Desynchronization Attacks on Watermarks

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Presentation transcript:

Desynchronization Attacks on Watermarks Zhouyun Xu 269596

Content Introduction AWGN Attack on Blind Watermarking Desynchronization Attack A Channel Model for Desynchronization Attack Conclusion

Introduction Digital watermarking is the art of communicating information We consider digital watermarking as a communication problem, where the watermark communication channel is characterized by possible attacks against the embedded watermark

Blind Watermark In many applications, the original document cannot be used during watermark reception, which is denoted as blind watermark reception or more generally blind watermarking. We only talk about blind watermark here

AWGN attack It is the addition of white Gaussian noise (AWGN) The analysis of extended attack scenarios can often be based on the analysis of the AWGN attack It can be applied easily so that each watermarking scheme should show good robustness at least against it

Synchronization? The watermark receiver can look for the watermark information exactly at the same position where it has been embedded In real-world scenarios, this assumption does not hold necessarily An attacker may intentionally modifies the watermarked document in order to desynchronize the watermark receiver

AWGN Attack on Blind Watermarking Digital watermarking a communications problem which can be described as communication channel

The encoder derives from the watermark message m and the host signal x an appropriate watermark signal w which is added to the host signal to produce the watermarked signal s w must be chosen such that the distortion between x and s is negligible

The watermarked signal s might be processed,which gives a signal r Such processing potentially impairs watermark communication and thus is denoted as an attack against the embedded digital watermark. Finally, the receiver must be able to decode the watermark message from the received (attacked) signal r

Both, encoding and decoding, depend on a key sequence k, which ensures that only authorized parties can embed, decode, and modify the embedded watermark message m (will be talked about later) The structure is displayed as follow:

Watermark signal w which can be chosen independently from the host signal x spread-spectrum (SS) watermarking: a Gaussian watermark signal with:

For blind SS watermark re-ception, the unknown host signal x is considered as unavoidable interference. Watermark capacity of SS watermarking for Gaussian host signals and AWGN attacks is

In 1999, Costa showed theoretically that for a Gaussian host signal of power a watermark signal of power and AWGN of power The maximum rate of reliable communication capacity is

The result is surprising since it shows that the host signal x need not be considered as interference at the decoder although the decoder does not know x. But: It depends on a random codebook which must be available at the encoder and the decoder. This codebook may be so large that neither storing it nor searching it is not practical

Scalar Costa Scheme For SCS watermarking, the watermark message m is encoded into a sequence of watermark letters d, where in case of binary SCS. Each of the watermark letters is embedded into the corresponding host elements x[n]. The embedding rule for the nth element is given by:

Here, is denotes scalar uniform quantization with step size The key k is a pseudo-random sequence with This embedding scheme depends on two parameters: the quantizer step size and the scale factor

Watermark decoding from the received signal r is based on the pre-processed received signal y. The extraction rule for the nth element is

The basic properties of binary SCS watermarking can be demonstrated by the probability density function (PDF) of the transmitted signal s and the PDF of the extracted signal y Watermark-to-Noise power Ratio (WNR)

One period of the PDF is of the transmitted and the received signal for binary SCS . The filled areas represent the probability of detection errors assuming d = 0 was sent. The dotted line in the lower plot depicts the PDF when detecting with a wrong key k.

Desynchronization Attacks Early desynchronization attacks consisted of rather simple global affine transformation, which now can be recovered easily. Random bending attack: small local geometric distortions

StirMark applied to a regular grid

For this attack, a smooth transformation of the sampling grid is applied which desynchronizes a simple watermark detector. Thus, preprocessing prior to standard watermark detection is required to enable watermark detection We assume that resynchronization has been performed on the received data so that only a jitter in the sampling grid remains as the effective distortion

A Channel Model for Desynchronization Attacks s[n] = x[n] + w[n] denote the discrete watermarked signal . This signal corresponds to the critically sampled continuous signal s(t) which is bandlimited to where T denotes the width of one sampling interval. Then, denotes the resampled signal, where an offset in the sampling grid has been introduced. Assuming ideal interpolation, dfdf can be computed from with:

where Further signal distortions due to attack operations are described by an additive noise source v[n] with power , so that the received attacked signal is given by

Next, the nth received signal sample r[n] is decomposed into a component derived from the nth watermarked sample s[n] and additional contributions from samples with which gives

corresponds to the information bearing signal component, and describes Inter-Symbol-Interference (ISI). We assume that ISI is unavoidable interference for SCS watermark detection. Further, we assume in the following that the watermarked signal is white and Gaussian distributed with a power of

The power of the attenuated watermark after the warping operation : In turn, the resulting noise power contains now the ISI term from and the AWGN v[n]:

Another interesting value is the Attack to Interference Power Ratio (AIR), which is defined as

Watermark Capacity for Imperfectly Synchronized Reception SCS watermarking has been introduces as a powerful blind watermarking technology. Significant gains over state-of-the-art SS watermarking are predicted due to the host-signal independence of blind SCS watermarking

The described channel model for imperfectly synchronized watermark detection shows that the strength of ISI interference is strongly dependent on the host signal, in particular on the DWR

In SCS, the side-information about the host signal x at the encoder is exploited in a quite simple way. That is, the watermark sample w[n] is chosen such that interference from x[n] during blind watermark detection vanishes or is negligible at least. The infuence of samples x[n + v], for v ≠ 0, which contribute strongest to the total ISI, is not considered during SCS water-mark embedding

the performance of SCS in case of desynchronization attacks is no longer host signal independent. As soon as there is a desynchronization attack and this attack cannot be reversed perfectly, SCS suffers from host signal interference similar to SS watermarking

We assume that the ISI has a Gaussian distribution, which is reasonable for a white and Gaussian host signal x. Then, the capacity of SCS watermarking after AWGN and desynchronization attacks can be obtained from the the capacity of SCS watermarking facing a simple AWGN attacks using the effective watermark-to-noise ratio as derived before

Conclusions and Future Research SCS suffers from inter-symbol-interference (ISI) in case of imperfectly synchronized watermark detection. This is especially true for large document-to-watermark power ratios (DWRs), where ISI dominates other attack distortions. Thus, the propertyof SCS being host signal independent is no more true under desynchronization attacks.

For realistics DWRs, a synchronization error up to 10 % of the sampling interval is acceptable. For such accurate resynchronization,SCS watermarking performs for weak to medium-strong attacks still significantly better than SS watermarking. Very exact resynchronization plays a major role for this watermarking method to keep up a reasonable watermark capacity

Thank you!