Lectures in Microeconomics-Charles W. Upton Nash Equilibrium.

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Presentation transcript:

Lectures in Microeconomics-Charles W. Upton Nash Equilibrium

Modeling an Industry Competitive Industry – Many Firms Monopoly – One Firm Duopoly (Oligopoly) – A Few Firms

Nash Equilibrium Modeling an Industry Competitive Industry – Many Firms Monopoly – One Firm Duopoly (Oligopoly) – A Few Firms –Cournot –Bertrand –Might there be other approaches?

Nash Equilibrium Different Problems A can build an expensive or cheap car. B can build an expensive or cheap car. There are four possible outcomes (E,E), (E,C), (C,E), (C,C) What will happen?

Nash Equilibrium Different Problems Firm A can build an expensive or a cheap car. Firm B can build an expensive of cheap car. There are four possible outcomes (E,E), (E,C), (C,E), (C,C) What will happen? Which, if any of those outcomes is a Nash Equilibrium?

Nash Equilibrium Firms must end up at a Nash Equilibrium, named after John Nash A Nash Equilibrium –Each person or firm is acting rationally

Nash Equilibrium A Nash Equilibrium Each person or firm is acting rationally No one believes his actions will change other decisions

Nash Equilibrium A Nash Equilibrium Each person or firm is acting rationally No one believes his actions will change other decisions No one has an incentive to change

Nash Equilibrium Cournot q A = 45 – (1/2)q B q B = 45 – (1/2)q A

Nash Equilibrium Cournot q A = 45 – (1/2)q B q B = 45 – (1/2)q A Does the Cournot model predict we will end up at a Nash Equilibrium? Yes

Nash Equilibrium Cournot q A = 45 – (1/2)q B q B = 45 – (1/2)q A Each person or firm is acting rationally No one believes his actions will change other decisions No one has an incentive to change

Nash Equilibrium The Bertrand Model Demand function is as shown. Firm with lowest bid gets all the market. In case of tie, firms split market MC = 0 D Does the Bertrand Model predict we will end up at a Nash Equilibrium? Yes

Nash Equilibrium The Bertrand Model Demand function is as shown. Firm with lowest bid gets all the market. In case of tie, firms split market MC = 0 D Each person or firm is acting rationally No one believes his actions will change other decisions No one has an incentive to change

Nash Equilibrium Some Questions about Nash Equilibrium Nash Equilibrium is useful for studying problems where there are just a couple of players.

Nash Equilibrium This slide left blank

Nash Equilibrium Nash and Duopolies Does there have to be a Nash Equilibrium? No

Nash Equilibrium Nash and Duopolies Does there have to be a Nash Equilibrium? Does there have to be only one Nash Equilibrium? No

Nash Equilibrium End ©2003 Charles W. Upton