Ethics VIII: Morality & Advantage

David Gauthier: “Morality and Advantage” What is the relation between morality and advantage? Can duty be reduced to interest? Many argue that morality may require the agent to put aside considerations of his or her own advantage. Gauthier contends, if morality is to contribute anything to our advantage over and above prudence, it must offer something to advantage that prudence cannot. Kurt Baier: “[B]eing moral is following rules designed to overrule self-interest whenever it is in the interest of everyone alike that everyone should set aside his interest.” (736) Morality is designed to overrule prudence when it is to everyone’s advantage that it do so.

The Thesis Thesis Under Consideration: “Morality is a system of principles such that it is advantageous for everyone if everyone accepts and acts on it, yet acting on the system of principles requires that some persons perform disadvantageous acts.” (736) That is, each person would do better under this system than if: No system is accepted and acted on; or A similar system is accepted and acted on, but which never requires an agent to perform disadvantageous acts. “Disadvantageous acts” refers to acts which would be truly less advantageous than any alternative (in both the long- and short-term). Each person must gain more from the disadvantageous acts performed by others than he loses from the disadvantageous acts he performs himself.

The Thesis (cont’d) Gauthier hopes to show that the thesis could be true, but not necessarily that it is true (that a system of morality could work this way, but not necessarily that our current system does). Example: Suppose a simple system with only one rule: Everyone is always to tell the truth. If the Thesis is correct, then on such a system, each person will gain more from others’ truth-telling than she will lose from those occasions where it would be to her advantage to lie, but where she refrains from doing so. On the principle of the Thesis, whether or not one tells the truth will have no effect on whether others tell the truth.

A B Nuclear Arms Example Nations A and B are engaged in an arms race. Each possesses the latest in weaponry and recognizes that a full-scale war would be mutually disastrous. As such, A and B agree to a pact of mutual disarmament rather that continue mutual armament. A is considering whether or not to adhere to the pact. B A assumes disarmament will have disadvantageous consequences. A expects to benefit not from its own disarmament, but from B’s acts. If A were reasoning simply in terms of its immediate interests, A might decide to violate the pact.

A B A B Nuclear Arms Example (cont’d) Suppose B is able to determine whether or not A adheres to the pact. If A violates, then B will take this into account when considering its own actions. It would not be to B’s advantage to disarm alone, as B is in the same position as A. So, if A violates the pact, B is likely to do the same, dissolving the pact. Assuming A knows all this, its prudent course of action is to adhere to the pact. B Suppose B is unable to determine whether or not A adheres to the pact.

A B Nuclear Arms Example (cont’d) If A judges adherence in some particular situation to be disadvantageous, it will decide on the basis of prudence and immediate interest to violate the pact. Since B is unaware, A’s decision to violate will not affect B’s actions. Therefore, if A and B are prudent, they will adhere to the pact when their actions would be detectable, and violate the pact whenever their actions would be known. “[T]hey will adhere openly and violate secretly.” (738) The disarmament pact suits two aspects of the Thesis: Accepting the pact and acting on it is more advantageous for each, than having no pact at all. It requires each to perform disadvantageous acts—acts that run counter to considerations of prudence.

A B Nuclear Arms Example (cont’d) For the pact to fit the constraints of the Thesis, it must also be the case that the requirement of performing disadvantageous acts be essential to the advantage conferred by the pact. A and B must do better to adhere to the pact than to some other pact under which each must disarm only when their disarming is detectable. We can reasonably assume this to be the case: While A will gain by secretly retaining arms, it will lose by B also doing so, and the losses may outweigh the gains. While prudence would require violating secretly, each may well do better if both adhere under conditions of secrecy than if both violate. Supposing this to be the case, the disarmament case is formally analogous to a moral system, according to the Thesis.

