Module 08 Module 08Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident Vienna University of Technology Atominstitute Stadionallee 2 A-1020 Vienna, Austria ph:

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Location of the NPPs near Earthquake Epicenter (Tokai (I) is decommissioned) Dai-ni Dai-ichi

Contribution of Dai-ichi NPPs to electric power production in Japan ~30% of Japanese electrical grid supplied by 54 reactor units: 30 BWRs / 24 Pressurized Water Reactors, (PWRs) ~17% of electrical grid supplied by the 30 BWRs ~2% of electrical grid was supplied by the 4 damaged BWRs at Fukushima Dai-ichi

Fukushima Dai-ichi npp Status prior to Earthquake / Tsunami Event Six Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP Unit 1: 439 MWe, 1971 (in operation prior to event) Unit 2: 760 MWe, 1974 (in operation prior to event) Unit 3: 760 MWe, 1976 (in operation prior to event) Unit 4: 760 MWe, 1978 (shutdown prior to event) Unit 5: 760 MWe, 1978 (shutdown prior to event) Unit 6: 1067 MWe, 1979 (shutdown prior to event)

Scram Levels Normal earthquake scram level: 0,15 g Design basis acceleration level: 0,45g, in this case all safety functions must stay operational Actual ground acceleration at site: 0,56 g -  20% above design basis

Cross Section and Photo of GE Mark I (32 units world-wide, 23 in USA, 1 in Switzerland)

Fukushima Dai-ichi NPPs turbine buildings cooling water discharge

Loss of fuel tanks for emergency diesel generators before tsunami after tsunami

Status upon Earthquake: March 11, operating reactors automatically shut ‐ down due to ground acceleration exceeding the reactor seismic trip settings Onagawa Units 1,2,3 Fukushima (I) Dai-ichi Units 1, 2, 3 Fukushima (II) Dai-ni Units 1, 2, 3, 4 Tokai (II) (Tokai (I) is decommissioned) 3 reactors were shutdown prior to earthquake for periodic inspection Fukushima Dai ‐ ichi Unit 4 (reactor was defuelled), Unit 5 and Unit 6

Status upon Earthquake: March 11, 2011 Many Japanese high rise elevators and the bullet trains also have seismic safety protection. No elevator accidents were reported. 27 bullet trains in north eastern Japan, reported to have activated emergency brakes, seconds before the earthquake hit, due to its early detection, preventing any derailing.

Tsunami hits coast in Fukushima I

Sea starts to overflow Tsunami wall at Dai-ni, (10 km from Dai-ichi site)

1 minute later 16

Non-nuclear facility damage: oil refinery fire, Ichihara, Chiba Prefecture

Non-nuclear facility damage: oil refinery fire, Ichihara, Chiba Prefecture Ichihara, Chiba Prefecture Image credit dug spr — Home for Good

Relative elevation of NPP systems

Total loss of power

Simplified view of BWR reactor vessel and containment design DW: Drywell WW: Wetwell SFP: Spent Fuel Pool SCSW: Secondary Concrete Sheild Wall RPV: Reactor Pressure Vessel Drywell: Bulb-shaped : 30 mm steel, during operation filled with N2 Wetwell: Torus with about 3000 m3 cold water

Normal Operation Emergency Cooling

Fuel elements partially uncovered and start to heat up Containement designed for 4 bars pressure exceeds 8 bars, pressure relief through relief valves

Fuel storage pool damaged, water level decreases, fuel elements overheat are damaged and release fisson products H2 explosion below reactor roof, release of fission products to the environment

Accident progression (summary only) Emergency battery power provided core cooling for about 8 hours (Unit 1), after which the batteries were discharged. Decay heat in the reactors and spent fuel ponds could no longer be removed Offsite power could not be restored, delays were encountered in obtaining and connecting portable generators Reactor temperatures increased, water levels in the reactor vessel decreased, eventually uncovering and overheating the Unit 1 core. Hydrogen was produced by oxidation of zirconium metal fuel cladding, zirconium-water reactions in core start above 1000ºC

Accident progression (summary only) Spent fuel pool temperature rises in Unit 4 (containing all the reactor fuel), as water is lost from possible pool wall damage, 150 tons seawater pumped in, then fresh water pumped in. Unit 4 fire breaks out, April 11, that later extinguishes, with subsequent significant fire damage. April 2011 core damage status (subject to revision): Unit 1: 55%; Unit 2: 35%; Unit 3: 30%.

