May 22nd & 23rd 2007 Stockholm EUROTRANS: WP 1.5 Task 1.5.4 Containment Assessment IP-EUROTRANS DOMAIN 1 Design WP 1.5 Safety Assessment of the Transmutation.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
NuScales Passive Safety Approach Update September 2011 Contact Information: Bruce Landrey Chief Marketing Officer Dr. Jose N.
Advertisements

Generic Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR): Safety Systems Overview
WP 5 Safety and Transient Analysis Task 5.6 Containment and source term assessment for the ETDR LEADER Lead-cooled European Advanced DEmonstration Reactor.
Lesson 18 - Decay Heat DEFINE the term decay heat. Given the operating conditions of a reactor core and the necessary formulas, CALCULATE the core decay.
International Energy Agency Hydrogen Implementing Agreement Proposed Task on Hydrogen Safety.
Modeling boiling water reactor main steam isolation valve leakage using MELCOR Presented at the 21 st Annual Regulatory Information Conference March 10-12,
EUROTRANS – DM1 RELAP5 Model Evaluation with SIMMER-III Code and Preliminary Transient Analysis for EFIT Reactor WP5.1 Progress Meeting KTH / Stockholm,
EUROTRANS WP 1.5 Meeting FZK – Karlsruhe, November 27-28, 2008 FPN-FISNUC / Bologna EUROTRANS – DM1 EFIT Transients Analysis with RELAP5, SIMMER-III and.
Sheet 0 November 13 th -14 th, 2007, Madrid Task Containment Assessment IP-EUROTRANS DOMAIN 1 Design WP 1.5 Safety Assessment of the Transmutation.
AREVA NP EUROTRANS WP1.5 Technical Meeting Task – ETD Safety approach Safety approach for EFIT: Deliverable 1.21 Lyon, October Sophie.
Framatome ANP IP-EUROTRANS Meeting WP 1.5 Progress in safety approach development TEE, March Sophie EHSTER.
AREVA NP EUROTRANS WP1.5 Technical Meeting Task – Safety approach Madrid, November Sophie EHSTER.
EUROTRANS – DM1 Preliminary Transient Analysis for EFIT with RELAP5 and RELAP/PARCS Codes WP5.1 Progress Meeting Empresarios Agrupados - Madrid, November.
EUROTRANS: WP1.5 Technical meeting, Karlsruhe, November 27 – 28, XT-ADS DHR Conceptual Design L. Mansani
AREVA NP EUROTRANS WP1.5 Technical Meeting Task – ETD Safety approach Safety approach for XT-ADS: Deliverable 1.20 Lyon, October Sophie.
ARIES Meeting General Atomics, February 25 th, 2005 Brad Merrill, Richard Moore Fusion Safety Program Pressurization Accidents in ARIES-CS.
AREVA NP EUROTRANS WP1.5 Technical Meeting Task – ETD Safety approach Safety approach for EFIT: Deliverable 1.21 Stockholm, May Sophie.
Nuclear Plant Systems ACADs (08-006) Covered Keywords
Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors Final Presentation ESL Fall 2006 Anatoliy Borodin.
Main Requirements on Different Stages of the Licensing Process for New Nuclear Facilities Module 4.5/2 Design Geoff Vaughan University of Central Lancashire,
Fukushima Incident Preliminary Analysis, Consequences and Safety Status of Indian NPPs Part-1 Dr. S.K.Jain Chairman & Managing Director NPCIL & BHAVINI.
Risk-Informed In- Service Inspection (RI-ISI) Ching Guey.
Chapter 4 Nuclear Energy. Objectives Describe how nuclear fuel is produced. List the environmental concerns associated with nuclear power. Analyze the.
Analyses of representative DEC events of the ETDR
Work Package 2 Giacomo Grasso ENEA UTFISSM-PRONOC LEADER Work Package 2 meeting Madrid, May 8, 2012 Current status and organization of the work.
LEADER/ELECTRA Safety Workshop: Petten February 2013 IRSN presentation on its document “ Overview of Generation IV (Gen-IV) reactor designs Safety.
,Yalta,17-th Symposium of AER1 IMPACT OF CHANGED FUEL PERFORMANCES ON SAFETY BARRIER EFFECTIVENESS AT NORMAL OPERATION OF NPP WITH VVER A.V.
MODULE “PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL” SAFETY ASSESSMENT DURING DECOMMISSIONING SAFE DECOMMISSIONING OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Project BG/04/B/F/PP ,
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant Event Summary and FPL/DAEC Actions.
EUROTRANS – DM1 ENEA Activities on EFIT Safety Analysis ENEA – FIS/NUC Bologna - Italy WP5.1 Progress Meeting Tractebel / Brussels, March 17, 2006 G. Bandini,
KIT – University of the State of Baden-Wuerttemberg and National Research Center of the Helmholtz Association Institute for Neutron Physics and Reactor.
