Consequences of consensus democracy

Structure The impact of consensus and majoritarian democracies Lijphart Patterns of Democracy Yale 1999 The effects of electoral systems Pippa Norris Electoral Engineering CUP 2004 Next class Monday: discussion exercise: Use Lijphart’s theory to evaluate the new constitution and electoral system in Afghanistan.

I: Impact of consensus v. majoritarian democracies Is majoritarian democracy better at government and consensus democracy better at representation? Lijphart’s indicators… Performance (Table 15.1) Macroeconomic performance Control of violence/riots/deaths Representation (Table 16.1) Women’s inclusion Voter Turnout Satisfaction with democracy Public policy outcomes

Impact on stability & performance Mean Majoritarian Consensus Riots 1948-77 1.96 3.17 Political deaths 1948-77 6.86 2.41 Economic growth 1961-88 3.4 3.5 Inflation 1961-88 7.5 6.3 Unemployment 1965-88 6.1 4.4 Income top 20% 1988 42.9 39.0

II. Impact of electoral systems Proportionality of votes to seats (fair outcomes) Party competition Electoral turnout Parliamentary representation Women & ethno-political minorities Strength of cleavage politics Constituency service What criteria do you regard as most important? Why?

Recap: Classification of systems Adversarial Majoritarian

Evidence Aggregate effects Individual-level effects Classify electoral systems worldwide Analyze results in elections for lower house 1995-2000 in 143 nations Individual-level effects Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 30 nations 1996-2001 – survey battery

1. Impact on proportionality Proportionality of votes to seats Winning party Perfect proportionality 20% 2nd party, 3rd etc Seat share 20% Vote share

Proportionality Regressions of % Votes to % Seats per party

Measures of proportionality Loosemore-Hanby Index (D) D =__1__ Σ (vi – si) 2 Sums absolute difference between Vote percentage (vi) Seat percentage (si) Divided by 2 (Slightly exaggerates disproportionality of systems with many small parties) (Index was standardized to 100-point scale by Rose)

Proportionality Standardized Loosemore-Hanby Index

Proportionality influenced by: Number of parties in the electorate Geographical distribution of the vote District magnitude (members per district) Legal vote thresholds The type of electoral formulae eg d’Hondt etc

2. Impact on parties: Duverger’s laws (1) “The plurality single-ballot rule tends to party dualism.” (2)“The double-ballot system and proportional representation tend to multipartyism.” Maurice Duverger. 1954. Political Parties, Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. New York: Wiley.

Effect on parties All Majoritarian 5.22 3.33 54.5 56.8 All Combined   Mean N of parl parties (1 seat) Mean N of relevant parl parties (3%+ seats) % Vote for party 1st % Seats for party 1st Number of countries All Majoritarian 5.22 3.33 54.5 56.8 83 Alternative Vote 9.00 3.00 40.3 45.3 1 Block vote 5.60 4.57 52.9 56.2 10 2nd Ballot 6.00 3.20 54.8 57.8 23 FPTP 4.78 3.09 55.1 49 All Combined 8.85 4.52 46.8 49.5 26 Independent 8.89 3.94 51.7 53.9 19 Dependent 8.71 6.17 33.9 36.9 7 ALL Proportional 9.52 4.74 43.8 61 STV 5.00 2.50 50.1 2 Party List 9.68 4.82 44.5 43.6 59 TOTAL 7.05 4.12 48.7 50.0 143 Ref: Pippa Norris ‘Institutions Matter’ CUP 2003

ENPP by Electoral System Ref: Pippa Norris ‘Electoral Engineering’ CUP 2004

“A 5% increase in disproportionality reduces the ENPP by half a party” Lijphart p168

3. Effect on Turnout Ref: Pippa Norris 2002. Democratic Phoenix Ch 4. Type of Electoral System Mean Vote/VAP 1990s N. MAJORITARIAN   Alternative Vote 65.5 2 2nd Ballot 58.5 21 First-Past-The-Post 61.2 43 Single Non-Transferable Vote 52.6 Block Vote 56.5 9 All majoritarian 60.4 77 COMBINED Combined-Dependent 66.6 7 Combined-Independent 63.5 19 All combined 64.0 26 PROPORTIONAL List PR 70.0 59 Single Transferable Vote 83.4 All PR Systems 68 All 65.0 164

But also impact of compulsory voting   Vote/VAP Vote/Reg N. of Nations Older democracies Compulsory 79.4 86.9 7 Non-Compulsory 71.7 72.7 32 Difference +7.7 +14.2 39 Newer democracies 67.7 75.8 9 69.3 73.9 31 -1.6 +1.9 40 Semi-democracies 53.9 60.6 5 56.6 67.0 -2.7 -6.4 45 Non-democracies 40.9 70.6 2 61.8 67.8 38 -20.9 +2.8 All 65.9 75.4 23 64.2 70.0 140 +5.4 163

4. Impact on women “As a simple rule, women proved twice as likely to be elected under PR than majoritarian electoral systems. Women were 10.8 percent of MPs in majoritarian systems, 15.1 percent in mixed or semi-proportional systems, and 19.8 percent of members in PR systems.” P.Norris in R.Rose Encyclopedia of Elections (CQ 2001)

FPTP Mixed PR

But also other rules matter… Political culture & societal development Demand by selectors Demand by voters Electoral laws 1.Electoral system 2.Legal gender quotas 3.Reserved seats Candidate selection process within parties 4.Voluntary gender quotas Pool of parliamentary candidates Elected members Supply of candidates Equal opportunities in education, home and work

Legal gender quotas Country Date % Quota % Before % After Change Argentina 1991 30 6 27 +21 Ecuador 1997 20 4 15 +11 Paraguay 1996 11 18 +7 Peru Venezuela 1998 13 Belgium 1994 33 23 +5 Costa Rica 40 14 19 Dominican Rep 25 12 16 +4 Panama 8 10 +2 9 France 1999 50 +1 Bolivia Mexico 3 Brazil 7 -1 17 Average   Note: Legal gender quotas for the lower house of national parliaments: laws which specify that each party must include a minimum proportion of women on party lists of candidates. Source: Pippa Norris Electoral Engineering Table 8.5

5. Impact on cleavage politics Majoritarian Combined PR Pippa Norris ‘Electoral Engineering’ CUP 2004

6. Impact on constituency service?   % With contact Type of Districts Iceland 31 PR New Zealand 24 Combined Canada 22 Majoritarian Denmark 20 Open PR Switzerland Thailand 17 Australia 16 Israel Closed PR Korean Rep Lithuania 15 Norway Britain 13 Chile 12 USA Germany 11 Sweden Mexico 10 Belarus 9 Peru Czech Republic 8 Japan Taiwan Ukraine Hungary 7 Romania Poland 6 Portugal Netherlands 5 Russia 3 Spain ALL % With contact with elected member in last 12 months Ref: Pippa Norris ‘Electoral engineering’ CUP 2004

Effects of electoral systems Proportionality of votes to seats  Party competition  Electoral turnout  Parliamentary representation Women  Ethno-political minorities (?) Strength of cleavage politics  Constituency service ?

Next class Monday Case study application Apply Lijphart’s theory to evaluate the new Afghanistan electoral system What evaluative criteria are most important in this case? Stability? Policy effectiveness? Gender? Ethnicity? What does the new constitution propose? How has the electoral system worked? What are the consequences of the constitutional choices?