ExperimenTor: A Testbed for Safe and Realistic Tor Experimentation Kevin Bauer 1 Micah Sherr 2 Damon McCoy 3 Dirk Grunwald 4 1 University of Waterloo 2.

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Presentation transcript:

ExperimenTor: A Testbed for Safe and Realistic Tor Experimentation Kevin Bauer 1 Micah Sherr 2 Damon McCoy 3 Dirk Grunwald 4 1 University of Waterloo 2 Georgetown University 3 UCSD 4 University of Colorado 4th Workshop on Cyber Security Experimentation and Test (CSET ’11)

What is Tor and why is it important? 1 Tor is a low-latency overlay network and a software package that allows you to use TCP-based applications anonymously Tor has an estimated 350,000 daily users world-wide and its network consists of over 2,500 volunteer-operated Tor routers Ordinary Citizens - Protect web browsing habits - Research sensitive or taboo topics - Circumvent censorship Corporations - Research the competition - Safeguard trade secrets Activists & Whistleblowers - Expose human rights violations - Promote democracy - Protest election results Law Enforcement - Online surveillance - Sting operations

Get router list Directory Server Tor uses layered encryption to hide your online behaviors Tor provides anonymity for TCP applications by tunneling traffic through a virtual circuit of three Tor routers using layered encryption Client Destination Circuit The Tor Network Entry Guard Middle Router Exit Router Communicating parties are unlinkable as long as the entry and exit routers do not collude Tor Router 2

Tor is still an evolving research network Past and current research aims to improve Tor’s: – Security and anonymity [CCS ‘07, NDSS ’08, USENIX Security ‘10] – Quality of service [USENIX Security ‘09, CCS ’10, PETS ’11] Problem: There is no standard methodology for conducting Tor research in a realistic and safe manner; prior methods include: 3 Network simulators Small-scale network emulation Abstract modeling Live Tor network Distributed research networks Realism Safety

ExperimenTor: A whole-network Tor emulation testbed Goal: Propose a standard experimental methodology 4 -Replicates all components of the Tor network in isolation -Reproduces plausible network conditions through scalable network emulation -Fuels experiments with empirically derived models Network simulators Small-scale network emulation Abstract modeling Live Tor network Distributed research networks Realism Safety Allows investigators to study global, whole-network effects ExperimenTor

Talk outline Motivating case studies from prior Tor research Challenges of building a Tor network testbed Design and implementation of ExperimenTor Early experiences and lessons learned Conclusions and future work 5

Case study: Whole-network PlanetLab experiments Uniform router selection: Probability of attack’s success is (c/n) 2, c malicious routers in a network of n total routers It is assumed that an attacker who controls an entry/exit pair can trivially link the communicating parties: traffic confirmation attack 6 Tor Client Destination Entry Guard Middle Router Exit Router Tor routers are selected in proportion to their perceived bandwidth capacities for load balancing, but malicious routers can lie [Bauer et al., WPES ‘07]

7 Experiment: Evaluated the attack on two small Planetlab deployments with 40 and 60 honest Tor routers Details: Sample the bandwidth distribution of the real Tor network Limitations: 1. Reduced scale 2. Need to run many measurements to find suitable PlanetLab nodes 3. Repeatability? [Bauer et al., WPES ‘07] Case study: Whole-network PlanetLab experiments (2)

Case study: Small-scale experiments with the live Tor network Tunable Tor was proposed to help users manage their risk of the previous attack 8 High anonymity High performance User-tunable router selection Skewed to high bandwidth nodesUniform selection [Snader and Borisov, NDSS ’08] Mean time to fetch 1 MB Experiment : Deployed one “Tunable Tor” client on the live Tor network Details: Measured download times at different “selection levels” Limitations: What happens when many Tor clients use Tunable Tor? Global effects?

A case for whole-network Tor emulation Goal: Capture all salient dynamics of the live Tor network and reproduce in isolation  Realistic and safe experiments Desired features: 1. Allow investigators to deploy small-scale, large-scale, or global changes to any part of Tor’s design 2. Should eliminate any risk to the live Tor network 3. Experimental results should be meaningful to the live Tor network 9 Our argument: All can be realized with whole-network Tor emulation

Design challenges Modeling the live Tor network is difficult – Tor routers: Bandwidths, guard statuses, exit policies? – Tor clients: How many? Applications? Behaviors? Large-scale network emulation – Emulab and DETER have limited and shared resources Need to run unmodified Tor and application code – Avoids re-implementation errors; promotes realism 10

Meeting the design challenges Modeling Tor routers: - Publicly-available router metadata from Tor’s directories - Historical router data aggregated by the Tor Metrics Portal 11 Replicate live Tor’s router state, or scale things up or down

Meeting the design challenges (2) Modeling Tor clients: Leverage existing empirical data on Tor clients and their behaviors 12 Instant Messaging [McCoy et al., PETS ’08] Also leverage existing empirical studies of HTTP traffic to emulate realistic workloads [e.g., Hernándes-Campos et al., MASCOTS ’03; Google web metrics 2010]

Meeting the design challenges (3) Modeling Tor clients: Leverage existing empirical data on Tor clients and their behaviors 13 [McCoy et al., PETS ’08] Instant Messaging Model the distribution of client traffic by connection and volume (GB)

Meeting the design challenges (4) Modeling Tor clients: Can also leverage publicly-available data about Tor clients from the Tor Metrics Project 14 Replicate live Tor’s client state, or scale things up or down

Meeting the design challenges (5) Large-scale network emulation with ModelNet [Vahdat et al., OSDI ‘02] – Emulates a specified network topology – Runs native code without modification – Commodity hardware and OSes; can be deployed at local institution High-level system architecture – “Emulator” machine: Emulates a network topology in a kernel module – “Virtual node” machine: Runs applications within the virtual topology Physical network (e.g., 1 Gbps) Linux FreeBSD “Emulator” Applications run on “virtual node” machines 16

Putting it all together 16 Prototype: FreeBSD 6.3 Linux Accompanying toolkit: - Topology generation - Configure Tor clients, routers, & directories - Run experiments & perform analyses Testbed and toolkit are publicly available

Early experiences ExperimenTor prototypes are deployed at four research institutions (single emulator) Used to support two ongoing research projects: – Evaluate the effects of link-based router selection – Re-design Tor’s congestion control and flow control Both projects require global design changes to Tor 17

Limitations and future work Scalability – Scaling experiments to Tor’s estimated 350K users is likely not possible; necessary to “down sample” Improve client and traffic models – Data on Tor usage are limited – Is it possible to emulate diverse versions and configurations of Tor users? 18

Summary and conclusion ExperimenTor is a whole-network emulation-based testbed and toolkit for safe and realistic Tor experiments Enables large-scale Tor experiments that: – Use real Tor router bandwidths to inform topology – Emulate Tor clients and their traffic – Enable experiments with global changes to Tor’s design – Can be deployed cheaply on commodity systems 19 For more information: