On the Difficulty of Scalably Detecting Network Attacks Kirill Levchenko with Ramamohan Paturi and George Varghese.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Xiaoming Sun Tsinghua University David Woodruff MIT
Advertisements

UDP & TCP Where would we be without them!. UDP User Datagram Protocol.
CIT 380: Securing Computer SystemsSlide #1 CIT 380: Securing Computer Systems Scanning.
Measurement in Networks & SDN Applications. Interesting Questions Who is sending a lot to a subnet? – Heavy Hitters Is someone doing a port Scan? Is someone.
11 Packet Sampling for Worm and Botnet Detection in TCP Connections Reporter: 林佳宜 /10/25.
Broadcasting Protocol for an Amorphous Computer Lukáš Petrů MFF UK, Prague Jiří Wiedermann ICS AS CR.
Firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems
1 Design of Bloom Filter Array for Network Anomaly Detection Author: Jieyan Fan, Dapeng Wu, Kejie Lu, Antonio Nucci Publisher: IEEE GLOBECOM 2006 Presenter:
DFence: Transparent Network-based Denial of Service Mitigation CSC7221 Advanced Topics in Internet Technology Presented by To Siu Sang Eric ( )
8-1 Internet security threats Mapping: m before attacking: gather information – find out what services are implemented on network  Use ping to determine.
Lecture 23: Network Primer 7/15/2003 CSCE 590 Summer 2003.
Beyond the perimeter: the need for early detection of Denial of Service Attacks John Haggerty,Qi Shi,Madjid Merabti Presented by Abhijit Pandey.
“On Scalable Attack Detection in the Network” Ramana Rao Kompella, Sumeet Singh, and George Varghese Presented by Nadine Sundquist.
FIREWALLS & NETWORK SECURITY with Intrusion Detection and VPNs, 2 nd ed. 6 Packet Filtering By Whitman, Mattord, & Austin© 2008 Course Technology.
WXES2106 Network Technology Semester /2005 Chapter 8 Intermediate TCP CCNA2: Module 10.
Game-based Analysis of Denial-of- Service Prevention Protocols Ajay Mahimkar Class Project: CS 395T.
Gursharan Singh Tatla Transport Layer 16-May
Hash, Don’t Cache: Fast Packet Forwarding for Enterprise Edge Routers Minlan Yu Princeton University Joint work with Jennifer.
Firewalls CS432. Overview  What are firewalls?  Types of firewalls Packet filtering firewalls Packet filtering firewalls Sateful firewalls Sateful firewalls.
MITACS-PINTS Prediction In Interacting Systems Project Leader : Michael Kouriztin.
1 Issues in Benchmarking Intrusion Detection Systems Marcus J. Ranum.
Packet Filtering. 2 Objectives Describe packets and packet filtering Explain the approaches to packet filtering Recommend specific filtering rules.
FIREWALL Mạng máy tính nâng cao-V1.
January 2009Prof. Reuven Aviv: Firewalls1 Firewalls.
Karlstad University Introduction to Vulnerability Assessment Labs Ge Zhang Dvg-C03.
Chapter 6: Packet Filtering
1 Semester 2 Module 10 Intermediate TCP/IP Yuda college of business James Chen
Network security Further protocols and issues. Protocols: recap There are a few main protocols that govern the internet: – Internet Protocol: IP – Transmission.
SIGCOMM 2002 New Directions in Traffic Measurement and Accounting Focusing on the Elephants, Ignoring the Mice Cristian Estan and George Varghese University.
Port Scanning 0x470~0x480 Presenter SangDuk Seo 1.
CIT 380: Securing Computer SystemsSlide #1 CIT 380: Securing Computer Systems Scanning.
Tight Bounds for Graph Problems in Insertion Streams Xiaoming Sun and David P. Woodruff Chinese Academy of Sciences and IBM Research-Almaden.
Implementing a Port Knocking System in C Honors Thesis Defense by Matt Doyle.
CS332, Ch. 26: TCP Victor Norman Calvin College 1.
Packet Filtering Chapter 4. Learning Objectives Understand packets and packet filtering Understand approaches to packet filtering Set specific filtering.
1 The Internet and Networked Multimedia. 2 Layering  Internet protocols are designed to work in layers, with each layer building on the facilities provided.
Access Control List (ACL)
Breno de MedeirosFlorida State University Fall 2005 Network Intrusion Detection Systems Beyond packet filtering.
Scanning & Enumeration Lab 3 Once attacker knows who to attack, and knows some of what is there (e.g. DNS servers, mail servers, etc.) the next step is.
Lecture 22 Network Security CS 450/650 Fundamentals of Integrated Computer Security Slides are modified from Hesham El-Rewini.
1 Firewalls Types of Firewalls Inspection Methods  Static Packet Inspection  Stateful Packet Inspection  NAT  Application Firewalls Firewall Architecture.
CPS 290 Computer Security Network Tools Cryptography Basics CPS 290Page 1.
The Cost of Fault Tolerance in Multi-Party Communication Complexity Binbin Chen Advanced Digital Sciences Center Haifeng Yu National University of Singapore.
CS603 Fault Tolerance - Communication April 17, 2002.
Chapter 8 Network Security Thanks and enjoy! JFK/KWR All material copyright J.F Kurose and K.W. Ross, All Rights Reserved Computer Networking:
1 Lecture 13 IPsec Internet Protocol Security CIS CIS 5357 Network Security.
DoS/DDoS attack and defense
Automated Worm Fingerprinting Authors: Sumeet Singh, Cristian Estan, George Varghese and Stefan Savage Publish: OSDI'04. Presenter: YanYan Wang.
Transport Protocols.
Lower bounds on data stream computations Seminar in Communication Complexity By Michael Umansky Instructor: Ronitt Rubinfeld.
UDP & TCP Where would we be without them!. UDP User Datagram Protocol.
IP packet filtering Breno de Medeiros. Florida State University Fall 2005 Packet filtering Packet filtering is a network security mechanism that works.
@Yuan Xue CS 285 Network Security Placement of Security Function and Security Service Yuan Xue Fall 2013.
Cisco I Introduction to Networks Semester 1 Chapter 7 JEOPADY.
Chapter 8.  Upon completion of this chapter, you should be able to:  Understand the purpose of a firewall  Name two types of firewalls  Identify common.
PPP Protocol.
Information Complexity Lower Bounds
The Transport Layer (TCP)
Computer Data Security & Privacy
Principles of Computer Security
Introduction to Networking
Module 18 (More Network Discovery)
Chapter 4: Access Control Lists (ACLs)
Network Security: IP Spoofing and Firewall
POOJA Programmer, CSE Department
EE 122: Lecture 7 Ion Stoica September 18, 2001.
PPP Protocol.
On the Difficulty of Scalably Detecting Network Attacks
Session 20 INST 346 Technologies, Infrastructure and Architecture
TCP Connection Management
Presentation transcript:

