Do Incentives Build Robustness in BitTorrent? Piatek, Isdal, Anderson, Krishnamurthy, and Venkataramani Piatek, Isdal, Anderson, Krishnamurthy, and Venkataramani.

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Presentation transcript:

Do Incentives Build Robustness in BitTorrent? Piatek, Isdal, Anderson, Krishnamurthy, and Venkataramani Piatek, Isdal, Anderson, Krishnamurthy, and Venkataramani Presented by Rejaie Johnson and Jim Spadaro

BitTorrent BitTorrent is a protocol for bulk data transfer BitTorrent is a protocol for bulk data transfer The more you give, the more you get The more you give, the more you get Tit-for-tat Tit-for-tat Not really Not really

Altruism Not really TFT Not really TFT 80% of users get more than they give 80% of users get more than they give 70% of capacity comes from high capacity users 70% of capacity comes from high capacity users Not really a fair protocol Not really a fair protocol Operates based on altruism of high capacity users Operates based on altruism of high capacity users

Exploiting Altruism Selfish users Selfish users Want to cheat Want to cheat Can download with many low-speed connections rather than 1 high-speed Can download with many low-speed connections rather than 1 high-speed

BitTyrant Maximize reciprocation bandwidth per connection Maximize reciprocation bandwidth per connection Find peers that give the most for the least Find peers that give the most for the least Maximize number of reciprocating peers Maximize number of reciprocating peers Get as many peers as possible Get as many peers as possible Until benefit of new peer is outweighed by cost of reduced reciprocation from other peers Until benefit of new peer is outweighed by cost of reduced reciprocation from other peers Deviate from equal Deviate from equal Decrease uploading on each connection Decrease uploading on each connection Until peer stops reciprocating Until peer stops reciprocating

Results BitTyrant improves average download performance by 70% BitTyrant improves average download performance by 70% Regardless of capacity, using BitTyrant is in the selfish interest of every peer individually Regardless of capacity, using BitTyrant is in the selfish interest of every peer individually When all peers behave selfishly, average performance degrades for all peers, even those with high capacity When all peers behave selfishly, average performance degrades for all peers, even those with high capacity

Conclusion BitTorrent works because people use the default client BitTorrent works because people use the default client No cheating No cheating BitTyrant is now available in the wild BitTyrant is now available in the wild This is a test – Do incentives build robustness? This is a test – Do incentives build robustness? Maybe users will continue to donate excess bandwidth Maybe users will continue to donate excess bandwidth Maybe users will be selfish Maybe users will be selfish Proven to reduce overall capacity Proven to reduce overall capacity