University of Nijmegen Jaap-Henk Hoepman Department of Computer Science University of Nijmegen, the Netherlands Secure Method Invocation in JASON

J.H. Hoepman Secure Method Invocation in JASON 2 ContentsContents  JavaCard: Promises and Problems  JASON vision  JASON secure method invocation  Discussion

J.H. Hoepman Secure Method Invocation in JASON 3 JavaCard: Promises and Problems  Promises  Object oriented programming of smart card applications  Better chance of application separation through Java Virtual Machine  Problems  Object orientation invisible outside smart card. Still the same paradigm: Select application Send APDU command

J.H. Hoepman Secure Method Invocation in JASON 4 JASON Vision  Objectives  Viewing a smart card system as a collection of named, networked, objects  Truly object-oriented smart card programming  Automatically enforce security requirements at method granularity as specified by programmer “Javacards As Secure Objects Network” …towards a smart card OS…

J.H. Hoepman Secure Method Invocation in JASON 5 Related work  JCCAP (VandeWalle)  Capability based access control  VISA Open Platform Specification  Secure loading, installation and deletion of smart card applications  PC/SC / OpenCard  Transparently handle multiple smart cards  JiniCard  Download terminal plugins to accept any smart card

J.H. Hoepman Secure Method Invocation in JASON 6 JASON Secure Method Invocation  Role based access control  Independent, per method  Role = ownership of key  Protecting parameters and results  Confidentiality  Authenticity Integrity no-replay

J.H. Hoepman Secure Method Invocation in JASON 7 JASON Architecture dispatcher APDU dispatcher terminalcard keys skel capplet stub

J.H. Hoepman Secure Method Invocation in JASON 8 Generating stubs/skeleton  JASON Definition File  JAVA Interface  Specify roles at start of class file  Extra keywords accessible to authentic confidential “ JASON definition file JASON definition file compiler java stub java stub java skeleton java skeleton

J.H. Hoepman Secure Method Invocation in JASON 9 Example: specifying a purse public interface Purse { roles: BANK, MERCHANT, OWNER ; accessible to ALL: confidential authentic short getBalance () ; accessible to MERCHANT authentic void decreaseBalance ( authentic short amount ) ; accessible to BANK authentic void increaseBalance ( confidential authentic short amount ) ; }

J.H. Hoepman Secure Method Invocation in JASON 10 The authentic keyword  Guarantees  Authenticity  Integrity  Freshness No replay  For results  It guarantees that the called method was actually executed at this time in the proper way with the intended side effect cf. a decrease purse command

J.H. Hoepman Secure Method Invocation in JASON 11 Example: calling a purse try { Purse purse = (Purse) SMINaming.connect("smi://smartcard/Purse", Purse.MERCHANT, purseKeyStore) ; try { purse.decreaseBalance(10); System.out.println("You have paid"); } catch (UserException ue) { System.out.println ("Transaction failed. You have not paid."); } catch (RemoteException re) { System.out.println("Failed to connect to service."); }

J.H. Hoepman Secure Method Invocation in JASON 12 Behind the scenes (1)  Connect(, )  Negotiate ciphers  Authenticate caller role  Establish authenticated caller/callee id’s  Exchange session keys privately  Return handle of skeleton

J.H. Hoepman Secure Method Invocation in JASON 13 Behind the scenes (2)  Method call  stub converts call to secured APDU stream (only when necessary) Using session keys and message counters  Dispatcher forwards APDU stream to skeleton  skeleton verifies/decrypts parameters and calls method

J.H. Hoepman Secure Method Invocation in JASON 14 Behind the scenes (3)  Cryptography  Keys in separate key file  Authentication based on Public key crypto (Diversified) symmetric key crypto Determined by key type in key file  Symmetric session keys

J.H. Hoepman Secure Method Invocation in JASON 15 Behind the scenes (4)  Efficient protection by reshuffling

J.H. Hoepman Secure Method Invocation in JASON 16 SMI vs RMI… SMI RMI SMI stub RMISMI stub or

J.H. Hoepman Secure Method Invocation in JASON 17 DiscussionDiscussion  SMI Extensions  Transaction support  Transaction tickets  Logging & auditing  Naming and brokerage  Not finalised yet  Multi-threading method calls  Outbound calls too  JASON not limited to smart cards  Client-server  Embedded/Ambient systems

J.H. Hoepman Secure Method Invocation in JASON 18 Closing remarks  ml