On the Difficulty of Scalably Detecting Network Attacks Kirill Levchenko with Ramamohan Paturi and George Varghese

Which Intrusion Detection problems are hard (require per-flow state)? Counting distinct flows? Approximately? Detecting SYN Flooding? Port Scans? Are there efficient algorithms we don’t know yet? How to tell? Detecting Attacks

Abstract problem formulation Communication Complexity Source for NIDS problem reductions Establishes worst-case lower bounds Easy and fun to use Theoretical Techniques

Problem Motivation and Setting The Set Disjointness problem Application to SYN Flooding Implications Conclusion Outline

Problem Setting Idea: move the NIDS into the network, protect more systems!

Problem Setting Protect more hosts Single device to administer More informed position

Challenges: More hosts to protect Higher bandwidth links How do resource requirements scale? Are there fundamental limits? Problem Setting

Two packet sequences: traffic entering and leaving the network Goal: detect attack using packet sequences Problem Setting Outbound Inbound

Formalize the algorithmic problem An algorithm on packet sequences Reduce one problem to another Show solving one problem solves the other Algorithms & Reductions

Solving the NIDS problem solves the Set Disjointness problem Use strong bounds on Set Disjointness Establishes space lower bound for the NIDS problem Our Reduction Set Disjointness → NIDS Problem

Set Disjointness AliceBob Disjoint?

Set Disjointness AliceBob Communication: (even randomized)

Let’s Try It! (on SYN Flooding)

SYN Flooding NormalAttack Goal: detect unclosed connections.

SYN Flooding 1. Creates packet sequence corresponding to her set with SYN flag 2. Runs NIDS algorithm on input sequence 3. Suspends it after reading the last item 4. Sends the state of the algorithm to Bob

SYN Flooding Yes/No 1. Creates packet sequence corresponding to elements not in his set with FIN flag 2. Resumes NIDS algorithm on input sequence (using state sent by Alice) 3. Result indicates if sets intersect or not

SYN Flooding If A and B intersect, there is a SYN packet not followed by a FIN If A and B are disjoint, every SYN packet has a matching FIN Algorithm sees:

1. Alice sent Bob the state of the NIDS algorithm: 2. Set Disjointness requires Ω(n) bits ∴ The state of the algorithm is Ω(n) bits SYN Flooding no. of flows

Port Scans per-host state required TCP connection hijacking per-flow state required Evasion by fragmentation re-assembly required Other NIDS Problems

Sometimes per-flow state is required, but: Examples are artificial (may not occur in practice) Problem semantics may be a great help System can fail gracefully when out of memory Additional information may be available! Implications

Additional information can be useful: Count outgoing SYN+ACK and FIN packets Works if protected network can be trusted Hop-count filtering or other fingerprinting Small UDP fragments are unusual Implications

Set Disjointness is a useful reduction source Even hard under randomization Permits relaxations (see paper) Exposes and formalizes the hardness of some NIDS problems Guides practical algorithm design to consider hard cases and failure modes Conclusion