A B Nuclear Arms Example (cont’d) Assuming each A and B have two choices—to adhere to, or to violate the pact, there are four possible outcomes. We can rank these outcomes in order of preference for each nation. (We can assume mutual violation is equivalent to no pact.) Mutual adherence is not the most advantageous for either. As each ranks mutual adherence above mutual violation, each gains less from its own violation than it loses from the other’s. adheres violates A B 2, 2 4, 1 1, 4 3, 3

A B Nuclear Arms Example (cont’d) Case (1): Adherence or violation is publicly known. Suppose each initially adheres to the pact. A notices that switching to violation moves its outcome from a 2 to a 1. But A realizes if it switches, B can also be expected to switch, moving from 4 to 3. With both now violating, A’s outcome will have moved from a 2 to a 3. So prudence dictates no change. adheres violates A B 2, 2 4, 1 1, 4 3, 3

A B Nuclear Arms Example (cont’d) Case (2): Adherence or violation is secret. Although A does not know B’s strategy, it knows that if B adheres, it is preferable that A violate. Likewise, if B violates, it is preferable that A violate. So regardless of what B does, prudence dictates A violate. B, of course, reasons the same way. This outcome, however, is mutually disadvantageous, since mutual adherence would be preferable to each over mutual violation. So prudence alone will not reap the maximum possible advantage. adheres violates A B 2, 2 4, 1 1, 4 3, 3

A B Nuclear Arms Example (cont’d) Return to Morality It is to the advantage of each to make it possible for the other to detect his own violations. Each must find it prudentially advantageous to ensure their strategies are interdependent, but this will not always be possible. Return to Morality According to the Thesis, morality requires some to perform genuinely disadvantageous acts as a means to greater mutual advantage. Those who are merely prudent will not perform the required disadvantageous acts. So violating the principles of morality, they disadvantage themselves. Each loses more by the violations of others than he gains by his own violations.

Return to Morality (cont’d) Since one gains from the sacrifices of others, one cannot secure the advantages of the moral system by himself. “If all men are moral, all will do better than if all are prudent. But any one man will always do better if he is prudent than if he is moral.” (739) So, why should I be moral? If all are moral, all will do better than if all are prudent. But any individual always does better to be prudent rather than moral, provided his choice does not determine others’ choices. “The individual who needs a reason for being moral which is not itself a moral reason cannot have it.” (740)

Return to Morality (cont’d) The rationally prudent man is incapable of moral behavior. The “moral” man (the man who is moral according to the Thesis) is prudent-but-trustworthy. One who is trustworthy adheres to a commitment he has made, regardless of advantage. However, the prudent-but-trustworthy (or “moral”) man is trustworthy only insofar as he sees the commitment as advantageous.

A B Return to Morality (cont’d) There are two characteristics commonly associated with morality: A willingness to make sacrifices; and A concern with fairness. B The “moral” man—being trustworthy—is required to make certain sacrifices, but these are limited in scope. Assume the government of A has developed a defense rendering A invulnerable to attack by B, which can be installed secretly. A now has to decide whether to take advantage by installing its defense, violating its pact with B, and establishing its dominance.

B A A B Return to Morality (cont’d) A reasons that: It will do better to violate no matter what B does; and It will in fact do better if both violate than if both continue to adhere to the pact. B A is now in a position to gain from abandoning the pact. Had this been the case from the beginning, A would never have had reason to enter the disarmament pact. A is prudent-but-trustworthy—but is A going to stick by the pact, now that it no longer considers it advantageous to do so? adheres violates A B 3, 2 4, 1 1, 4 2, 3

A B Return to Morality (cont’d) If A adheres to the pact in this situation, it makes a sacrifice greater than any advantage it receives from similar sacrifices of others. It must possess a capacity for trustworthiness greater than that ascribed to the merely prudent-but-trustworthy. The (fully) trustworthy man (or nation) is the one willing to adhere—and judges he ought to adhere—to his prudentially undertaken agreements even if they prove disadvantageous to him. “It is likely that there are advantages available to trustworthy men which are not available to merely prudent-but-trustworthy men.” (741) Only (fully) trustworthy men who know each other to be such will be able to rationally enter into such agreements.

A B Return to Morality (cont’d) “Our commonplace moral views do, I think support the view that the moral man must be trustworthy. Hence, we have established one modification required in the thesis, if it is to provide a more adequate set of conditions for a moral system.” (742)