Main Requirements on Different Stages of the Licensing Process for New Nuclear Facilities Module 4.5/1 Design Geoff Vaughan University of Central Lancashire,
The Pilgrim Power Plant By Khloe, Oliver, Galina, Robert and Rachel.
1 Kaspar Kööp, Marti Jeltsov Division of Nuclear Power Safety Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) Stockholm, Sweden LEADER 4 th WP5 MEETING, Karlsruhe.
Page June 2015 OICA position on venting EVSTF-04-11e.
Nuclear Power Plant Meltdown Zach, Luke, and Nick.
Nuclear Power. Fission Uranium-235 Plutonium-239 Neutron 10n10n 10n10n 10n10n Strontium-90 Xenon-144.
Repository Design Overview Presented to: NSNFP Meeting Presented by: Joe Price Office of Repository Development April 13, 2005 Bethesda, MD.
Review of the operation scenarios and required manning of the activities P. Schnizer and L. Serio.
Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe in der Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft Technology of Transmutation TETRA - Preparation for FP6 - Presented by X. Cheng ADOPT meeting,
KIT – University of the State of Baden-Wuerttemberg and National Research Center of the Helmholtz Association Institute for Neutron Physics and Reactor.
Natural Convection as a Passive Safety Design in Nuclear Reactors
Nuclear Fission 6B Cheng Pui Ling (7) Tsang Wai Man(23)
International Atomic Energy Agency Regulatory Review of Safety Cases for Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities David G Bennett 7 April 2014.
Review of the operation scenarios and required manning of the activities P. Schnizer and L. Serio.
IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making Workshop Information IAEA Workshop Defence in Depth Safety Culture Lecturer.
Nuclear Power Plant How A Nuclear Reactor Works.
KIT – University of the State of Baden-Wuerttemberg and National Research Center of the Helmholtz Association Institute for Neutron Physics and Reactor.
Nuclear Power Plant How A Nuclear Reactor Works. Pressurized Water Reactor - Nuclear Power Plant.
JLAB Pressure Systems Considerations Ed Daly. Outline Introduction Federal Law - 10CFR851 Compliance JLAB Pressure Systems Program –Complies with 10CFR851,
16.2 – Nuclear Energy. Objectives Explain how a nuclear reactor converts nuclear energy to thermal energy. Describe the advantages and disadvantages of.
November 19th 2010, Bologna LEADER 1 1st LEADER PCC MEETING WP4 PLANT OPERATION, INSTRUMENTATION, CONTROL AND PROTECTION SYSTEM DESIGN.
IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making “Overview of Level 2 PSA” Workshop Information IAEA Workshop City, Country.
1.9. Safety assessment “School for Drafting Regulations on Radiation Safety, IAEA - Module 1 Regulatory framework for safety, authorization and inspection.
Workshop on Risk informed decision making on nuclear power plant safety January 2011 SNRC, Kyiv, Ukraine Benefits and limitations of RIDM by Géza.
Post-Fukushima Severe Accident Management Update Kim, Hyeong Taek KHNP- Central Research Institute July KINS Safety Analysis Symposium.
Version 1.0, May 2015 SHORT COURSE BASIC PROFESSIONAL TRAINING COURSE Module V Safety classification of structures, systems and components This material.
Radiological impacts from nuclear industrial facilities on the public and the environment : Their magnitude and the next 50 years forecast Sylvain Saint-Pierre.
BASIC PROFESSIONAL TRAINING COURSE Module V Safety classification of structures, systems and components Case Studies Version 1.0, May 2015.
Containment System (CNS)
Approaches and measures aimed at ensuring safety, preventing severe accidents in new RF NPP designs Gutsalov N.A. 10/03/2016.
Pressurized Water Reactor
9.5 Nuclear Power Although nuclear power does not come from a fossil fuel, it is fueled by uranium, which is obtained from mining and is non-renewable.
Sandia National Laboratories
BASIC PROFESSIONAL TRAINING COURSE Module III Basic principles of nuclear safety Case Studies Version 1.0, May 2015 This material was prepared.
Session Name: Lessons Learned from Mega Projects
Group 1 Best Group.
Version 1.0, May 2015 SHORT COURSE
RSFs & categorisation 20 May, 2019.
Approaches and measures aimed at ensuring safety, preventing severe accidents in new RF NPP designs Gutsalov N.A. 10/03/2016.
Presentation transcript:

