How much about our interaction with – and experience of – our world can be deduced from basic principles? This talk reviews recent attempts to understand.

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Presentation transcript:

How much about our interaction with – and experience of – our world can be deduced from basic principles? This talk reviews recent attempts to understand the self-organised behaviour of embodied agents, like ourselves, as satisfying basic imperatives for sustained exchanges with the environment. In brief, one simple driving force appears to explain many aspects of action and perception. This driving force is the minimisation of surprise or prediction error. In the context of perception, this corresponds to Bayes-optimal predictive coding that suppresses exteroceptive prediction errors. In the context of action, motor reflexes can be seen as suppressing proprioceptive prediction errors. We will look at some of the phenomena that emerge from this scheme, such as hierarchical message passing in the brain and the ensuing perceptual inference. I hope to illustrate these points using simple simulations of perception, action and action observation.. Free energy and active inference Karl J. Friston, University College London No conflicts of interest or financial disclosures

Overview The statistics of life Markov blankets and ergodic systems simulations of a primordial soup The anatomy of inference graphical models and predictive coding canonical microcircuits Action and perception perceptual omission responses simulations of action observation

“How can the events in space and time which take place within the spatial boundary of a living organism be accounted for by physics and chemistry?” (Erwin Schrödinger 1943) The Markov blanket as a statistical boundary (parents, children and parents of children) Internal states External states Sensory states Active states

The Markov blanket in biotic systems Active states External states Internal states Sensory states

The Fokker-Planck equation And its solution in terms of curl-free and divergence-free components lemma : any (ergodic random) dynamical system ( m ) that possesses a Markov blanket will appear to actively maintain its structural and dynamical integrity

But what about the Markov blanket? Reinforcement learning, optimal control and expected utility theory Information theory and minimum redundancy Self-organisation, cybernetics and homoeostasis Bayesian brain, active inference and predictive coding Value Surprise (free energy) Entropy Model evidence Pavlov Ashby Helmholtz Barlow

Overview The statistics of life Markov blankets and ergodic systems simulations of a primordial soup The anatomy of inference graphical models and predictive coding canonical microcircuits Action and perception perceptual omission responses simulations of action observation

Position Simulations of a (prebiotic) primordial soup Weak electrochemical attraction Strong repulsion Short-range forces

Element Adjacency matrix Markov Blanket Hidden states Sensory states Active states Internal states Markov Blanket = [ B · [eig(B) > τ]] Markov blanket matrix: encoding the children, parents and parents of children Finding the (principal) Markov blanket A

Autopoiesis, oscillator death and simulated brain lesions

Decoding through the Markov blanket and simulated brain activation Christiaan Huygens

The existence of a Markov blanket necessarily implies a partition of states into internal states, their Markov blanket (sensory and active states) and external or hidden states. Because active states change – but are not changed by – external states they minimize the entropy of internal states and their Markov blanket. This means action will appear to maintain the structural and functional integrity of the Markov blanket ( autopoiesis ). Internal states appear to infer the hidden causes of sensory states (by maximizing Bayesian evidence) and influence those causes though action ( active inference )

The statistics of life Markov blankets and ergodic systems simulations of a primordial soup The anatomy of inference graphical models and predictive coding canonical microcircuits Action and perception perceptual omission responses simulations of action observation Overview

“Objects are always imagined as being present in the field of vision as would have to be there in order to produce the same impression on the nervous mechanism” - von Helmholtz Thomas Bayes Geoffrey Hinton Richard Feynman The Helmholtz machine and the Bayesian brain Richard Gregory Hermann von Helmholtz

“Objects are always imagined as being present in the field of vision as would have to be there in order to produce the same impression on the nervous mechanism” - von Helmholtz Richard Gregory Hermann von Helmholtz Impressions on the Markov blanket… Plato: The Republic (514a-520a)

Bayesian filtering and predictive coding prediction update prediction error

Making our own sensations Changing sensations sensations – predictions Prediction error Changing predictions Action Perception

Descending predictions Descending predictions Ascending prediction errors A simple hierarchy whatwhere Sensory fluctuations Hierarchical generative models

frontal eye fields geniculate visual cortex retinal input pons oculomotor signals Prediction error (superficial pyramidal cells) Expectations (deep pyramidal cells) Top-down or backward predictions Bottom-up or forward prediction error proprioceptive input reflex arc Perception David Mumford Predictive coding with reflexes Action

Biological agents minimize their average surprise (entropy) They minimize surprise by suppressing prediction error Prediction error can be reduced by changing predictions (perception) Prediction error can be reduced by changing sensations (action) Perception entails recurrent message passing to optimize predictions Action makes predictions come true (and minimizes surprise)

Overview The statistics of life Markov blankets and ergodic systems simulations of a primordial soup The anatomy of inference graphical models and predictive coding canonical microcircuits Action and perception perceptual omission responses simulations of action observation

Perceptual inference and sequences of sequences SyrinxNeuronal hierarchy Time (sec) Frequency (KHz) sonogram External states Internal states Sensory states

omission and violation of predictions Stimulus but no percept Percept but no stimulus Frequency (Hz) stimulus (sonogram) Time (sec) Frequency (Hz) percept peristimulus time (ms) LFP (micro-volts) ERP (prediction error) without last syllable Time (sec) percept peristimulus time (ms) LFP (micro-volts) with omission

Overview The statistics of life Markov blankets and ergodic systems simulations of a primordial soup The anatomy of inference graphical models and predictive coding canonical microcircuits Action and perception perceptual omission responses simulations of action observation

proprioceptive input Action with point attractors visual input Descending proprioceptive predictions Descending proprioceptive predictions

action position (x) position (y) observation position (x) Heteroclinic cycle (central pattern generator) Descending proprioceptive predictions Descending proprioceptive predictions

“Each movement we make by which we alter the appearance of objects should be thought of as an experiment designed to test whether we have understood correctly the invariant relations of the phenomena before us, that is, their existence in definite spatial relations.” ‘he Facts of Perception’(1878) in The Selected Writings of Hermann von Helmholtz, Ed. R. Karl, Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1971 p. 384 Hermann von Helmholtz

Thank you And thanks to collaborators: Rick Adams Andre Bastos Sven Bestmann Harriet Brown Jean Daunizeau Mark Edwards Xiaosi Gu Lee Harrison Stefan Kiebel James Kilner Jérémie Mattout Rosalyn Moran Will Penny Lisa Quattrocki Knight Klaas Stephan And colleagues: Andy Clark Peter Dayan Jörn Diedrichsen Paul Fletcher Pascal Fries Geoffrey Hinton James Hopkins Jakob Hohwy Henry Kennedy Paul Verschure Florentin Wörgötter And many others

Perception and Action: The optimisation of neuronal and neuromuscular activity to suppress prediction errors (or free- energy) based on generative models of sensory data. Learning and attention: The optimisation of synaptic gain and efficacy over seconds to hours, to encode the precisions of prediction errors and causal structure in the sensorium. This entails suppression of free-energy over time. Neurodevelopment: Model optimisation through activity- dependent pruning and maintenance of neuronal connections that are specified epigenetically Evolution: Optimisation of the average free-energy (free-fitness) over time and individuals of a given class (e.g., conspecifics) by selective pressure on the epigenetic specification of their generative models. Time-scale Free-energy minimisation leading to…

Searching to test hypotheses – life as an efficient experiment Free energy principleminimise uncertainty