Wood Bros Homes v Walker Adj Bureau (Colo. 1979)

Section 196 applies to contracts for the rendition of services. It provides: “The validity of a contract for the rendition of services and the rights created thereby are determined, in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, by the local law of the state where the contract requires that the services, or a major portion of the services, be rendered, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in s 6 to the transaction and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.”

188 Law Governing in Absence of Effective Choice by the Parties (1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the principles stated in s 6.

(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see s 187), the contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of s 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include: (a) the place of contracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of performance, (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and (e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties These contracts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.

§ 6. Choice-Of-Law Principles (1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.

(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include (a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.

Leflar – choice influencing considerations predictability of results maintenance of interstate and int’l legal orders simplification of judicial task advancement of forum interest choosing better rule of law

Milkovich v Saari (Minn. 1973)

Kell v. Henderson (NY Sup. Ct. 1965) Ontario guest and Ontario host leaves in car from Ontario to NY Accident in NY NY law, rather than Ontario guest statute, applied

On the consideration of governmental interest, Professor Leflar found adequate support for the decision rendered by the New York court. In so doing, he rejected the concept of the practical interest of the state in the supervision and safety of its state highways since the rule in question, unlike rules of the road and definitions of negligence, does not bear upon vehicle operation as such. Instead, he pointed out that the factor to be considered is the relevant effect the New York rule has on the duty of host to guest and the danger of collusion between them to defraud the host's insurer.

New York's interest in applying its own law rather than Ontario law on these issues, he found to be based primarily on its status as a justice-administering state. In that status, it is strongly concerned with seeing that persons who come into the New York courts to litigate controversies with substantial New York connections have these cases determined according to rules consistent with New York concepts of justice, or at least not inconsistent with them. That will be as true for nondomiciliary litigants as for domiciliaries. This interest will not manifest itself clearly if the out-of-state rule does not run contrary to some strong socio-legal policy of the forum, but it will become a major consideration if there is such a strong opposing local policy. Professor Leflar then pointed out that this consideration leads to preference for what is regarded as the better rule of law, that New York has such a preference, and that it is a vigorous one. He concluded that the combination of the last two items, governmental interest and better rule of law, called for the application of New York law.

The compelling factors in this case are the advancement of the forum's governmental interests and the application of the better law. While there may be more deterrent effect in our common- law rule of liability as opposed to the guest statute requirement of gross negligence, the main governmental interest involved in that of any ‘justice-administering state.’ In that posture, we are concerned that our courts not be called upon to determine issues under rules which, however, accepted they may be in other states, are inconsistent with our own concept of fairness and equity. We might also note that persons injured in automobile accidents occurring within our borders can reasonably be expected to require treatment in our medical facilities, both public and private. In the instant case, plaintiff incurred medical bills in a Duluth hospital which have already been paid, but we are loath to place weight on the individual case for fear it might offer even minor incentives to ‘hospital shop’ or to create litigation-directed pressures on the payment of debts to medical facilities. Suffice it to say that we recognize that medical costs are likely to be incurred with a consequent governmental interest that injured persons not be denied recovery on the basis of doctrines foreign to Minnesota.

In our search for the better rule, we are firmly convinced of the superiority of the common-law rule of liability to that of the Ontario guest statute. We can find little reason for the strict limitation of a host's liability to his guest beyond the fear of collusive suits and the vague disapproval of a guest ‘biting the hand that feeds him.’ Neither rationale is persuasive. We are convinced the judicial system can uncover collusive suits without such overinclusive rules, and we do not find any discomfort in the prospect of a guest suing his host for injuries suffered through the host's simple negligence.

Jepson v. Gen. Casualty Co. of Wisc. (Minn. 1994)

Dépeçage

Adams (NY domiciliary) is member of NY organization Enrolls in its nature program Truck takes him to Mass Breaks down Farmer with unregistered truck offers to take them the rest of way Truck hits Adams, but not negligent Mass law: driver unlicensed car is outlaw – liability w/o fault NY requires negligence Mass has charitable immunity NY does not

Currie: “While Massachusetts has a policy of deterring the operation of unlicensed vehicles, it does not extend that policy to charities…. While New York has a policy of requiring compensation for its injured residents, it has no policy of imposing liability in the absence of negligence. To impose liability on this New York corporation, which has been free from fault, simply in order to carry out a nonexistent Massachusetts policy of deterrence, seems to me to be entirely unjustified….”

Maryland Cas v Jacek (D.N.J. 1957) Suit by MD insurer for declaratory judgment concerning liability under auto insurance policy Issued in NJ to NJ domiciliaries D had driven car with wife in NY – accident there NJ – Insurer liable for any successful suit against insured – BUT spousal immunity NY – no spousal immunity – BUT if spouse is successfully sued, insurer not liable

renvoi désistement

Pfau v Trent Aluminum Co. (NJ 1970)