Fuel assemblies: 4m long, About 60 rods per assembly Block 1: ca fuel rods (70 t Uran) Block 2-4: ca Fuel rods (95 t Uran)

Spent Fuel Pools Dimensions in m Num,ber of Fuel Assemblies Heat input if not cooled Depth in m Unit 112 x 7900 Unit 212 x Unit 312 x Unit 412 x appr. 3 MW 12* * Above fuel top: 7m, after accident : - 5m ** Evaporation: 100 m3 per day Normal temperature: 30 C, max: 85 C

GE-BWR Reactor Hall with Fuel Pool

GE-BWR during revision

Decay Heat 33 Nachzerfallswärme der Spaltprodukte

Reactor decay heat problem Decay heat after shutdown (Dai-ichi Units 2 and 3) Unit 4 with over 1000 fuel rods in the spent fuel pool, the decay heat could boil off about 100m 3 of water per day, if the water was at boiling point TimePercentage of Full powerDecay Heat MW_thermal 1 sec7 %167 1 day1 – 2 %47 1 year0.2 %5

Reactor decay heat problem Radioactive isotopes (fission products) in the fuel produce radiation as they decay (gamma, beta, and alpha radiation) This decay radiation deposits most of its energy in the fuel (decay heat), about 7% of thermal power, immediately after a reactor is shutdown The decay heat must be removed at the same rate it is produced or the reactor fuel core will heat up and in the absence of any cooling the fuel may melt The removal of decay heat is performed by various cooling systems that provide water flow through the reactor core with the heat being transferred to heat exchangers and the ultimate heat sink of the sea. At Fukushima the integrity of the cooling systems was compromised by the tsunami and made it difficult for the operators to sustain decay heat removal

Accident progression (summary only) Operators vented the reactor pressure vessel to relieve pressure, steam and hydrogen were discharged to primary containment (drywell), causing primary containment temperatures and pressures to rise Hydrogen explosions occurred (March 12, Unit 1: March 13, Unit 3: and March 15, Unit 2) while venting secondary containment, likely ignited by a sparks and hydrogen encountering free oxygen Hydrogen re-combiners, designed to burn vented hydrogen, did not operate probably because of power requirements

Unit 1 Hydrogen explosion of outer secondary containment building March 12, 2011

March 14, 2011 Unit 3 Hydrogen explosion

Hydrogen Explosion Unit 1 to 3, especially Unit 4

Emergency Actions Operating and emergency support staff used portable generators and portable pumps to inject seawater into the reactor vessels of and primary containments of Units 1, 2, and 3 via mobile fire trucks This had the effect of flooding the primary containment to cool the reactor vessel and any core debris that may have been released into primary containment. The seawater was the only cooling possibility but seawater effectively would render reactors unusable due to corrosion of fuel, coolant piping and reactor vessel, as well as leading to salt accumulation and clogging

Emergency Actions A general emergency was declared in response to the initial events at Unit 1, with evacuation of public within km of the plant: about 200,000 people evacuated Electrical power and cooling functions eventually restored, but much equipment is damaged and status unknown Offsite radiation and contamination, as a result of venting and the uncontrolled releases from hydrogen explosions and fires Potassium iodide pills distributed but not administered to public to minimize I-131 uptake in the thyroid Measures implemented to control affected contaminated food

Summary of a Complex Accident All 13 effected Japanese NPP units withstood a massive earthquake, with likely minimal damage, but 4 units were overwhelmed by the tsunami Seawall was 5.7 m but the tsunami was 14 m (the design basis was underestimated) Significant reactor core fuel damage to 3 units (full meltdown predicted at Unit 1), damage to fuel in some fuel ponds (Unit 4 undamaged, Unit 3 damage due to explosions) Loss of site emergency diesel generators on site was key. 3 staff fatalities (explosion and heart attack), 15 injured by hydrogen explosions and tsunami

