Lecture Graphical Analysis of Tariff and Quota Game Theory; The prisoner's Dilemma.
Games. Adversaries Consider the process of reasoning when an adversary is trying to defeat our efforts In game playing situations one searches down the.
Extensive Games with Imperfect Information
Topic 3 Games in Extensive Form 1. A. Perfect Information Games in Extensive Form. 1 RaiseFold Raise (0,0) (-1,1) Raise (1,-1) (-1,1)(2,-2) 2.
M9302 Mathematical Models in Economics Instructor: Georgi Burlakov 2.1.Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information Lecture
Frank Cowell: Microeconomics Game Theory: Basics MICROECONOMICS Principles and Analysis Frank Cowell March 2004.
Games People Play. 2. Sequential move games. In this section we shall learn How to figure out what to expect in games with sequential moves. Techniques.
Dynamic games, Stackelburg Cournot and Bertrand
Extensive Form (Dynamic) Games With Perfect Information (Theory)
Dynamic Game Theory and the Stackelberg Model. Dynamic Game Theory So far we have focused on static games. However, for many important economic applications.
Chapter Book1 CONFLICT ANALYSIS: MODELS AND RESOLUTIONS.
M9302 Mathematical Models in Economics Instructor: Georgi Burlakov 2.1.Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information Lecture
Dynamic Games of complete information: Backward Induction and Subgame perfection.
Now that we have set of pure strategies for each player, we need to find the payoffs to put the game in strategic form. Random payoffs. The actual outcome.
Q 2.1 Nash Equilibrium Ben
Games with Sequential Moves
Operations Management
5. Combining simultaneous and sequential moves.
Supplement: Decision Making
Alpha-Beta Search.
Alpha-Beta Search.
Alpha-Beta Search.
Game Theory and Strategic Play
Alpha-Beta Search.
Game Theory Day 2: More Simple Games.
Alpha-Beta Search.
Lecture 8 Nash Equilibrium
Presentation transcript:

QR 38, 2/15/07 Extensive form games I.Writing down a game II.Finding the equilibrium III.Adding complexity

I. Writing down a game Consider a trade game: Congress and the president are deciding whether trade policy should be protectionist or free trade President is a free trade Congress is more protectionist Both prefer a moderate level of protection to the highly protectionist status quo Partisan conflict: the president benefits from getting Congress to vote against a moderate bill

Trade game Order of moves: President presents a bill to Congress. The bill can be either free trade or moderate. Congress then votes “yes” or “no” If no, the protectionist status quo prevails

Trade game This is a sequential move game; the order of moves is clearly defined We can show this game with a game tree: Trees are the extensive form of a game Trees are made up of nodes and branches

Game trees Two types of nodes –Decision nodes Decisions are made here Decision nodes are associate with the player who makes a decision there The first decision node is called the initial node, where the game starts –Terminal nodes These indicate the possible outcomes and the payoffs attached to them. May be a lot.

Game trees Branches represent possible actions from any decision node The branches must account for all possible actions at that node, including letting the status quo prevail (that is, do nothing) There must be at least one branch from each decision node; there is no maximum number Each decision node can have only one branch leading to it

Game trees These definitions of nodes and branches mean that successive branching at nodes is key; the game can only be read in one direction Illustrate trade game on board

Strategies Definition: a strategy is a complete plan for playing a game A pure strategy is a rule that says what choice to make at each decision node; what to do under every contingency, no matter how unlikely

Strategies In this game, the president has two pure strategies: free or moderate For Congress, the strategy set is more complex, since it is contingent on what the president has done

Strategies Congress has 4 pure strategies –Yes, if P free or moderate –Yes if P free, No if P moderate –No if P free, Yes if P moderate –No if P free or moderate Represent these 4 strategies as Y if F, Y if M; Y if F, N if M; N if F, Y if M; N if F, N if M. Remember this notation.

II. Finding the equilibrium Definition of equilibrium: all players’ actions are the best response to the actions of others. To find an equilibrium, have to look ahead and reason back. This is called rollback or backward induction. Start by thinking about what will happen at last decision nodes, roll back to initial node

Finding equilibria On a game tree, identify the best choice at each decision node by drawing an arrow. Prune branches that will not be chosen. This leads to a rollback equilibrium. Note that the first player’s choice will be conditional on what he expects the second player to do.

Describing equilibria Describe an equilibrium by the set of strategies that lead to it. Here, Congress’ best strategy is N if F, Y if M; P’s best strategy is M. This leads to the outcome at the 3d terminal node, with payoff 3, 4.

Finding equilibria Note that in equilibrium, many branches and nodes are missed. But we still have to consider what would happen at these in order to identify the equilibrium. Out-of-equilibrium expectations are important. Note that rollback works because players know what all the options are at all nodes (common knowledge).

III. Adding complexity Add another node to this game, allowing Congress to decide whether to give the president fast-track authority. Since Congress now moves first, write down its payoff first. Assume that Congress prefers not to delegate, all else equal. Could also add a second country

Order of moves Does it matter who gets to move first? Often, yes. Some games have a first-mover advantage. –Example: entering new markets Other games have a second-mover advantage. –Example: cake-cutting.

Adding complexity When adding more players or moves, the game tree and description of the full strategy set get complicated very quickly. When too complex, have to use techniques to simplify, such as calculating an intermediate value function (estimate the value of continuing down different paths).