A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions Patricia Anthony & Nicholas R. Jennings Dept. of Electronics and Computer Science University.

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A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions Patricia Anthony & Nicholas R. Jennings Dept. of Electronics and Computer Science University of Southampton, UK presented by Marcin Szczodrak from International Conference on Electronic Commerce (ICEC) 2003, Pittsburgh, PA 1 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions

Problem: number of auction sites increases consumers want to track and bid multiple auctions consumers want to get the best deal need to adopt varying strategies for different auctions consumers need a bidding agent to help them 2 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions

Simple Bidding Proxies Limitations: sites like eBay and Yahoo!Auction provide bidding proxies will bid in a stated auction up to some predefined limit fixed to operate at a single auction fixed to operate with a particular auction protocol bidding decisions are left to the human users 3 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions

Goals / Expectations: participate in multiple heterogeneous auctions make purchases autonomously never bids above the private value consistent with consumer’s preferences (eg. earliest time, lowest price) 4 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions

Previous Work: different types of protocols for English, Dutch, and Vickrey multiple heterogeneous auction environments environment is complex, dynamic, and unpredictable strategies are heuristic strategies are heavily influenced by the nature of environment search for strategy using genetic algorithm A genetic algorithm (GA) is a search technique used in computing to find exact or approximate solutions to optimization and search problems. Genetic algorithms are categorized as global search heuristics. Genetic algorithms are particular class of evolutionary algorithms (also know as evolutionary computation) that use techniques inspired by evolutionary biology such as inheritance, mutation, selection, or crossover (also called recombination). 5 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions

Design Environment: auctions : English, Dutch, Vickrey known start time of all auctions known end time of English and Vickrey deadlines to purchase : t max private value : p r types of intentions : bargain, desperate, combination buy no more than one instance 6 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions

Intelligent Bidding Strategy: a collection of strategies for a single agent while t < t max && item_is_not_acquired do build active action list L(t) calculate current maximum bid based on bidding constraints select from L(t) the potential auctions to bid in select target auction that maximizes agent’s expected utility bid the target action, but less than p r end 7 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions

Bidding constraints: remaining time left remaining auctions left desire for bargain level of desperateness we put weight on each constrain ex. (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25) all constraints are equal ex. (0.5, 0, 0.5, 0) agent considers only remaining time and desire for bargain 8 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions

Bidding constraints Bidding value function Function with two parameters k - range [0..1] starting bidding value (k * p r ) β - range [ ] rate of concession to p r 9 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions

10 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions

11 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions

Early experiments results: p r is the most effective factor successful strategies require precise definition of the environment’s characteristics the key defining characteristics of environment is the number of auctions that are active before t max 12 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions

Evolving Strategies: performance relates to strategy strategy is based on k, β, and weights on bidding constraints so number of strategies is infinite! use GAs to search for strategy do the search assuming that agent knows which strategies are effective in which environment, and can assess the environment accurately 13 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions

Categories of Environments: 1.agent private value 2.agent behavior 3.bidding Time and number of Auctions RP1 → Low RP2 → Medium RP3 → High FE1 → Desperate FE2 → Bargain FE3 → Balance x T y A x → Short; Medium; Long y → Less; Many Ex: RP1 FE2 STMA 14 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions

15 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions

Intelligent Bidding Strategy: a collection of strategies for a single agent while t < t max && item_is_not_acquired do build active action list L(t) calculate current maximum bid based on bidding constraints select from L(t) the potential auctions to bid in select target auction that maximizes agent’s expected utility bid the target action, but less than p r end 16 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions

Experimental Evaluation: 1.to show that intelligent bidding strategy perform effectively in wide range of bidding contexts 2.to understand what will happen when there are multiple such agents in the environment 17 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions

Experimental Evaluation Model: 1.Accurate Agent – correctly determine environment 2.Inaccurate Agent – incorrectly determines environment 3.Agent C – fixed strategy bargain: RP2 FE2 MTMA desperate: RP2 FE1 MTMA both: RP2 FE3 MTMA 18 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions

Success Rate Comparison 19 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions

Average Utility Comparison 20 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions

Agent’s Performance with Varying Environment Prediction Accuracy 21 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions

Experimental Evaluation: 1.to show that intelligent bidding strategy perform effectively in wide range of bidding contexts 2.to understand what will happen when there are multiple such agents in the environment 22 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions

Market Model: 1.Dummy Bidder 2.Intelligent Agent 3.Set equilibrium: price at 81 and quantity at 25 have individual an environmental parameters values generated as in dummy bidders have intention and poses behavior maintain information about target, private value starting bid, and increment values generated randomly from standard probability distribution 23 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions

Supply and Demand Curve for the Market 24 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions

Effectiveness of the Market: calculate market’s allocative efficiency calculate Smith’s Alpha (α) coefficient Allocative efficiency is defined as the total actual profit earned by all the sellers divided by the maximum total profit that could have been earned in an ideal market (expressed as percentage) Smith’s Alpha coefficient measures how close the actual trade prices are to the equilibrium, α = 100 * σ 0 / P 0, where σ 0 is the standard deviation of trade prices around P A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions

total 300 agents start with 0 intelligent agents and then increase by A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions The Bidder’s Average Utility

27 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions Number of Intelligent Agents vs. Allocative Efficiency Efficiency can be improved by adding even small number of intelligent agents

28 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions Number of Intelligent Agents vs. Smith’s Alpha market is slowly converging to its equilibrium

29 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions Number of Intelligent Agents vs. Average Utility intelligent agents are competing against dummies intelligent agents are competing against each other

Experiment Summary: intelligent bidding strategy can perform effectively in a wide range of environments achieves high success rate and average utility achieves high utility between many intelligent agents 30 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions

Conclusion: “… as the number of on intelligent agents increases, the market efficiency increases which, in turn, leads to an increase in profit to the sellers.” 31 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions Future Work: Determine methods such that agent can quickly and accurately determine the type of trading environment

32 A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions Questions? Thank You, marcin (