Clustering and Sharing Incentives in BitTorrent Systems Arnaud Legout 1, Nikitas Liogkas 2, Eddie Kohler 2, Lixia Zhang 2 1 INRIA, Projet Planète, Sophia.

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Clustering and Sharing Incentives in BitTorrent Systems Arnaud Legout 1, Nikitas Liogkas 2, Eddie Kohler 2, Lixia Zhang 2 1 INRIA, Projet Planète, Sophia Antipolis, France 2 UCLA, Los Angeles, CA USA

2 BitTorrent Overview Web server Tracker coolContent.torrent random peer set P1P2P3 coolContent.xvid  Which peers to ask pieces from?  Which piece to download first?

3 Peer and Piece Selection  Peer Selection  Choking algorithm  Maximize performance  Foster reciprocation and penalize free riders  Piece selection  Rarest first algorithm  Enable high piece diversity Always find an interesting piece at any other peer Does not bias peer selection  Focus on peer selection

4  Choking algorithm  Local and remote peers  Choke and unchoke  Leechers: upload to the peers (regular unchoke) from which we are downloading the fastest Re-evaluate periodically (10s)  Optimistic unchoke Changed periodically (30s)  Typically: 3 regular unchokes + 1 optimistic unchoke  Seeds: refer to the paper Choking Algorithm

5 Choking Algorithm Properties  Does the choking algorithm  Converge to an equilibrium? Speed and stability  Provide effective sharing incentives? How much do I gain if I contribute  Reach optimal efficiency? How far is it from a 100% upload utilization What is the impact of the initial seed upload capacity on those properties ?

6 Outline  Background and Motivation  Methodology  Results  Fast Seed  Slow Seed  Conclusion

7 Methodology: Experiments  Instrumentation of around 40 peers on PlanetLab  1 single initial seed connected for the duration of experiment  40 leechers join at the same time (flash crowd) and leave as soon as they have the content  All peers (seed + leechers) use an instrumented client  Content: 113MB, 453 pieces (256kB each)

8 Methodology: Experiments  Leechers upload limit  U max is the maximum upload speed  Three-class scenario 13 slow leechers with U max = 20kB/s 14 medium leechers with U max = 50kB/s 13 fast leechers with U max = 200kB/s  Seed upload limit  Three types of experiments 200 kB/s, 100 kB/s, and 20 kB/s  No download limitation for leechers

9 Metrics  Clustering index (cluster creation)  Convergence?  Completion time (sharing incentives)  How does a peer’s upload speed affects its download speed?  Upload utilization (efficiency)  What is the peers’ upload utilization?

10 Outline  Background and Motivation  Methodology  Results  Fast Seed  Slow Seed  Conclusion

11 Peer Clustering: Fast Seed seed  Three-class scenario, averaged over all 13 runs  Seed max upload speed: 200kB/s  We see clusters per class  Two artifacts  Slow class squares are darker since peers take longer to complete  Peer 27 slower than other peers in its class (problem with a PlanetLab node): Reciprocates mainly with the slow leechers slowmedium fast Peer 27

12 Clustering Index  Clustering index of a peer P for class C  I C (P)=1 if P unchoked only peers in class C  I C (P)=0 if P unchoked only peers not in class C  I C (P)=0.3 if P unchoked peers uniformly at random (with 3 classes)

13 Peer Clustering: Fast Seed  Three-class scenario, averaged over all 13 runs  Seed max upload speed: 200kB/s  Each peer has a high clustering index to peers in its class  Peers of a specific class prefer to unchoke peers in the same class th 10th Clusters of peers in the same class

14 Sharing Incentive: Fast Seed  Three-class scenario, for all 13 runs  Seed max upload speed: 200kB/s  Fast peers complete close to earliest possible completion time  The more you contribute the faster you complete Earliest possible completion time Effective sharing incentive

15 Upload Utilization: Fast Seed  Three-class scenario, for all 13 runs  Seed max upload speed: 200kB/s  Each dot is the average upload utilization over all peers for a single run  Upload utilization close to 1  Room for improvement at the beginning (bandwidth matching to improve cluster formation) High upload utilization

16 Outline  Background and Motivation  Methodology  Results  Fast Seed  Slow Seed  Conclusion

17  Three-class scenario, averaged over all 8 runs  Seed max upload speed: 100kB/s seed Peer Clustering: Slow Seed No discernible clusters Fast peers break all clusters

18 Sharing Incentive: Slow Seed  Three-class scenario, for all 8 runs  Seed max upload speed: 100kB/s  Most peers complete close to the earliest completion time  Choking algorithm does not provide effective sharing incentive when the seed is underprovisioned  Earliest completion time longer than with a fast seed Earliest possible completion time No effective sharing incentives

19 Upload Utilization: Slow Seed  Three-class scenario, for all 8 runs  Seed max upload speed: 100kB/s  Each dot is the average upload utilization over all peers for a single run  Still fairly high upload utilization  With an initial seed at 20kB/s the upload utilization falls to 0.2 Upload utilization depends on seed upload speed

20 Outline  Background and Motivation  Methodology  Results  Fast Seed  Slow Seed  Conclusion

21 Conclusion  Seed provisioning is critical to the choking algorithm’s effectiveness  Well-provisioned initial seed  Cluster formation, effective sharing incentive, good upload utilization  Underprovisioned initial seed  No clustering, ineffective sharing incentives, upload utilization can still be high  What is the practical impact of these results?

Conclusion  It has been known that the initial seed upload speed is critical to the service capacity of torrents in their starting phase  We have shown that it is also critical to the robustness of the torrent to free riders  Rule of thumb  Depends on how many fast peers there are  Would be nice to model 22 The seed should be at least as fast as the fastest leechers to support a robust torrent during the startup phase

Clustering and Sharing Incentives in BitTorrent Systems Questions? Instrumented client available at: Arnaud Legout, Nikitas Liogkas, Eddie Kohler, Lixia Zhang