May 22nd & 23rd 2007 Stockholm EUROTRANS: WP 1.5 Task Containment Assessment IP-EUROTRANS DOMAIN 1 Design WP 1.5 Safety Assessment of the Transmutation System Design

May 22nd & 23rd 2007 Stockholm EUROTRANS: WP 1.5 Task Containment Assessment Scope EUROTRANS Detailed Implementation Plan 3rd DIP, WP1.5 objectives: Perform scoping assessment of the source term and the containment and to determine if there are no show-stoppers EUROTRANS Detailed Implementation Plan 3rd DIP, Task 1.5.4: “This task is concerned with the analysis of the integrity of the containment and its leak tightness to keep any fission products released from the vessel from escaping the containment. The adequacy of the containment systems proposed by the designers will be addressed by assessing thermal and pressure loading of the containment due to release of coolant and melt from the vessel. LWR containment codes may be modified for this purpose. Transport of the fission product and polonium compounds in the containment will also be considered”.

May 22nd & 23rd 2007 Stockholm EUROTRANS: WP 1.5 Task Containment Assessment ADS Safety Barriers For fission products: Fuel cladding Primary coolant boundary Containment For spallation products: Target boundary Accelerator isolation/Primary coolant boundary Containment

May 22nd & 23rd 2007 Stockholm EUROTRANS: WP 1.5 Task Containment Assessment The Containment System Safety Functions: fission product confinement and control protection against external events biological shielding

May 22nd & 23rd 2007 Stockholm EUROTRANS: WP 1.5 Task Containment Assessment Fission product confinement and control Limitation of radionuclide releases Fission and spallation product removal mechanisms containment isolation leak tightness Containment integrity structural behaviour energy management system

May 22nd & 23rd 2007 Stockholm EUROTRANS: WP 1.5 Task Containment Assessment Fission and spallation product removal mechanisms Definition of radioactive products liberation to containment in different DBC and DEC Special care with the consideration of severe accident conditions Identification of the need for radioactive products removal means

May 22nd & 23rd 2007 Stockholm EUROTRANS: WP 1.5 Task Containment Assessment Containment isolation: Containment isolation provisions shall be designed to assure that fluid lines which penetrate the Primary Containment boundary are isolated in the event of DBC or DECs, so as to minimise the release of radioactivity to the environment. Also applicable to accelerator tube. Leak tightness: Containment shall be designed leaktight with a maximum leak rate compatible with dose limits considering design pressure.

May 22nd & 23rd 2007 Stockholm EUROTRANS: WP 1.5 Task Containment Assessment Energy management system. Heat removal from damaged fuel and containment. Severe accident DEC with core damage. Identification of fuel damage sequences Possible need of a heat removal system from the containment after core damage.

May 22nd & 23rd 2007 Stockholm EUROTRANS: WP 1.5 Task Containment Assessment Structural Behaviour The Primary Containment structure shall be designed to assure adequate performance in all plant conditions considered in the design process and specifically in DBC, testing, and DEC.

May 22nd & 23rd 2007 Stockholm EUROTRANS: WP 1.5 Task Containment Assessment Protection against external hazards Natural external hazards The Containment System structures shall be designed to cope with the natural Hazards, including earthquakes. Man- made external hazards The Containment System shall be designed to cope with man- made external hazards without loss of its structural integrity. An aircraft crash will not prevent reactor safe shutdown. Therefore no significant release of fission products will occur inside the containment and two Barriers will be assured even if the containment design leakrate cannot be proven under these conditions.

