Authority & Democracy Political Obligation II: Natural Duties and Associative Reponsibilities

Natural duty view Natural Duty of Justice: ‘first, we are to comply with and to do our share in just institutions when they exist and apply to us; and second, we are to assist in the establishment of just arrangements when they do not exist, at least when this can be done with little cost to ourselves’ (Rawls, 1971, p. 351).

Wellman’s samaritan theory Wellman grounds political obligation in state benefits, but focuses on benefits provided to other people rather than to ourselves. We have a duty to obey the state because this is the only way to save others from the perils of the state of nature. NB: Since we do not expect that a person in danger has to accept our help explicitly before we aid her, we do not need to give any account of the acceptance conditions required for such aid being justified.

Structure of Wellman’s argument (1) States provide vitally important benefits; (2) These benefits could not be secured in the absence of states; (3) States can provide such benefits without imposing unreasonable costs upon their citizens. Car example “State’s nonconsensual coercion of its citizens is morally analogous to Beth’s nonconsensual borrowing of Cathy’s car insofar as each is necessary ‘to prevent extremely unhappy occurrences.’”

Legitimacy  Political Obligation Without citizens’ compliance states would not be able to perform their functions if enough people did not support them. But not everyone’s support is necessary. Doe everyone have PO? Fair-play approach complements the Natural Duty approach NB: pluralist approach (J. Wolff, Klosko, Renzo)

What kind of duty? Rawls, Buchanan: Duty to realize justice Christiano: Duty to realize equality Wellman: Samaritan duty Renzo: Duty not to expose others to dangers NB: positive duties vs negative duties

Particularity Requirement Particularity requirement: “that we are only interested in those moral requirements [including obligations and duties] which bind an individual to one particular political community, set of political institutions, etc.” (1979, p. 31; emphasis in original). Can natural duty theories account for the particularity requirement?

Transactional Theories Transactional theories ground political obligation in some kind of interaction between the state and its citizens. (Contract, Fair- play) Appeal: PO is treated as something that individuals choose to incur, rather than as an imposition. Problem: under-inclusiveness  Cannot account for Universality

Natural duty theories Natural duty theories ground PO in some moral duty that all individuals owe to all human beings, regardless of any transaction. (E.g. promote justice, promote utility). Appeal: These theories account for universality, Problem: overinclusiveness  cannot account for Particularity

Three requirements for a theory of Political Obligation Universality: everyone living on the territory of the state has a duty to obey the law Particularity: political obligation involves a duty to obey the laws of a particular state (the one to which we belong); Generality: political obligation involves a prima facie obligation to obey all the laws of the state any time we are in a position to do so

Associativism PO is grounded in our occupation of certain social roles. These roles have not been voluntarily entered, but are duty-laden, and thus generate obligations. Compare: Family obligations, friendship obligations. NB: Associativism seems able to account both for universality and particularity because the theory grounds a duty to obey the law for all and only the members of the political community.

Objections 1)Do associative obligations exist? 2)If they do, can they be ultimately reduced to transactional obligations? 3)If they exist and create genuine moral obligations, can they ground political obligation?

Structure of Associativism ‘Commonplaces’ about the way we relate to our polity: -we regard taxes and legal punishment as conceptually distinct from theft and the mere threat of harm. -we feel pride or shame in relation to the actions of our polity -we normally accept that the polity can act in our name, thereby committing us in many ways -we generally accept that we are answerable for what our polity does, whether or not we support its policies

Structure of Associativism “Our membership of a particular polity not only shapes our lives in a causal sense, it also enters conceptually and morally into the way we think about ourselves, our relationships with others, in what we feel and how we think about what we should do” (J. Horton, Political Obligation) “Proof” of PO Vs drawing our attention to the many ways in which we think of ourselves as members of a polity

2 steps in the Associativist argument 1)Our identity is determined by our being part of a specific political community (M. Sandel, C. Taylor) 2)Conceptual relationship between membership within the political community and the obligations owed to the community. Acknowledging that membership within the political community has non-instrumental value is to see the other members as sources of special responsibilities in virtue of our relationship with them.

Rejection of “External Justification” PO does not need an ‘external justification’ (based on an independent moral principle such as consent or a natural duty of justice). Hermeneutic effort aiming to uncover the social pre-conditions of our identity, and the role that political obligation plays within the relationships generated by them. 1)PO is constitutive of our relationship to our polity of which we are members 2)this relationship is constitutive of our own identity

Objections 1)Circularity: the commonplaces listed by associativists are a consequence of the fact that we grow up in political communities. Not what justifies our membership in these communities. 2)Individuals can be manipulated into identifying themselves with morally repugnant or degrading practices. manipulation objection repugnance 3)Do we need to accept somehow membership?

Answers to 2 Tamir: Associative obligations are only prima facie Horton: associative obligations can only be generated in the case of associations that have a minimal threshold of value “Institutions which give rise to moral obligations … exist within a wider context of other moral beliefs and commitments, … [and t]hese may set various limits to the moral obligations to which institutions can legitimately give rise” (Horton, Political Obligation)