Lectures in Microeconomics-Charles W. Upton Priceline and E-Bay.

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Presentation transcript:

Lectures in Microeconomics-Charles W. Upton Priceline and E-Bay

Two Popular Services Different Techniques Both want to get as much of your consumer surplus as possible.

Priceline and E-Bay Priceline and Consumer Surplus Priceline offers goods for sale on the web (an airline trip, for instance). They would ideally like to get people to bid .

Priceline and E-Bay Priceline and Consumer Surplus Priceline offers goods for sale on the web (an airline trip, for instance). They would ideally like to get people to . They offer you a take-it-or-leave-it deal. Your bid will be accepted or rejected.

Priceline and E-Bay How much should you bid? If you bid , you may pay too much. If you don’t, you might not get the fare.

Priceline and E-Bay How much should you bid? If you bid , you may pay too much. If you don’t, you might not get the fare. Thus the take-it-or-leave-it option. –Without that, bid $1. –If that is rejected, bid $2, etc.

Priceline and E-Bay How much should you bid? If you bid , you may pay too much. If you don’t, you might not get the fare. Thus the take-it-or-leave-it option. –Without that, bid $1. –If that is rejected, bid $2, etc. The right bidding strategy depends on your estimate of any given bid being accepted.

Priceline and E-Bay E-bay and Vickery Auctions E-bay uses a Vickery Auction. The highest bidder gets it at the second bidder’s price. You have an incentive to bid .

Priceline and E-Bay An Example Charles Upton offers a Wonder Widget® on E-bay. –He sets a reservation price ($50) –He requires bids in $5 increments

Priceline and E-Bay An Example Charles Upton offers a Wonder Widget® on E-bay. Bidder 1 logs on.  1 = $100 He bids $95, and is told the current high bid is $50 (his)

Priceline and E-Bay Bidder 2 For Bidder 2  2 = $200 He bids $195, and is told the high bid is $95 (his).

Priceline and E-Bay You  = $300 You bid $295, and are told the current high bid is $195 (yours).

Priceline and E-Bay Bidder 4  4 = $250 Bidder 4 logs on, is told the current high bid is $195. He bids $245 and the bid is rejected, for the current high bid is automatically raised to $245 (yours). Assuming no other bidders you will get it for that price.

Priceline and E-Bay An Example Unlike Priceline, you have no incentive to bid less than .

Priceline and E-Bay A Warning There are other strategic issues in both Priceline and E-bay. This is by no means a complete introduction. Use these two services at your own risk.

Priceline and E-Bay End ©2003 Charles W. Upton