May 22nd & 23rd 2007 Stockholm EUROTRANS: WP 1.5 Task Containment Assessment Biological shielding The Containment System shall be designed to limit, in all plant conditions, the exposure of on- site personnel and population to radiation generated by the primary circuit and associated systems. This function is accomplished mainly by concrete structures inside the Primary Containment and the containment concrete wall.

May 22nd & 23rd 2007 Stockholm EUROTRANS: WP 1.5 Task Containment Assessment Subtasks definition Conditions associated to representative events analysed (DBC and DEC) Subtask a Evaluation of analysed representative events in relation to any sequences that may imply radioactive releases and/or release of mass and energy from the reactor vessel or from other related systems, such as steam or feedwater pipe ruptures Subtask b Identification of potential severe accident scenarios and definition of associated conditions related to containment/confinement requirements Subtask c Evaluation of possible hydrogen generation and the eventual possibility of reaching explosive concentrations depending on the hydrogen mass generated and the free volume of locations in which it can accumulate. Subtask d Based on the above results, a list of potential initiators and accident/release sequences including the associated mass and energy release estimate will be elaborated under this subtask.

May 22nd & 23rd 2007 Stockholm EUROTRANS: WP 1.5 Task Containment Assessment Subtasks definition Source Term Behaviour Subtask a Bounding definition of potential releases to the containment and its behaviour on the basis of the different source term information available from Work Package and the above analyses Subtask b Fission products and Polonium transport mechanism will also be evaluated. Subtask c The potential dose to the operators and the environment from the above source terms will be calculated. Subtask d Recommendations, if required, for radioactive and fission product removal will be analysed.

May 22nd & 23rd 2007 Stockholm EUROTRANS: WP 1.5 Task Containment Assessment Subtasks definition Containment Requirements for the XT-ADS and EFIT Designs Subtask a Evaluation of containment function performance requirements for both designs, based on the data gathered from the above activities and WP 1.2 results Subtask b Evaluation of containment function taking into account the main features related to the following: Limitation of radionuclide releases (confinement function) Containment integrity Subtask c Evaluation of other features such as protection against external hazards, HVAC/Filtering requirements or biological shielding Subtask d Consideration of specific conditions that may be imposed on containment and confinement requirements

May 22nd & 23rd 2007 Stockholm EUROTRANS: WP 1.5 Task Containment Assessment Subtask Responsibilities The Task Partners are: KTH, FZK and EA The following split of responsibilities for the elaboration of Task deliverables is proposed: Subtask aFZK Subtask bKTH Subtask cKTH Subtask dEA Subtask aFZK/KTH Subtask bFZK/KTH Subtask cEA Subtask aEA Subtask bEA Subtask cEA Subtask d EA

May 22nd & 23rd 2007 Stockholm EUROTRANS: WP 1.5 Task Containment Assessment Deliverables to be issued under this Task: D1.63Report on Containment Assessment for XT-ADS Month 40 D1.65Report on Containment Assessment for lead cooled EFIT Month 40 Related Source Term reports: D1.62Report on Source Term Assessment for XT-ADS Month 33 D1.64Report on Source Term Assessment for EFIT Month 39 Convenient to have some preliminary information on source term in advance to start bounding dose calculations

May 22nd & 23rd 2007 Stockholm EUROTRANS: WP 1.5 Task Containment Assessment The following index, and input elaboration of responsibilities, is proposed for the Deliverables of this Task Deliverable Chapter 1Introduction and Purpose 2General Safety Criteria. Containment Criteria 3General Functions of the Containment 4Barriers Against the Release Of Radioactive Products 5DBC. Containment Design Requirements 6DEC. Containment Design Requirements 7Source Term Behaviour 8Summary of Containment Design Requirements Responsible EA ALL KTH/FZK EA

May 22nd & 23rd 2007 Stockholm EUROTRANS: WP 1.5 Task Containment Assessment Budget The assigned total budget allocation for Task is as follows: EA4 m/m FZK4 m/m KTH4 m/m