Wireless LAN Security Framework Backend AAA Infrastructure RADIUS, TACACS+, LDAP, Kerberos TLSLEAPTTLSPEAPMD5 VPN EAP PPP 802.3802.5802.11 802.1x EAP API.

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Presentation transcript:

Wireless LAN Security Framework Backend AAA Infrastructure RADIUS, TACACS+, LDAP, Kerberos TLSLEAPTTLSPEAPMD5 VPN EAP PPP x EAP API NDIS API

IEEE 802.1X authentication Performs authentication in a layer above the IEEE MAC layer Performs authentication in a layer above the IEEE MAC layer Removes all authentication processing from the IEEE MAC Removes all authentication processing from the IEEE MAC 802.1X can use any EAP method installed on the client and AAA server 802.1X can use any EAP method installed on the client and AAA server Methods in common use include TLS, Cisco LEAP (based on MS-CHAPv1), and Funk's Tunneled TTLS (TTLS) Methods in common use include TLS, Cisco LEAP (based on MS-CHAPv1), and Funk's Tunneled TTLS (TTLS)

Common EAP Methods EAP-TLS EAP-TLS TLS handshake is used to mutually authenticate a client and server TLS handshake is used to mutually authenticate a client and server EAP-TTLS extends this EAP-TTLS extends this Uses the secure connection established by the TLS handshake to perform additional authentication Uses the secure connection established by the TLS handshake to perform additional authentication PEAP PEAP Similar to EAP-TTLS but only allows EAP for authentication Similar to EAP-TTLS but only allows EAP for authentication Also has key exchange, session resumption, fragmentation and reassembly Also has key exchange, session resumption, fragmentation and reassembly