Dr Marek Porzycki Chair for Economic Policy.  Underlying causes of the crisis  From credit crunch to sovereign debt crisis  Greece: insolvency of the.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Test 1. Currency Crisis Financial Crisis Banking Crisis Foreign Debt Crisis.
Advertisements

Fiscal policy and sovereign debt crisis in the EU Francesco Passarelli University of Teramo and Bocconi University.
Euro Challenge 2013 Delegation of the European Union to the United States The euro crisis: an update.
1 The European sovereign debt crisis and the future of the euro Peter Bekx European Commission Reykjavik, 19 February 2013.
Economic Experience and Crisis in the Euro Zone Carlos Hurtado* The Restructuring and Resolution of External Sovereign Debt World Bank. Annual Law, Justice.
Portugal: From financialization to crisis “Alternative solutions to the Debt Crisis”, Brussels, 07/03/2014 Portugal in the EMU: From financialization to.
Topics in EU Political Economy By Ivan F Dumka. Presentation Outline Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) –EMU in Overview –Key events –The Maastricht Treaty.
Eric Johnson.  The Euro: A Summary  History Lesson  Sovereign Debt Crisis  Future of the Euro  Q & A.
EU delegation to Norway The EU’s response to the financial crisis YS breakfast meeting János Herman, Head of Delegation Oslo, 29 September 2011.
Macroeconomic Policy in the Eurozone: Are There Alternatives to Slow Growth and High Unemployment? Mark Weisbrot, Co-Director Center for Economic and Policy.
Macroeconomic Policy in the Eurozone: Are There Alternatives to Slow Growth and High Unemployment? Mark Weisbrot, Co-Director Center for Economic and Policy.
C A U S E S International factors: -Increased Access to Capital at Low Interest Rates -Heavily borrow -Access to artificially cheap credit -Global finance.
Ireland’s Financial Crisis The Celtic Tiger Boom & Bust By: Griselda Hernandez, Jennie Duong, Driss Elouartallani.
Is the Euro Crisis Over? Klaus Regling, Managing Director, ESM International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies, Geneva 25 March 2014.
The European Monetary Union (the eurozone)
Student Name Student ID
The Shape of the EU Post Crisis Peter O’Shea Monash European and EU Centre January 2014.
European Policy Response and Regional Development: The Case of Greece Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, M. Nikiforos and Gennaro Zezza Levy Economics Institute.
16. December 2010 Perspectives on Financial Crises Perspectives on Financial Crises Discussion of Prof. Peter Diamond Gernot Doppelhofer.
Rescuing the eurozone: the right prescription? March 8,
Dr Marek Porzycki Chair for Economic Policy.  Treaty provisions on the euro  Euro regulations  Derogation and adoption of the euro  Opt-out  Convergence.
© 2011 wheresjenny.com Unemployment. © 2011 wheresjenny.com Unemployment NEWS Euro zone unemployment reaches all-time high.  The eurozone’s stagnant.
1 Financial Crisis (addendum) Savings and Loan Crisis (the S&L Crisis) Deposit insurance creates moral hazard Relaxed regulation permitted.
L E A D E R S H I P  P R O B L E M SO L V I N G  V A L U E C R E A T I O N © Copyright Alvarez & Marsal Holdings, LLC. All Rights Reserved. Alvarez.
Thoughts on developments in Euro area Ilmārs Rimšēvičs Governor of the Bank of Latvia June 8, 2010.
The sovereign debt crisis: towards fiscal union in Europe?
Why do PIIGS matter to the price of corn in Indiana? Philip Abbott.