Summary of a Complex Accident 1 indirect death, reportedly from suicide, of a local farmer after farming restrictions 4 hydrogen explosions in reactor buildings caused very significant structural and reactor equipment damage, fires in Unit workers received doses over 100mSv, 6 of them between 309 and 678 mSv. The dose limit was first set to 250mSv, and reduced to 100mSv in August workers were hospitalized for severe burnings due to beta – radiation, they received doses around 180mSv A perspective on dose comparisons: mSv is typical radiation dose to the bronchial tissue, from smoking 1.5 packs of cigarettes per day from polonium-210 inhalation, every two years, and - One CT scan can give a dose of about 30 mSv

Summary of a Complex Accident Over 200,000 people evacuated from the area, ground contamination up to 50 km from site Huge Japanese economic and financial consequences Nuclear industry worldwide: future increased safety vigilance and costs; international scrutiny (IAEA) Nuclear ‘renaissance’ projects worldwide now on hold or being reviewed TEPCO has said it may take the rest of the year to bring the plant back under control The world’s worst industrial accident (Bhopal) far exceeded Fukushima in human toll, but likely not in economic consequences

Major Accident Contributors Underestimation of maximum earthquake Tsunami height Location of safety related systems in buildings (Diesel) No backfitting of pressure relief pipes No filters in pressure relief pipe No H 2 recombinators

International Nuclear Event Scale INES

Contaminated Water in m 3 low active water released to the sea to increase capacity for high active water mainly from Unit 1+2 Daily 1200m 3 of high active water treated by filters ion-exchange and reverse osmosis Floating barge 136 m x 46 m to increase storage capacity m 3 already treated, m 3 still remains to be treated

Contaminated Water in 2013 Tepco Releases Contaminated Water Into Sea At Fukushima 1,130 tonnes of water below 30 (Bq/ℓ) of strontium-90 released, this is safety limit imposed by Japanese authorities Rainwater built up inside enclosure walls around clusters of tanks containing contaminated water that was used to cool damaged reactors. Recent leaks of contaminated water were reported on 19 August 2013, water was discovered inside and outside a dike surrounding one of the water tanks. The storage tanks were built following the March 2011 accident at the plant to hold radioactive water. An estimated 300 cubic metres of water escaped from one of the tanks, leaving “hot spots” of pools of radioactive water. The concentration of caesium-137 was 1.7 Bq/ℓ or less. The Ministry of Environment standard for public bathing is 10 Bq/ℓ.

Stresstests for NPPs Total loss of all power supply (extern, emergency diesel, batteries) Total loss of cooling capacity including spent fuel ponds Effects of earthquake on water environment (ocean, river, dams, hydrostations upstreams, mud slides) Human deficiencies Aircraft crash and terrorist attacks considered through other national security actions

Stresstest Time Schedule Until Sept all operators had to check their NPP according to the stresstest conditions They had to report to the National Regulatory Body which evaluated the results and reported to the EU commission by December 2011 The EU Commission then recommended further steps to improve the safety of NPP‘s Web pages dedicated to public engagement:  engagement

Stress Tests: Participation All 14 EU Member States that operate nuclear power plants, plus Lithuania, Switzerland, and Ukraine

Stress Tests: Follow-up On October 4 th 2012 the EC published its position on the stress tests Totally 145 NPPs have been analysed The risk analysis for earthquake and flooding should be based for all NPPs on the year time frame On-site seismic instruments Containment filtered venting systems

Stress Tests: Follow-up Equipment to fight severe accidents Backup emergency control room Nuclear insurance and liability should be harmonized in Europe The Commission intends to report on the implementation of the stress test recommendations in June

Conclusion Acivity release to the environment especially during explosions Depending on meteorology local short term increase of activity without reaching international emergency radiation limits outside NPP site Iodine pills distributed but not administered Activity continuously measured by radiation network both in air and seawater No radiological short- or long term effects exspected Cs-137 and I-131 were measured also in Austria with high precision equipment (€ )

What you should remember All operating NPPs were shut down by earthquake sensors without any damage The tsunami destroyed all possible power supply systems In this case core temperature increases rapidly and fuel elements were destroyed both in the core and in the spent fuel pool as no cooling was possible Mainly Iodine-131 and Cs-137 were released Hydrogen explosion took place due to Zr-H 2 O reaction No excessive overexposure of public Four staff members were killed by mechanical accidents

References tm(=on-line radiation data in all provinces) M.Braun AREVA PPT vom R.Michel IRS, Leibnitz Universität Hannover NucNet News in Brief No th May 2011 NUCNET News in Brief FORATOM NachrichtenOn-line Information