The European Union and the Euro Crisis Layna Mosley Dept. of Political Science UNC Chapel Hill
Macroeconomics Prof. Juan Gabriel Rodríguez The Sovereign Debt Crisis.
Dr Marek Porzycki Chair for Economic Policy.  Underlying causes of the crisis  From credit crunch to sovereign debt crisis  Greece: insolvency of the.
Stefan Ingves Extra meeting of the Riksdag Committee on Finance 16 August 2011.
Strengthening the EMU and the European Financial Area after the Recent Financial and Economic Crisis MOCOMILA Academic Session in cooperation with the.
Dr Marek Porzycki Chair for Economic Policy.  Markets in which funds are chanelled from savers/investors (people who have available funds but no productive.
Alexander Consulting Enterprise 10/19/2015 Euro Crisis?
Crash, Euro crises and welfare futures. Outline: from 2008 to 2012 Why the crash in ? – On mortgages, banks and public expenditure How the disease.
ECON 5570: Money and Banking
Economic Policies Adopted by the European Central Bank Day 3 Group 4 MinhPhuong, Yu-Hin, ChingHung, Powen.
International finance The functioning of the euro area- current problems.
PRESENTATION TO THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY AFFAIRS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Brussels, 16 th March 2010 CARMINE LAMANDA SENIOR EXECUTIVE VICE-PRESIDENT,
Dr Marek Porzycki Chair for Economic Policy.  Optimum Currency Area (OCA) as the economic theory behind EMU  History of the Economic and Monetary Union.
Alexander Consulting Enterprise 1/10/2016 The European Union and the EURO.
Prof. Angel Saz-Carranza Director, ESADEgeo The European Union and The Interlocking Economic Crises 1.
Dr Marek Porzycki Chair for Economic Policy.  relaxation of collateral rules: acceptance of government bonds as collateral in monetary policy operations.
“Debt and Credit, Growth and Crises” Bank of Spain and the World Bank Madrid, Spain 19 June,
Much Ado about EMU Andrew K. Rose Berkeley, Haas 1Andrew Rose, EMU.
Global economic forecast May 13th GDP growth softened to 1.8% in the first quarter as consumer spending and confidence was hit by oil gasoline prices.
ABA Section of International Law Spring Meeting 2011 The Aftermath of the Financial Crisis – Part 1 Globalization of the crisis and European responses.
EU Debt Crisis Group 1 Day3 Pavlina Rucki, Tony Chen.
1 José Julián Sidaoui Banco de México Washington, June 2003 Critical issues in Financial Stability: Preventing and Confronting Bank Insolvency The Mexican.
Constitutional Resilience in Times of Crisis The Responses to the Eurozone Crisis and their Implications on EU and National Constitutional Law Martina.
Greek bailout agreements
Dr Marek Porzycki Chair for Economic Policy
Dr Marek Porzycki Chair for Economic Policy
The Assisted Countries
The ESM Dr. Nellie Munin.
GROWTH AND CRISIS IN THE European Policy Response: The Euro
The Greek disaster and the future of the EMU
Dr Marek Porzycki Chair for Economic Policy
A financial union By 2019 Beyond 2019
Economic and Monetary Union
Lecture 14. EUROPEAN POLICY RESPONSE:
Dr Marek Porzycki Chair for Economic Policy
Issues Regarding Implications for EMU-Integration of Europe‘s Policy Response to the Fiscal Crisis Prof. Dr. Wagner.
Measures taken By the ECB, EC, FMI to tackle the crisis
Dr Marek Porzycki Chair for Economic Policy
The European Union and the EURO.
Dr Marek Porzycki Chair for Economic Policy
Dr Marek Porzycki Chair for Economic Policy
Dr Marek Porzycki Chair for Economic Policy
Dr Marek Porzycki Chair for Economic Policy
Presentation transcript:

Dr Marek Porzycki Chair for Economic Policy

 Underlying causes of the crisis  From credit crunch to sovereign debt crisis  Greece: insolvency of the state  Ireland: oversized banking sector sunk by real estate bubble  Spain: drawbacks of common monetary policy  Cyprus: a bailout gone foul  Monetary response – ECB measures  Fiscal response – bailouts and stability mechanisms  Political response – the „fiscal compact” and quest for closer integration  Breakup of the eurozone?

 EMU as a political project to enhance European integration – was it justified from the OCA perspective?  Fundamental weakness: monetary integration not backed by fiscal integration  Inefficiency of the Stability and Growth Pact  Impossiblity of „one-size-fits-all” monetary policy for „core” and „peripherial” Member States – credit booms and real estate bubbles  Silent assumption of creditworthiness resulting from membership in the eurozone  similar interest rates on public debt of eurozone member states

 Subprime mortgage crisis and credit crunch in the U.S.  Global financial crisis, wave of failures in the financial sector in 2008  Lack of liquidity on the global financial market and excessive public debt in some EU member states (Greece, Portugal)  difficulties in accessing the financial market for re-financing public debt  Bursting of real estate bubbles in Ireland and Spain

 Structural weaknesses of the Greek economy - large budget deficits and excessive public debt - deficient tax collection - euro adoption based on misreported statistics  early 2010 – a new govt reveals true extent of the budget deficit (15,4% in 2009)  bond yields increased  difficulties in re-financing public debt  actual insolvency of the state – rating downgrades, risk of default  bailout loans (May 2010, July 2011 – Feb 2012)  austerity measures, EU/IMF programme supervised by the ‘Troika’ (Commission, ECB and IMF representatives)  debt restucturing – a nominal ‘haircut’ of 53,5% on Greek bonds  deep recession caused by austerity measures

 ‘Celtic tiger’ – dynamic economic growth before 2008  real-estate bubble and oversized banking sector  recession and collapse of real estate prices in 2008 hits the banking sector  2008/09 - blanket guarantee issued by the govt to depositors and holders of bonds issued by banks  bail-outs of banks caused budget deficit to skyrocket to 31% of GDP (2010)  actual insolvency of the state  November 2010 – bail-out loan by the EU and IMF  austerity measures, EU/IMF programme  differencies in economic outlook between Ireland and Greece

 underlying conditions: - dynamic growth fuelled partly by public spending before high unemployment and inflexible ‘two-tier’ labour market - real estate bubble  large exposure of banking sector to risk from real estate market  restructuring of the ailing banking sector  June 2012: EU bail-out loan to Spanish govt, for the financing of restructuring of the banking sector via a specific bank restructuring fund (FROB)

 underlying conditions: - role of off-shore financial center and ‘tax paradise’, with large involvement of Russian investors - oversized banking sector - relatively small size of Cypriot economy in relation to the whole EU  direct trigger: Cypriot banks were hit by write-off on their holdings of Greek govt bonds  request for bail-out loan from the EU  insisting of the Eurogroup on the involvement of bank creditors and depositors  first proposal (16 March 2013): ‘haircut’ would be imposed on all depositors, even those covered by the deposit guarantee scheme (below EUR)  closure of banks (‘bank holiday’) to prevent bank run until the final deal was reached

 resolution of two biggest banks, write-off of shareholders  protection of deposits up to EUR but imposition of significant losses on higher amounts (write-off and/or conversion into equity)  re-opening of banks together with ‘temporary’ capital controls (eased over time but still in place) - restriction on withdrawals - restriction on transferring funds abroad - restriction on sending payments abroad and exporting cash  fundamental question: are capital controls compatible with Treaty rules on free movement of capital (Art of the TFEU)?

 relaxation of collateral rules: acceptance of government bonds as collateral in monetary policy operations even despite rating downgrades  Emergency Liquidity Assisstance: provision of liquidity to distressed (but still solvent) banks  LTRO: longer-term refinancing operations  purchases of sovereign bonds on secondary markets - Securities Market Programme - Outright Monetary Transactions  extremely low interest rates

 bail-out loans to troubled Member States by EU and IMF  austerity measures taken within the framework of EU/IMF programmes (supervision by the ‘Troika’ of Commission, ECB and IMF representatives)  institutional framework: - EFSF: a special purpose vehicle incorporated as a company, capacity to raise up to 440 bn EUR (guaranteed by Member States govts) - EFSM: mechanism established by Commission, capacity to raise up to 60 bn EUR - European Stability Mechanism (ESM): a permanent mechanism initiated in Oct 2012, capacity of 500 bn EUR, based on the separate ESM Treaty - IMF involvement

 adding fiscal union to the monetary union?  Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (European Fiscal Compact), signed in March 2012  European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB): hosted by the ECB, tasked with systemic oversight of the EU financial sector, established in Dec 2010  European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs): ESMA, EBA and EIOPA – enhanced cooperation between national financial supervisors  proposal for a bank union – single supervision and single resolution mechanism in the EU

 Possible reasons for a break-up or withdrawal of a member state - stimulating growth by expansionary monetary policy - improving competitiveness by currency devaluation  Scenario 1 – negotiated withdrawal  Scenario 2 – expulsion  Scenario 3 – unilateral withdrawal  Legal aspects – euro adoption is irrevocable, there are no Treaty provisions on withdrawal from the eurozone. Cf. Art. 50 of the EU Treaty on withdrawal from the EU.  Economic aspects of a withdrawal or break-up.

 Ch. Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money, 7th ed. 2012: - Chapter 32, Withdrawal from the Eurozone, pp Additional:  Ph. Athanassiou, Withdrawal and expulsion from the EU and EMU: some reflections, ECB Legal Working Paper Series, no. 10, December 2009,  Euro break-up – the consequences, Report by UBS, 6 September 2011, l'euro.pdf l'euro.pdf  see also section „Current interest” on the course website